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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**HIGHLIGHTING EFFECTS OF CURRENT
GLOBALIZATION TENETS, NAMELY DEMOCRACY,
CAPITALISM, AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION, ON
THE ARAB ISLAMIC MIDDLE EAST**

by

David Lee Richardson Jr.

June 2009

Thesis Co-Advisors:

Robert Looney
Abbas Kadhim

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE June 2009	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Highlighting Effects of Current Globalization Tenets, Namely Democracy, Capitalism, and Cultural Transformation, on the Arab Islamic Middle East.			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR David L. Richardson Jr.				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis examines the shape of globalization in the Middle East, specifically with respect to three major elements of globalization, those of politics, economics, and culture. This thesis attempts to shed light on the importance and difficulties of fostering positive conditions, which could facilitate favorable terms for Islamic Arabs in the Middle East to fully embrace current globalization, thus increasing the region's and inevitably the world's prosperity and stability. Moreover, this thesis also addresses and analyzes the compatibility of Islamic Arabs in the Middle East with current globalization trends. Acknowledging that Middle Eastern globalization is a fairly large subject to cover, the scope of this research has been narrowed to answer the question of whether or not the acceptance of democracy, capitalism and cultural changes by Arab Islamic Middle Eastern societies, specifically the secular authoritarian regimes and the opposing Islamists organizations, could increase the prosperity and stability within the region, and if so, bring to light the obstacles which stand in the way of such progress.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Middle East, Globalization, Democracy, Capitalism, Cultural, Islam, Arabs, Muslims, Terrorism			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 137	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

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**HIGHLIGHTING EFFECTS OF CURRENT GLOBALIZATION TENETS,
NAMELY DEMOCRACY, CAPITALISM, AND CULTURAL
TRANSFORMATION, ON THE ARAB ISLAMIC MIDDLE EAST**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA)**

from the

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the shape of globalization in the Middle East, specifically with respect to three major elements of globalization, those of politics, economics, and culture. This thesis attempts to shed light on the importance and difficulties of fostering positive conditions, which could facilitate favorable terms for Islamic Arabs in the Middle East to fully embrace current globalization, thus increasing the region's and inevitably the world's prosperity and stability. Moreover, this thesis also addresses and analyzes the compatibility of Islamic Arabs in the Middle East with current globalization trends. Acknowledging that Middle Eastern globalization is a fairly large subject to cover, the scope of this research has been narrowed to answer the question of whether or not the acceptance of democracy, capitalism and cultural changes by Arab Islamic Middle Eastern societies, specifically the secular authoritarian regimes and the opposing Islamists organizations, could increase the prosperity and stability within the region, and if so, bring to light the obstacles which stand in the way of such progress.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my family and friends for their support and patience during the work in performing this thesis. I also would like to acknowledge and thank Professor Robert Looney and Professor Abbas Kadhim for their guidance, counseling, and leadership of which they provided an immense amount.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In Search of World Peace and Prosperity through the Embracement of Globalization in the Arab Islamic Middle East

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations . . . (world) peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty.¹

President Woodrow Wilson

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis examines the shape of globalization in the Middle East, specifically with respect to three major elements of globalization, those of politics, economics, and culture. This thesis attempts to shed light on the importance and difficulties of fostering positive conditions, which could facilitate favorable terms for Islamic Arabs in the Middle East to fully embrace current globalization, thus increasing the region's and inevitably the world's prosperity and stability. Moreover, this thesis also addresses and analyzes the compatibility of Islamic Arabs in the Middle East with current globalization trends. Acknowledging that Middle Eastern globalization is a fairly large subject to cover, the scope of this research has been narrowed to answer the question of whether or not the acceptance of democracy, capitalism and cultural changes by Arab Islamic Middle Eastern societies, specifically the secular authoritarian regimes and the opposing Islamists organizations, could increase the prosperity and stability within the region, and if so, bring to light the obstacles which stand in the way of such progress.

B. IMPORTANCE

The topic of this thesis originates from the issues which the world community, in general, has encountered due to the regional stagnation of the Middle East, which is attributable to the increased political, economic, and cultural turmoil created partly by the Islamists and the reactionary and irreversible military and police retaliatory actions that

¹ President Woodrow Wilson's "Declaration of War Message to Congress," April 2, 1917; Records of the United States Senate; Record Group 46; National Archives.

have occurred within the Muslim population of the Middle East. The objective of this thesis is to highlight the affects of current globalization and bring to ideas and solutions which could potentially help to marginalize or moderate hostility within the region, leaving more time, energy, and resources for the enrichment of the Muslim population at large, the Middle East region, and the world as a whole.

If we look at this crisis through a political, economical, and cultural lens, we may be able to postulate that Islamic Arabs could eventual and fully accept the influence of current globalization into the societies in which they reside. If acceptance of globalization can be obtained successfully in the Middle East, the effects of positive economic growth, political autonomy, and cultural modernity could light the pathway for Islamic Arab populations on the road to a better quality of life. Although easier said than done, in order to pursue this path to a better life, among many other issues, secular authoritarian regimes will need to adjust the political structure, Islamists will need to moderate there political agendas, and culture shifts within the populous will need to take place.

On the other hand, globalization is not just a one way street, and there is another variable in this equation. The states which are encouraging, fostering, and promoting current globalization and all its elements around the world have a responsibility too. Globalization will not be accepted at face value nor will it be accepted voluntarily, and by no means should it be forced upon the Middle East. Forcing globalization onto societies that are neither prepared for nor educated to the political, economical, and cultural changes that must preemptively take place in order to successfully globalize, will not only be counter productive to the globalization process, but will make it more difficult and possibly impossible to construct the necessary foundation upon which productivity and prosperity are in present day being built upon. Therefore, it is the responsibility of those encouraging globalization, in this case mainly western powers, to study and understand the Middle Eastern societies which hinder globalization. Those powers must understand the history, personality, and culture of those societies, and create relationships which will aid in the coordination of society tailored globalization learning. Lastly, and more importantly, Middle Eastern societies must be made aware and see the benefits of

fostering current globalization. The spark or ignition for globalization can be lit by external forces, but the oxygen, fuel, and heat to keep the fire going must come from within the society, and can only be done by a society which is educated on, passionate about, and truly comprehends globalization.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

With 9/11 in the world's rear view mirror and the Global War on Terror, or newly coined "Overseas Contingency Operations," currently in the driver's seat, what is next on the horizon? Could we be on the road to a Kantian like "perpetual peace?" If peace is in fact on the horizon, one must address the political, economical, and cultural turmoil associated with many of the Arab Islamic countries in the Middle East. Islam and its devout followers seem to be in the spotlight and under the microscope these days, but much of the media attention and resources seem to be directed not on the actions of the Muslim majorities but on those actions of the violent and radical Islamist minorities. Although military force is currently being used to quell the violent actions of such extremists, it seems to be only a short term solution to a rather long and complicated dilemma which has come to fruition due to feelings of repression, political exclusion, and social/cultural stagnation, in other words the roots causes of Islamists' actions and regional instability. In many cases, foreign military power and local police actions will continue to defeat individual violent Islamist groups, but other, potentially more violent and more global groups, will inevitably rise up and take their place. So, what other options are out there? I believe the answer rests not with short term band-aid like military fixes but rests with a true to concentration on the root causes Middle East instability.

As Peter Mandaville stated, "for many Muslims, globalization is still associated with Westernization and new forms of hegemony,"² in a sense globalization is one of the reasons for the Islamist revival. Islamism partially stems from the failure of secular Islamic revolutionaries and nationalists, of the past, to economically, militarily, and culturally globalize the Middle East. So, if failure of past globalization is the reason for

² Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 350.

the rise of Islamism, then certainly successful globalization could potentially be the cure. The answer thus lies in understanding and concentration on not just the Islamists' short term violence, but on a deeper understanding of the Islamists' true goals and root causes of frustration, the secular authoritarian regime power struggle, and how to blend and adapt globalization into a tasteful Middle Eastern flavor. Therefore, my hypothesis is two fold. First, that openly communicating and addressing the root causes that create obstacles and tension at the local and regional levels between secular authoritarian regimes, Islamists, and the trapped societies in between will help to create a better foundation for eventually fostering globalization in the Middle East. Secondly, that the building blocks which will be placed on that foundation of understanding will be shaped by encouraging current globalization forces, and melding or massaging globalization to fit into a Middle Eastern mold which can be accepted by the parties involved.

For many years theorists, scholars, and political leaders believed that conveying the idea of democracy, capitalism, and western culture to secular authoritarian states may eventually bring about a long term and positive solution to the problem of violent faction emergence, although this conveyance does not fully equal globalization.³ In the past, the debate amongst the Middle East and Arab world seemed to stem from the question of whether or not Islam and its Muslim followers were compatible with the idea of current globalization, and more specifically the ideas of democracy, capitalism, and cultural modernity. Today, this idea has been partially answered by the political events within Arab Islamic countries which resemble "democratic like" political progress and political learning, almost a hybrid between democracy and authoritarianism. For instance countries like Egypt and Morocco have recently allowed moderate Islamist parties into the political arena, for example the Wasat and PJD respectively. In cases like these, the resident Islamist groups began to exhibited signs of moving away from violence, and in other cases, publicly renouncing violence or other similar acts, in order to obtain or maintain their legitimate political status with the state. Again, this paper will reflect on the

³ Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism, Past and Present," in Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed.), *The New Global Terrorism*, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2002), 92–105.

compatibility of Islamic Arabs and current globalization, as well as the political, economical, and cultural conditions within the Middle East that could foster a type of compatibility with globalization.

D. METHODS AND SOURCES

The analytical approach to this thesis will be fairly linear in fashion. Initially, an attempt has been made to describe and lay out a description and definition of the term Globalization, especially in reference to the Middle East. Because of the various globalization definitions, several theories are introduced, from writers like Thomas Friedman, Martin Wolf, and Charles Wheelan, which generate a definition that is appropriate for the Middle East.

From this definition of globalization, I intended to use some case study analysis in analyzing the political elements of globalization, by using a variety of historical political cases which have had both positive and negative affects on the politics in the Middle East. I will use theories from Robert Dahl, Asef Bayat and Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Olivier Roy, Amin Saikal, Peter Mandaville, and other scholars, and focus on their examination of Islamic democratization and Islamist political inclusion.

Next, I will tackle the economic element of globalization with respect to Islam by examining the theories of Charles Wheelan, Frederic L. Pryor, Barry Rubin and others, as well as looking at some Middle East economic and statistical data (GDP, Religious Populations, and the like) over the past decade. Although I plan on addressing the theories of Islam and capitalism in this section I will also address this relationship in the political section, as well, by addressing its relative existence to and interdependence on the democratic principles.

Finally, I will address the cultural element of globalization by analyzing the works of authors like John Esposito and Marvin Gettleman, in order to gain insight into the Moderate Muslim world which I will then compare to the extreme violent Muslims examinations of Martha Crenshaw and Mary Habeck. I will also examine the works of

Sayyid Qutb and Raymond Ibrahim in order to gain a primal understanding of the Islamist mind. In order to tie these elements together I will again refer to authors like Amin Saikal and Mark Juergensmeyer.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW

In the introduction section, I have described the motivation for this thesis, which is to highlight the affects of current globalization on the Arab Islamic Middle East. By understanding some of these affects it may be possible to foster further ideas for melding current globalization with the Middle East, thus regaining prosperity and security in this part of the world and inevitably the rest of the world.

The body of the thesis will be divided up into four main sections. The first chapter will consist of a description of current globalization, Islamic obstacles to globalization, and ideological differences between the globalized and non-globalized worlds. The second chapter will consist of an examination of the political element of globalization, lightly addressing the questions about the compatibility of democracy and Islam, heavily addressing current Middle Eastern political regime troubles, and finally touching on the relationship between the fundamentals of democratization and the Islamic religion. The third chapter will examine the economic element of globalization and look at the reasons why the Middle East has done so poorly in the world market and shed some light on which obstacles need to be removed in order to get back in the game. The last chapter will attempt to examine the cultural element of globalization, focusing on the spectrum of Islamic followers, from the Islamic secularist to the extremely violent Islamist, to see what Middle Eastern cultural characteristics can be leveraged to marginalize the Islamist. Finally, in the conclusion, I will attempt to offer a collection of scholarly predictions about the road ahead and globalization in the Middle East.

II. GLOBALIZATION AND THE MIDDLE EAST

A. CULTURAL MODERNITY AND GLOBALIZATION

So what is Globalization? To understand this phenomenon properly we must first understand its components and how each one of them works individually and how they work together as a whole. Of course globalization is a quite complicated event with multiple variables which can be very misunderstood and misinterpreted. Barry Rubin of *YaleGlobal* provided a decent but broad definition of globalization, stating that “globalization refers to the spread throughout the globe of ideas, customs, institutions, and attitudes originated in one part of the world.”⁴ In a century where another round of globalization, of a Western flavor, is upon us, countries of the world are once again required to be flexible and adapt their cultures to the modern changes that are necessary for continued self growth and world growth. The topic of globalization is quite controversial and is being studied, written about, and debated on a daily basis around the world. The book *Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives* by Anthony Giddens and *The World Is Flat* by Thomas Friedman are examples of today’s ongoing globalization debate.

In an age where technology permits much of the world access to just about any information almost instantaneously, which in turn, increases the average person’s intelligence level; people in general are getting a taste of modernity and diversity and a chance to build a new and better life. Globalization, in the most basic sense, consists of cultural and social, economic, political, and even technological elements. Globalization itself is not a new concept, but in fact, has been around throughout the several hundred centuries. It is a constant process that ebbs and flows like the tide, but never truly goes away. Globalization tends to represent the ideas or ideologies of the most successful culture or society of the time. Globalization in the 21st Century has been portrayed by many as mainly Western in nature. That is, 21st Century Globalization has specific characteristics associated with its basic elements. This Western flavor consists of the

⁴ Barry Rubin, “Globalization and the Middle East: Part One,” *YaleGlobal Online*, 16 January 2003, 2. <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.print?id=744>.

specific elements of technical and social modernity, Western culture, capitalism, and democracy. With this understanding, globalization has deep generic roots in cultural modernity, which in the past has always been a threat to the tradition, especially in religious traditions.⁵

B. IS GLOBALIZATION A PARADOX OR AN ANSWER?

Another question to resolve is whether current globalization is self-sustaining or self-defeating. If history could speak, its answer would likely be, “like all forms of globalization in the past, it will eventually run out of steam.” It is evident that current globalization trends do have steam today, but for how long? Is globalization self-defeating? The answer is not as self evident as one might think, and may only be answered by analyzing past trends. Those Islamists who are battling against current globalization, in fact, use those same elements of globalization to fight against it, specifically world wide travel, technology, open borders, mass communication, media, and the internet, to name a few. Their goal is to disestablish and build up a resistance to globalization. Therefore, this creates a globalization paradox for those defending globalization. Can an Islamic culture accept globalization without being totally changed into an unrecognizable society by those same globalization elements?

With respect to the Islamists living in the Muslim world, globalization also creates a paradox which has not been recognized by those fighting against it. On the outside, Islamists seem to be fighting against globalization, but this needs to be examined more carefully. The fact is that Islamists, on the inside, are ultimately pro-globalization, but not of the Western kind described above. Islamists want to spread Islam, and they want the world under an Islamic umbrella, practicing an Islamic form of globalization. As described above, the paradox is that the Islamists are themselves using many of the same elements of current globalization in their fight against that same globalization and in the promotion of Islamic globalization. In other words, Islamists cannot attempt to defeat current globalization without using the elements of current globalization.

⁵ Barry Rubin, “Globalization and the Middle East: Part One,” *YaleGlobal Online*, 16 January 2003, 2. <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.print?id=744>.

C. GLOBALIZATION AND THE ISLAMIC “FATS”

Thomas Friedman stated that “politics in the flat world will consist of asking which values, frictions, and fats are worth preserving . . . and which must be left to melt away into the air.”⁶ Friedman hit the nail on the head with this point. There are obstacles standing in the way of globalization, i.e., the values, frictions, and fats as he has stated above. But then again, it is not as simple as it may seem to allow these things to just fly away. There is a dilemma and a paradox to deal with here. Predominately Muslim states want to maintain their Islamic identity, but without dissolving those identity “frictions” they will most certainly loose out on globalization, on the other hand if they fully accept globalization they in fact risk loosing some of their cultural and religious identity. So, can a state or people fully adapt to globalization without giving up their entire identity, “habits, cultures, and traditions?”⁷ The truth is, nations have been adapting and evolving to globalization for centuries. People and cultures have been adapting their identities in order to survive and some have traded in many of their “frictions” in order to compete and be successful in the global market, Japan and the U.S. for example. In many ways, in today’s society, one could look at the hierarchy (wealth and productivity) of the nations of the world, and correlated it to the amount of adaptation they have made with respect to globalization.

For example, religion, one of the most prominent frictions in the world, has been around for centuries. Many countries were founded and formed upon certain religious doctrine, and in many cases even went to war over it. Take for instance the United States, which is at the top of the hierological world power pyramid, was predominately founded by settlers who based their beliefs upon Protestant doctrine.⁸ Today, it can be argued that the United States, in general, is “Christian” based, but is also a nation which is very understanding, tolerant, and accepting of just about every other religious practice. That cannot be said about other countries of the world especially those that are intolerable of

⁶ Thomas L Friedman, *The World is Flat*, (New York: Picador 2005), 259.

⁷ Ibid., 236.

⁸ *CIA World Fact Book 2008*, s.v. “GDP,” <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html> (Accessed March 4, 2008).

other religions and less secular beliefs, therefore remaining at the bottom of the pyramid. Many countries in the Middle East fall into this later category.⁹

That is not to say people and cultures should give up their identity to be successful in today's global market. Moreover, states should plainly become more tolerant and understanding of other cultures and beliefs. Some fundamentalist groups, like Al-Qaeda, which would be considered a "friction" factor, would argue that becoming more tolerant or more secular is wrong for an Islamic nation. The fact is, this adaptation does not happen overnight. It is a generational evolution that takes place over time. The question then becomes how far should a nation go and how much (cultural, values, beliefs) should a nation give up or tolerate in order to get on the globalization train? The fear is that there is a point at which the world can or will, as Friedman stated it, "*loose something important*,"¹⁰ and that is what we need to be careful and mindful of. We must be cautious and conscious not to lose the identity which defines us, but at the same time we must accept and promote globalization and become integrated with the rest of the world. Again, a fine line we must be aware of.

D. CAN GLOBALIZATION ADDRESS THE CAUSES OF MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM?

Is it possible the world perceives that the word "Terrorism" and the Middle East region tend to go hand in hand, and therefore that this relationship has a propensity to inhibit globalization in this area of the world. In several of her scholarly works, Martha Crenshaw has explained cogently what the causes of terrorism are. If globalization addresses these causes, we can defeat terrorism? This section reflects upon the ideas behind the use of terrorism in the Middle East, and whether or not the ideas behind globalization can address the root causes of such disparity.

⁹ CIA World Factbook 2008, s.v. "Religion," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html> (Accessed March 4, 2008.).

¹⁰ Thomas L Friedman, *The World is Flat*, (New York: Picador 2005), 236.

There is no doubt that Crenshaw has logically explained the causes and conditions of terrorism.¹¹ There is no doubt if we could address the causes and conditions of terrorism, in a perfect world, we would, in fact, eradicate terrorism. But we are by no means living in a perfect world and definitely not a utopia. So, I believe the question is not whether we can defeat terrorism itself, but whether or not we can address the causes and conditions that make terrorism a tactical option. The question of whether terrorism will ever truly be defeated is a quite relevant one, but not realistic. My hypothesis to this question is that the answer is more complicated than a simple “yes” or “no.”

It is an obvious fact that the use of terrorism as a tactic has been around for centuries. Although it is generally a tactic of the weak, it has been used by the strong and the weak alike, from strong states to weak states and large factions to small guerilla groups. It has been seen as an effective tactic by those who have chosen to use it to achieve their goal or goals and by those factions it has been used against. Even though there are many forms and groups of terrorist sects, for the purpose of this thesis I will briefly utilize the violent extreme Islamist groups as the examples. The Islamist extremist groups easily display both a religious and political aspects within the cause(s) for which the group is fighting for or defending. It is for these dual motivations (political and religious) that make answering the question of whether terrorism will ever truly be defeated, more complicated, and an almost impossible to postulate a formidable response.

This investigation is by no means an end all be all answer to defeating the causes and conditions of terrorism altogether. On the contrary, it is more or less a light surface scan of the basic building blocks of terrorism, i.e., Crenshaw’s causal conditions of why terrorism eventually becomes an option. Before this section goes too deep into answering the question of whether or not the causes of terrorism can be defeated, I would like to address what some scholars believe and many governments have implemented in the past, are the possible treatments of terrorism.

¹¹ Martha Crenshaw, “*The Causes of Terrorism*,” in Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed), *The New Global Terrorism*, 92–105.

Let begin with a look at Crenshaw's "conditions" of terrorism. In the book *The New Global Terrorism* by Charles W. Kegley Jr., Part Two, Chapter Eight "*The Causes of Terrorisms*," Crenshaw describes what she believes to be the causes of terrorism.¹² Crenshaw briefly attests to the notion that "*modernization*" and "*urbanization*" are the factors that aid in creating the framework from which brew the basic foundations of terrorism ideologies.¹³ Furthermore, for this essay it will be assumed that urbanization is a byproduct of modernization, and that modernization is the original foundation of terrorism. Again, this paper is not meant to prove or disprove the causes of terrorism, but to rather understand why terrorism can neither be truly avoided nor destroyed altogether.

The obvious point which can be inferred is that, if modernization itself is the basic building block for the causes of terrorism, we can never truly defeat terrorism. Modernization by itself is an unstoppable force which is needed in order to continue and sustain life on earth as we know it. If this is true, we must then look at the causal conditions of terrorism that spawn from modernization. Crenshaw states that modernization over the years has generated so many religious, "*social*" and "*economical complexities*," and it is from the complexities, that "*grievances*" are created and formed in certain minority groups.¹⁴ Moreover, it is this formed grievance that, if powerful enough, will eventually create an overwhelming amount of dissatisfaction and resentment. If we could somehow stop this condition of terrorism here (i.e., allow the grieyed party to express themselves) there would most likely be less of a reason for the grieyed party to possibly feel the need to adopt the tactic of terrorism.

In order for the grieyed party to be heard, they would need some kind of outlet from which to be heard. This then leads us to the second condition of terrorism, which is described by Crenshaw as the lack of opportunity for "*political participation*."¹⁵ Undoubtedly, if we allowed the grieyed party to express themselves in a formal and

¹² Martha Crenshaw, "*The Causes of Terrorism*," in Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed), *The New Global Terrorism*. 92–105.

¹³ Ibid., 93–94.

¹⁴ Martha Crenshaw, "*The Causes of Terrorism*," in Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed), *The New Global Terrorism*, 94.

¹⁵ Ibid., 95.

political way, we would surely then be able to stop the build up of dissatisfaction and resentment, right? On the contrary, political participation alone would be the easy solution, but it is more detailed and complicated than that. When needs and grievances are not met by through political participation, to the satisfaction of the grieved party, the grieved party again begins to build dissatisfaction and resentment. Thus leading the same grieved parties to possibly ascertain terrorism as a means through which to be heard and have its requests met.

At this point we can stop at general conditions of terrorism, because it is from this point we can only diverge into the individual causations of the many different dissatisfied organizations. It is at this point that exist the many reasons why some groups chose terrorism as their method while others do not, and it is here that it becomes an overwhelming debate which is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Now that we have addressed the possible conditions for terrorism, let's look at Mark Juergensmeyer "cures" of terrorism. In his book *Terror in the Mind of God*, Juergensmeyer sums it up quite nicely by describing five potential "cures" for terrorism.¹⁶ The first is described as basic brute force, in a sense just destroying the terrorist with an overwhelming destructive and annihilating power.¹⁷ The second is as basic reversal of terror, in that, the mere threat of violence or retaliation by a government organization, or the like, may create doubt or vacillation in the minds of a terrorist organization, thereby halting their future actions.¹⁸ Third, the terrorist organization itself, through the use of violence, attains its goal, and hence ceases to use further aggressive attacks.¹⁹ A fourth ending would be to separate the religious aspects of the cause from the political aspect of the cause.²⁰ As Juergensmeyer points out, and many other scholars concur, negotiation with or bullying a religious fundamentalist group would most likely be in vain. Hence, dealing with a political element alone, has a higher probability of

¹⁶ Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror In The Mind Of God* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003)

¹⁷ Ibid., 233–34.

¹⁸ Ibid., 236–237.

¹⁹ Ibid., 238–239.

²⁰ Ibid., 240–241.

success and compromise. Lastly, and almost a reverse to the fourth ending, adding a “*moral integrity*” aspect to politics on the part of the government authorities, by basically gaining, at a minimum, a pseudo trust of a terrorist sect by adopting and demonstrating a sense of devout morality within the accused governmental organization.²¹ At the same time we must address the assumption that there are several variations of outcomes (actions and reactions), but these five represent a good summation and generalization of various historical endings.

With that said, let us briefly turn to Islamism as an example of why these conditions will never truly be eradicated, why terrorism as a means will never truly be defeated by globalization, and why the “cures” stated earlier are only effective to a point and don’t address the initial building blocks of terrorism. The answer and example presented may be over-simplistic in nature, and can lead to a lengthily discussion, but this cannot be entirely accomplished within the scope of this thesis. Simply put, one reason why these causes and conditions (modernization, settling of grievances, and political participation) can never truly be addressed when dealing with Islamists, and hence why Islamist sects who exercise terrorism will truly never be defeated or go away, rests merely in the complex nature of Islam. The simple answer is that Islam is a “*religion and a state*.”²² Many scholars will agree with the statement that terrorism by definition is *political in nature*, and that Islamists themselves are in the “*fight*,” with political agenda in their back pocket.²³ In the Islamic faith, there is also no objection, by those same scholars, to the fact that in Islam, the religious aspect and political aspect are connected by unbreakable bond, for as described by Johannes J.G. Jansen’s book, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism*. The problem is two fold. First, modernization by nature creates fundamentalists, i.e., those minority groups mainly on the fringes of a society who want to return to the days of old, i.e., pre-enlightenment. By modernization alone you

²¹ Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror In The Mind Of God*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 243–245.

²² Carl L. Brown, *Religion and State: the Muslim Approach to Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 31.

²³ Abdel S. Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, *Islamic Fundamentalism* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 3.

create a minority group with a grievance. In a sense, if we believe that modernization is necessary for the earth to sustain life, Crenshaw's first condition of terrorism, minority groups with grievances, is inevitable for the foreseeable future. We can not simply turn back the hands of time. Secondly, when dealing with a religious or divine aspect, in most cases there is no compromise. As Juergensmeyer describes, *compromise* with the religious aspect of a fundamentalist group is near impossible.²⁴ Due to the fact that the Islamist religious aspect is permanently bonded to the political aspect, the two shall never be separated. The second condition of terrorism cannot be successfully addressed either, due to this unwavering and uncompromising nature, especially in the religious aspect, of Islamism. In a sense, attempting to deal politically, and hence create a compromise, with the religious aspects of the Islamic would be fruitless. For this reason, "*this prevents the fundamentalist leaders from participating in government.*"²⁵ It can be said that any of Juergensmeyer's five "cures" could be effective against the Islamist, some better than others, but only up until the point where grievances are formed and modernization takes place.

Again this is overly simplistic, but my final thought is that terrorism, especially under the extremely violent Islamic terrorist wing, will never truly be dissolved, even in a totally globalized world. The fact remains that there will always be a time and a place, even in a constantly modernizing world, where and when a weak minority group will feel they must resort to terrorism or a terrorist act in order to be heard and create change. For Islamic Fundamentalism, the answer may not lie within the boundaries of the causes and conditions of terrorism, but may lie within the boundaries of the Islamic Faith itself. As Marari pointed, out most terrorist groups tend to act within the boundaries of their constituency's approval.²⁶ So, if the terrorism is contained within constituency, it is the constituency that must be manipulated to not approve the use of terrorism. This is a great topic of discussion which is currently being research by scholars today.

²⁴ Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror In The Mind Of God*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 241.

²⁵ Johannes J.G. Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1997), 24.

²⁶ Ariel Merari, "*Psychological Aspects of Suicide Terrorism*," in Bruce Bongar, Lisa M. Brown, Larry E. Beutler, James N. Breckenridge, and Phillip G. Zimbardo (eds.), *Psychology of Terrorism*, 110.

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III. EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON MIDDLE EAST POLITICS

A. POLITICS AND GLOBALIZATION

The question of democratizing Islam in this fashion has been examined by Asef Bayat, in his book, *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamic Turn* (Stanford University Press: 2007), by Amin Saikal's book, *Islam and the West: Conflict or Cooperation* (Palgrave MacMillan 2003), by Eva Wegner's article, "Islamist Inclusion and regime Persistence: The Moroccan Win-Win Situation,"²⁷ and by Carrie Rosefsky Wickham's essay, "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party."²⁸ There are similar and reoccurring arguments that these works have in common, basically stated, that the road to democratization, as these authors generally suggest, is made up of a few essential elements. The first, as stated above, is that the road to democratization will be paved through the state or leading authority's inclusion rather than exclusion of Islamists parties into the political system. The second element revolves around the Islamists making some concessions of their own, and moderating mainly their individual groups' violent actions and/or radical objectives. The authors also agree that democracy, whatever Middle Eastern or Arab form is created, will take time to foster and implement, will be a lengthy process, and will certainly not happen over night. Furthermore, democratization will not happen without its ups and downs, setbacks, pain, frustration, and will require an essential focus on continuous and steady "forward" progress.²⁹ If forward democratic learning progress is not properly fostered and carefully orchestrated on both sides, the result could be a paradoxical regression back to violence and political exclusion.

²⁷ Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "Islamist Inclusion and regime Persistence: The Moroccan Win-Win Situation," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 2, (January 2004), 205–228.

²⁸ Eva Wegner "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party," In Oliver Schlumberger, *Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Non Democratic Regimes*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 2007), 75–89.

²⁹ Asef Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamic Turn*, (Stanford University Press: 2007), 14. Amin Saikal, *Islam and the West: Conflict or Cooperation*, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 139.

B. DEMOCRATIZATION WITH PROPER AND IMPROPER POLITICAL LEARNING

The interesting dilemma faced here is a double edged sword for both the state authority and the Islamists. First, in general terms, states and governing authorities, run into problems when deciding whether or not to include or exclude Islamist groups in their political process. Basically, the governing authority must decide whether to exclude a particular Islamist group, and run the risk of fostering a more hostile Islamist organization or greater environment for violence, or chose to include the Islamist group, and run the risk of actually being politically beaten by or politically overpowered by a popular radical Islamist group. The opposition also possesses a similar volatile dilemma. On the same note, the Islamists must also be very careful. If the Islamist group is too radical, violent, or threatening to the political power of the governing authority, they run the risk of being suppressed even further by that authority. On the other hand, if the Islamist moderate too much and too fast, in order to appease the governing authority and gain access into the political arena, they run the risk of isolating or “alienating” their own network of followers, who may see these concessions as giving into the system they are in fact struggling against.³⁰ These quandaries lead to the ups and downs in which governing authorities and opposing Islamist parties go through in order to understand the process of democratic learning and find the right give and take balance.

The authors emphasize that states and Islamists need to understand this give and take “balancing act” in order to undergo a democratic learning process and make forward progress towards democratization. As their scholarly works suggest, allowing Islamists into the political arena is a balancing act for both the governing authority and the Islamists. On one side, allowing Islamists to enter the political arena (inclusion) allows them to voice their grievances, which resolves their feeling of repression and hence less of a reason to resort to violence. On the other side, if the Islamists are able to rally a majority of the people, they threaten the very governing authority allowing them to participate, which could lead to exclusion. This is a balancing act that can only be

³⁰ Eva Wegner, *Islamist Inclusion and regime Persistence: The Moroccan Win-Win Situation*, *Comparative Politics* (January 2004): Vol. 36, No. 2, 77.

understood and eventually overcome by going through the democratic learning process, as will be discussed in a few historical cases studies.

C. IS DEMOCRATIZATION DOOMED IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

Middle Eastern societies are trapped between authoritarian elites and radical Islamist movements. The authoritarian elites do not want to give up power and the Islamists are not interested in democracy. Democratization is doomed in the Middle East until either the elites or the Islamists lose their power.

1. The Stance

First, this thesis disagrees with the statements that Islamists are not interested in democracy and that democratization is doomed in the Middle East until either the elites or Islamists lose power. However, it does agree with the statements that authoritarian elites do not want to give up or lose their power, and also that Middle Eastern societies are trapped between authoritarian elites and radical Islamists movements.

2. Islamists and Democracy

To begin, not all Islamists are created equal and there is wide range of beliefs and variance among Islamist parties.³¹ Another way to view this issue, for example, as Peter Mandaville explains it; there are basically two types of Islamist camps, those who promote the unembellished translation of the Qur'an and sunna (the literalists) and those who view these teachings as a set of guiding principles, and along those same line there are "new" and "old" Islamist variants.³² The fact is, there are Islamists throughout the fundamentalist spectrum that have seen positive gains and see future potential in having a democratic political system and institution in Middle Eastern countries. Similarly, there are Islamists throughout the spectrum who believe that "God, who is the sole source of political authority and from whose divine law must come all regulations governing the

³¹ Carrie R. Wickham, "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 2, (January 2004), 206.

³² Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 336 and 351.

community of believers,”³³ and that there is no place for political intervention or suffrage. For the purpose of this essay I will defend the statement that not all Islamists are antidemocratic by referencing several specific case studies from the Middle Eastern region.

Now one does not have to dig too deep to find Islamist parties that have cooperated politically (i.e., played by the electorate system rules) or moderated their goals and objectives in order to participate in democratic elections. Islamist parties such as Egypt’s Wasat party, Morocco’s Party for Justice and Reform (PJD), formerly the Islamist Movement of Unity and Reform (MUR) party, Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), Palestine’s Hamas, and Turkey’s Justice for Development (AKP) party have all demanded participation in the electoral process,³⁴ and some currently hold political positions within their individual systems. What these examples demonstrate is that Islamists are willing to participate in a democratic like process, but is this proof enough to say that there are Islamists who believe in a democratic process? What is still under contention and debatable is whether or not these types of Islamists truly believe in the democratic process and values in which they are participating or whether they are using the process to get into power and eventually (big picture) rid themselves of the authoritarian regime and the democratic process altogether, so that they would make certain they would never be voted out.³⁵ There is no evidence of this to date, especially

³³ Mark Tessler, Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes Towards Democracy in Four Arab Countries,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (April 2002), 340.

³⁴ See, Eva Wegner, “Islamist Inclusion and regime Persistence: The Moroccan Win-Win Situation,” In Oliver Schlumberger, *Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Non Democratic Regimes*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 2007), 75–89. Carrie R. Wickham, “The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt’s Wasat Party,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (January 2004), 205–228. Mark Tessler, Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes Towards Democracy in Four Arab Countries,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (April 2002), 337–354. Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 337.

³⁵ Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 92.

as seen in the cases of the Wasat, PJD, and Hamas parties which have all obtained democratically elected positions and have not attempted to radically change their political systems.³⁶

As described above, the proof is in the pudding and there are several Islamists parties interested in democracy whether it is a Western brand, Middle Eastern brand, or some combination of the two, and they are willing to practice and take part in several components of democratic learning.

3. Is Democratization Really Doomed in the Middle East?

Democratization is not doomed in the Middle East and what this statement is missing is the fact that democratization has been taking place in several countries throughout the Middle East without the total loss of power on either side. As described in the section above, just inclusion and participation of Islamist parties in the political arena of some non-democratic authoritarian countries (for example Egypt) provides the region with a taste, although in some cases only a small taste, of democratic learning and a so called form of Middle Eastern democratization.³⁷ This is by no means to say that the political systems in these cases are perfect or quickly on their way to becoming western like democracies, not at all. Most of the political systems in the Middle East are still very much secular and autocratic.³⁸ Democratization is a process which takes time to occur; it has ups, downs, setbacks, and progress all along its journey to acceptance. Turkey is a prime example of a country that is well on its way to transitioning to a fully competitive democratic nation with neither the elites nor the opposition parties totally losing power. As Michele Angrist stated, there are three pivotal parts to Turkey's competitive electoral political success, the number of political parties within the political arena, the polarizing

³⁶ Carrie R. Wickham, "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (January 2004), 224–225. Eva Wegner, "Islamist Inclusion and regime Persistence: The Moroccan Win-Win Situation," In Oliver Schlumberger, *Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Non Democratic Regimes*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 2007), 76.

³⁷ Ibid., Wickham, 224.

³⁸ See, Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (January 2004), 139–157

core values between the parties, and the ability of those parties to mobilize support.³⁹ In the Middle East, it is true that most secular Authoritarian regimes have had unsuccessful competitive political systems due to a failure in one or more of these critical areas, but that is not to say that that is not part of the process of political learning and part of the road toward eventually competitive political success. The Wasat and PJD parties are good examples of instances in which secular authoritarian countries, which are in the mist of political learning and understanding, have multiple parties, similar party ideas that can be presented and debated, and the apparent ability to mobilize support for those parties. What these examples, as well as many other similar inclusion stories, show is that democratization, or even a “gray zone”⁴⁰ form of it, elections without democracy, is not totally doomed in the Middle East. What must be understood is the fact that there are several significant political reasons that, as described above and including economics and cultural dynamics, can hinder the democratization process. Democratization is not doomed in the Middle East, and only over time, through political learning, and steady forward progress can democratization truly be obtained and yield lasting positive results.

4. Authoritarian Elites and Power in the Middle East

Third, as stated earlier authoritarian rulers and elites do not want to give up their power. This statement is deemed to be true and several scholars have a strong evidential basis for its explanation. A justification for elites not giving up their power partially stems from the effects of the so called “resource curse” in the Middle East.⁴¹ As Michael Ross concluded, the resource curse, which contains the complementary casual mechanisms of the rentier effect, the repression effect, and the modernization effect, gives the authoritarian regimes and elites the opportunity, wealth, and power to protect their self-interests.⁴² Also, as Eva Bellin points out, international institutions contribute support in multiple ways to these authoritarian regimes to enable them to maintain power

³⁹ Michele P. Angrist, “Party Systems and Regime Formation in the Modern Middle East: Explaining Turkish Exceptionalism,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (January 2004), 229.

⁴⁰ Dr. Mohammed Hafez, “The Middle East in World Affairs: *Democratization in the Middle East*” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, August 27, 2008).

⁴¹ See, Michael L. Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy,” *World Politics* 53 (April 2001), 325–61.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 335.

and stability, and any type of change to these receiving elites, whether it be a change in regime power, policies, or politics, is unlikely while support still exists.⁴³ Lastly, there are other several other reason why authoritarian regimes cling to their power starting from Bellin's historical significance of patrimonial monarchies to M. Steven Fish's male domination and Islamic religious traditions, specifically rigid female segregation, which both predominate the Middle East, even in the most secular regimes.⁴⁴

While wealth, power, greed, male domination, and historic tradition may be some of the selfish reasons why rulers and elites of authoritarian states want to keep their power, there also seems to be a somewhat arguable "legitimate" reason for this elite clutching of power. As Eva Wegner points out, monarchs and presidents both want to achieve stabilization within their respective countries and a popular Islamist opponent could possibly throw off the balance of power within the political establishment or if elected, radically change the course of the country.⁴⁵ This can clearly be seen in the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, when Khomeini, although not a professed Islamist, influenced much of the population and several powerful political entities in order to oust the Shah. Since then, the people of Iran have become discouraged by the clerical restriction imposed upon them and the executive political power is and has been stagnate and fairly inadequate in promoting any change.⁴⁶ The case study that "almost was" would have been the 1991 Islamist victory of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) party, but it is now a good example of the immense power of an authoritarian regime back by a dominant military force, effectively invalidating legal and popularly respected election results.⁴⁷ Although the Algerian regime's reasoning for annulling the elections and banning the FIS from participating in any future political processes can be argued

⁴³ Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (January 2004), 152.

⁴⁴ See, M. Steven Fish, "Islam and Authoritarianism," *World Politics* 55 (October 2002), 4–37. Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (January 2004), 153.

⁴⁵ Eva Wegner, "Islamist Inclusion and regime Persistence: The Moroccan Win-Win Situation," In Oliver Schlumberger, *Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Non Democratic Regimes*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 2007), 77.

⁴⁶ Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 90.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 92–93.

from several different angles, mainly personal interest, fear, or national stability, the result clearly supports the fact that repression of the opposition in such a visible way can lead to reradicalization of a moderating Islamist party and furthermore can be lead to the national instability they may have been attempting to avoid.⁴⁸ So, by the very nature of this situation and situations like this, elites and authoritarian regimes are caught in a paradoxical quandary, and along those same line so are the Islamists.

As Wegner, Wickham, and several other scholars have stated, authoritarian regime inclusion of Islamists parties in the political arena and moderation by those same Islamist parties is a primary and essential step in establishing regional and national stability in the Middle East. The real question, as Mandaville points out, is how the authoritarian regimes, in the future, will deal with trying to balance the preservation of the “old guard privileges” and the demands of a young, politically aware, and “technologically savvy” generation that is already starting to stir the pot.⁴⁹

5. Are Middle Eastern Societies Trapped?

Lastly, the statement that Middle Eastern societies are trapped between authoritarian elites and radical Islamist movements is also true. The middle classes in this region feel that they have no real representation, either from the Islamists or from the ruling elites. The majority of these middle class societies have been humiliated, colonized, victimized, and contained for many years.⁵⁰ As stated in the previous sections above, Middle Eastern societies are caught in a vicious paradoxical battle between two forces. On the one side the populous middle class societies have secular authoritarian regimes which are not willing to give up power for fear of losing wealth, power, or national stabilization, and as a consequence are forced to live in a repressive and stressful environment. On the other side, those same citizens have a range of Islamists parties, from violent militant radicals to political and religious fundamentalist, within their

⁴⁸ Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 92. Carrie R. Wickham, “The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt’s Wasat Party,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (January 2004), 226.

⁴⁹ Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 335.

⁵⁰ Dr. Mohammed Hafez, “The Middle East in World Affairs,” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 17, 2008).

society who are not necessarily fighting for or defending their actual grievances and who promote or add to, whether consciously or unconsciously, the causes of national chaos, instability, and repression. Inevitably in the Middle East, repression begets fundamentalism and fundamentalism begets repression. So what is the solution? Is it removal of the regimes and elites, or increased repression of the Islamists? As Bellin concluded, violent removal of current oppressive regimes or devices will not ensure future democracy or stability, but in fact would only lead to a similar authoritarian regime with a different autocratic flavor or worse, national anarchy, and furthermore, as Mandaville conclude, increased repression would only continue to lead to increased radicalization and reradicalization.⁵¹

Referring back to Mandaville's question and answering how authoritarian regimes will deal with the preservation of the old guard and the demand of the young tech savvy youth is essential to finding a solution for these trapped Middle Eastern middle class societies.⁵² The fundamental solution to this pandemic crisis is addressing the difficulty of all a round true political legitimacy. What does that mean? It basically implies that the authoritarian regimes must first, institutionalize instrumental rules that are fair and remain as part of the political institution's foundation, and second, find the right balance of political inclusion and eventual power sharing with moderating Islamist parties.⁵³ For the Islamists, it means they must moderate themselves and adjust, take down a notch, their objectives and goals, and in some cases even modernize or find a balance with the standards of modern day society and even international trends to include the true grievances of the local middle classes.⁵⁴ There is no doubt that there will be some authoritarian regimes and some Islamist parties that will have difficulty engaging in this

⁵¹ Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (January 2004), 153. Carrie R. Wickham, "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (January 2004), 225–226.

⁵² Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 335

⁵³ Dr. Mohammed Hafez, "The Middle East in World Affairs" (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 17, 2008).

⁵⁴ Ibid., 92.

gargantuan challenge, but this is the only way Middle Eastern societies will be able to escape from the trap they are in and be relieved of their frustrations and feelings of misrepresentation.

D. DEMOCRATIC POLITICS AND TERRORISM

Ignatieff in his book *The Lesser Evil* observes that “terrorism is an offense not only against the lives and liberties of its specific victims, but against politics itself, against the practices of deliberations, compromise, and the search for nonviolent and reasonable solutions.” How can democratic politics practice prevention of terrorism and counterterrorism without diminishing itself which is the very thing that terrorist seek?

This is an example of another great paradox, quite similar to Dahl’s paradox of democracy and capitalism. Here we find ourselves caught between defending freedom, democracy, and “our” way of life against those who threaten it, by means and actions that violate these same core values and principals we are trying to preserve and protect. So can our “ends” (retaining our democracy) justify the “means” (liberty violations) by which we secure those ends? This is a very difficult question to answer. Critics would say there is never a time when human rights, and the like, should be violated. On the other hand, there are groups who feel that there is a time and place when human rights can be suspended in order protect liberty. We cannot sit back and allow the terrorist to fight by a different set of rules (i.e., no rules), and at the same time restrict the way we defend ourselves by binding our own hands. Yet, we cannot push human rights suspensions so far as to risk playing the “game” with no rules for an indefinite period, thus becoming equally as wrong as the terrorists themselves. The fact is, we must walk along a very fine line in order not to lessen the very principals of our democracy, and at the same time we need to protect those principals from destruction.

One of the main problems that governments face when dealing with terrorism is actually viewing the “other side” as a political entity. Another main problem, as Ignatieff states, is that there are many forms of terrorism, insurrection, loner, liberation, separatist, occupation, and global, and that each must be dealt with differently. In most cases

terrorists seek and resort to violence as a means of “communicating” their message, because they feel they have no other formal, legitimate, or recognized means of voicing their political opinion.

As the definition of terrorism has been refined throughout the recent years, one thing has been constant, “*terrorism is a violent form of politics.*”⁵⁵ Terrorism, in itself, contains four key ingredients, (1) it is an act of violence, (2) it has a political motive or goal, (3) it is perpetrated against innocent persons, and (4) it is staged to be played before an audience whose reaction of fear and terror is the desired result.⁵⁶ Given this recipe for terrorism and the types of asymmetric tactics it uses, it is very difficult to find a truly effective counter to terrorism (wire taps, assassinations, and interrogations) that does not violate or diminish democratic politics.

So what is the answer? The truth of the matter is that we must suspend our democratic politics on occasion, for limited amounts of time, and only when deemed absolutely critical, i.e., when our way of life is truly in jeopardy. September 11, 2001 is an example of one of those times. The answer to the main question is that democratic politics must be able to defend itself against the atrocities of terrorism with words and at times, if deemed necessary by leadership, and as a last resort, brute force (militarily, human right suspensions, and the like). The key is that in order to protect ourselves from ourselves, we must institute rules and laws that will watch over the application of this “force” (i.e., Patriot Act, Sundown Laws, etc).

A government cannot be expected to defend itself in a battle that is being fought unfairly, asymmetrically, unconventionally, and be expected to play by the conventional rules of war. It would be impossible to win. It can be perceived that the tactic of terrorism will never truly go away, and truth be told, there are very few cases where terrorism has prevailed in the long run. We must as a society remember and understand this point, and in the mean time protect our liberties from theses types of aggressors with the means we deem necessary to be victorious. Yet, still be cautious when we overstep

⁵⁵ Michael Ignatieff, *The Lesser Evil*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 82.

⁵⁶ Cindy Combs, *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*, (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall 2003), 19.

those set boundaries and begin violating our own human rights. As Americans we must remember that in order to defeat terrorism and provide protection for our nation we may, when needed, and for limited amounts of time, violate the same principles we stand for. We must also trust our elected government officials to decipher the times when a suspension of rights is or is not deemed necessary.

E. IS DIPLOMACY USEFUL WHEN CONFRONTING VIOLENT EXTREMIST GROUPS?

The question above cannot be easily answered with a simple “yes” or “no” response. First, there are all too many types of violent extremist groups (e.g., Al-Qaeda), and second, because diplomacy or negotiations, although the first “*line of defense*”⁵⁷ when dealing with sovereign states, is one of the last lines of defense when dealing with terrorists. In order to get closer to answering the title question and because of the limited scope of this paper, I will focus on a specific type of non state foe, those identified as violent Islamic terrorists. Second, it must be understood that this essay is not focusing on a literal definition of the word “diplomacy,” like the one stated by Hedley Bull, as “*the conduct of relations between states and other with standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means.*”⁵⁸ Moreover, this essay will tend to use words like, *coercive negotiation*, defined by Patrick C. Bratton, as “*the use of threats to influence another’s behavior,*”⁵⁹ vice using the pure word “diplomacy.” The hypothesis of this essay is that diplomacy, negotiation, or coercion, can be used with certain violent Islamic terrorist organizations that meet a definite criteria. The effectiveness of negotiations depends on whether or not terrorist organization have elements similar to actual sovereign states, specifically with respect to an organizational structure, political components, and realistic goals or objectives. With that said, and as stated above there is no true “cookie cutter” solution or answer to the title question, because there is such a wide variety of terrorist entities around the world. But by understanding the elements

⁵⁷ Carl Bildt, “Force and Diplomacy,” *Survival* Vol. 42, No. 1 (Spring 2000), 141.

⁵⁸ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Columbia Press 1977), 156.

⁵⁹ Patrick C. Bratton, “When Is Coercion Successful?” *Naval War College Review*, Summer 2005, Vol. 58, No. 3, 99.

state above; we can get closer to understanding whether or not diplomacy can be used with violent Islamic terrorist organization. To get closer that answer, I will examine three different violent Islamic terrorist organizations with respect to the criteria and elements stated above, the National Liberation Front (FLN), which successfully repelled French colonization, Hamas, which has obtained political positions within Palestine but continues to use violence, and finally, Al-Qaeda, which has no political affiliation and continues to only use violence.

1. The Difference between Dealing with State and Non State Organizations

By nature, diplomacy is a very difficult instrument of nation power to wield when dealing with sovereign states, but is even more difficult when attempting to deal with violent Islamic terrorist non state organizations. In the past, sovereign states like the U.S. and major world organizations like the U.N. have painstakingly implemented embargos and economic sanctions on “hostile” sovereign states, (for example, *Trade Sanctions imposed on Iraq in the ‘90’s*), in order to twist the arm of “hostile” state leaders. Countries like the U.S. and Iran have also used “*Show of Force*” or “*Threat of Force*” scare tactics, such as floating an Aircraft carrier off the coast of a hostile country or launching experimental long range test missiles (both of which are currently being demonstrated in the Arabian Gulf today), in order to prevent actions of “hostile” states. So, why do these tactics not work with non state terrorist organization like they can with sovereign state opponents?

The difficulty faced when using instruments of national power on non state terrorist organizations is the fact that they may or may not be located altogether in any one particular location. In some cases the terrorist organization may live among a neutral population that may or may not be sympathetic with an embedded terrorist group, or in another case they may live in several areas unknown to neutral host populations. This implies that there may be no one specified country or area to in which to coerce or implement national power.

If we look at our three cases, we can start to see where these types of coercive negotiations or threats can and cannot be implemented. In the case of FLN and Hamas we see two violent Islamic terrorist organizations that have somewhat defined locations, the FLN was mainly in Algeria and Hamas is mainly in Israel. These two groups meet an element of the negotiation criteria, because having organizations that are somewhat centrally located (like a state) enables other sovereign states, in this case, France and Israel respectively, to implement forms national power (like diplomacy), on a centralized group. On the other hand, Al-Qaeda's organization fails to be located in any one particular state or region and is highly fractured (Afghanistan, Iraq, and other locations around the world), therefore making it difficult to effectively implement any conventional form of national power, much less foster any type of diplomacy or negotiations.

2. The Islamic Political Spectrum


It is important to point out that, although not completely unique, violent Islamic terrorist organizations are sometimes stoutly connection to their religion. In fact, for most Islamist groups there is no separation between church and state, or Islam and politics.⁶⁰ The factor of religion in politics adds a degree of difficulty when dealing with any Islamic state's political entity, but more so when dealing with a violent Islamic terrorist political entity. With that said, along with having a centralized polis, there needs to be some sort of political entity in which to negotiate with, and that entity must be able to separate, even if only temporarily, religion from politics, in order to be successful.

If we look at the political Islamic spectrum (Figure 1), we will see that for Muslims, Islam (Shari'a Law, Qur'an, etc) is the source of politics. The political spectrum itself is then broken down from left to right, with reconcilers on the far left and rejectionists on the far right. This basically illustrates that the more you move to the right, the more difficult it becomes to have successful "diplomatic" reconcile.⁶¹ Non state Islamist organizations that fall under headers such as Islamic Socialism, Liberalism,

⁶⁰ See Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, *Strong Religion*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003).

⁶¹ Dr. Jeffrey Bale, "Islamic Fundamentalism" (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, April 15, 2008).

and even Moderate Reformism, tend to have some form of rational and reconciling political entities within them, but as you approach the Islamic Right, rational reconcilers become more religious, rejectionistic, and in many cases grossly irrational.⁶²



Source: Dr. Jeffrey Bale, "Islamic Fundamentalism" (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, April 15, 2008)


Figure 1. Political Islamic Spectrum

Given the above, there is still further division within the Islamic Right, see Figure 2, where Islamist organizations, although rejectionistic, are willing to negotiate, even if only temporarily.⁶³ Even so, it is between the Gradual and Violent Islamists that we get closer to the tipping point of successful and unsuccessful negotiations. Many gradual Islamist organizations are willing negotiate, because they are usually patient and able to separate the religious aspect from the political aspect, in order to achieve their objectives.⁶⁴ It is not always so for the Violent Islamic Right.

⁶² Dr. Jeffrey Bale, "Islamic Fundamentalism" (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, April 15, 2008).

⁶³ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Columbia Press 1977), 43.

⁶⁴ Dr. Jeffrey Bale, "Islamic Fundamentalism" (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, April 15, 2008).



Source: Dr. Jeffrey Bale, "Islamic Fundamentalism" (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, April 15, 2008)

Figure 2. The Islamic Right Wing

The Violent Islamic Right is more impatient than the Gradual Right, in that, groups within this category often use the art of violence to coerce their enemy into rapidly doing their will. The FLN, Hamas, and Al-Qaeda all fall under the violent Islamic right terrorist category, but what makes them different? Why have some violent terrorist organizations been willing to negotiate and while others have not?

The fact is, within the violent wing of the Islamic Right there is a variable religious and political scale. The FLN and Hamas on one end have a more political agenda and on the opposite end Al-Qaeda has more of a cosmic or religious agenda, and it is the division between these elements where negotiations truly begin or end.⁶⁵ The example of this spectrum can be seen in Figure 3. The FLN and Hamas created political wings, in order to promote negotiations, because their military tactics eventual gave way to discussing their somewhat political objectives. Al-Qaeda is extremely violent and emanates both an extremely strong religious undertone and overtone.⁶⁶ Because of Al-Qaeda's radical and strong religious beliefs and ineffective military advances, it has never formed a political wing and shows no indications of undertone and overtone.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ See cosmic wars, Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press: 2003).

⁶⁶ See reading from both, Albert Bergesen, *The Sayyid Qutb Reader*, (New York: Routledge, 2008); Raymond Ibrahim, *The Al Qaeda Reader*, (New York: Broadway Book, 2007).

⁶⁷ See reading from both, Albert Bergesen, *The Sayyid Qutb Reader*, (New York: Routledge, 2008); Raymond Ibrahim, *The Al Qaeda Reader*, (New York: Broadway Book, 2007).




Figure 3. The Violent Islamic Right Wing

Because of Al-Qaeda’s radical and strong religious beliefs and ineffective military advances, it has never formed a political wing and shows no indications of doing so in the near future; in fact its leaders are opposed to negotiations, as stated in some of their literature.⁶⁸ As we will discuss in the section below, objectives play a major role in the formation of political entities.

3. Realistic and Unrealistic Objectives

In the case of organizational objectives, some violent Islamic terrorist organizations have somewhat realistic and obtainable goals while others do not. The FLN’s goal was to be relieved from French colonial occupation, a “near enemy,”⁶⁹ and reinstate Algerian nationalism, which the FLN eventual accomplished. Along the same lines, Hamas’ objective is the eradication of the Israelis, a “near enemy,”⁷⁰ and the reestablishment of a Palestinian Islamic state. Although, FLN’s and Hamas’ objectives were and are not easily obtainable, they are reasonable and not overly unrealistic. These objectives far differ from Al-Qaeda’s rather unfathomable transnational objective of defeating the “far enemy.”⁷¹ Al-Qaeda wishes to destroy the west and all those who have trespassed against Islam in order to reestablish the Islamic Caliphate.⁷² As stated before,

⁶⁸ Raymond Ibrahim, *The Al Qaeda Reader*, (New York: Broadway Book 2007), xxx.

⁶⁹ Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 43–69.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 43–69.

Al-Qaeda is in a cosmic battle, which for them, leaves no room for negotiation. Islamists, like Al-Qaeda, at their very core, believe the world is divided into “*dar-al-Islam, the region of submission to the will of God, and dar-al-Harb, the region of war which has yet to be converted.*”⁷³ Basically they believe that the dar-al-Harb world is only temporary and will eventually be immersed or taken over by the dar-al-Islam. In effect, it is the goal of Islamists to place the entire world living under an Islamic umbrella.⁷⁴ Again, this objective is a rather unrealistic and unobtainable, which emphasizes the difficulty in negotiating with Al-Qaeda like factions.

Although this section is by no means all encompassing, by briefly observing the cases of the FLN, Hamas, and Al-Qaeda, there poses some validity in stating that various violent terrorist organizations can have a form of negotiations, whether or not that form fits the true definition of “diplomacy” or not. What distinguishes these terrorist groups, from one another in the diplomatic realm, is whether or not they contain elements that foster negotiation similar to actual sovereign states, specifically with respect to an organizational structure, a political component, and realistic goals or objectives. The FLN is a good example of a non state foe negotiating with a sovereign state. Even though the FLN had both religious and political elements, it was centralized, its motivation was mostly political and less religious, and its objectives were realistic. To a lesser extent, Hamas is also an example of a non state foe negotiating with a sovereign state, because it is centralized, is more political than religious, and has goals that are not overly ambitious (although this is debatable). It remains to be seen whether or not Hamas will be successful in the future. On the opposite end, there are no negotiations with Al-Qaeda, because it is severely decentralized, radiates extreme religious and fundamental overtones with no physical political entity, and has unrealistic and outrageous objectives (not debatable).⁷⁵ Although this is not the main focus of this thesis, because terrorism has become more and more globalized, the answer to the title question, “can diplomacy

⁷³ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Columbia Press 1977), 42.

⁷⁴ See, Ali Rahnema, *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, (New York: Zed Books Ltd, 2005).

⁷⁵ See reading from both, Albert Bergesen, *The Sayyid Qutb Reader*, (New York: Routledge, 2008); Raymond Ibrahim, *The Al Qaeda Reader*, (New York: Broadway Book, 2007).

be use when confronting terrorist organizations?” is “yes,” but with the caveat that it can only be used with those terrorist organization that are willing to do so, and contain certain elements similar to true sovereign states.

F. STRONG AND WEAK STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

On a per capita basis, the Middle East has the most heavily armed states in the world. Yet instead of being considered ‘strong states’ because of that military power, most are viewed as quite weak, often not being able to get society to follow the rules the state makes. What is behind this paradox in the Middle East?

As pointed out by Joel Migdal, there are two arenas in which the state must engage in. The first is that of the “world arena” or state to state relationships, (International Relations).⁷⁶ The other arena is that of the state-society relationship, specifically the relationship between the populous of a country and the state apparatus which govern it. Weak states, specifically those within the Middle East region, tend to give the illusion of strength and authority both in the international and domestic arena. The reality is that these states, in many cases, display military power and authority, but in most cases do not truly possess enough of either to effectively rule (enforce rules, positively direct economy, penetrate or direct social movements) over the populous they are claiming to govern. As some scholars have described (see Roger Owen), and Migdal expressed in his book *Strong Societies and Weak States*, the problem with weak states rests within the relationship the between the state leadership and the society in which it governs.⁷⁷ Leadership within weak states tend to be powerless to the changes which occur in their societies, changes which have a propensity to occur regardless of attempted state interference in such transformations.⁷⁸ Weak states display certain tendencies and usually exhibit an inability to infiltrate the society within its borders, to

⁷⁶ Joel Migdal, *State in Society*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 62.

⁷⁷ Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 32–33, and Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 6.

⁷⁸ Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 6.

mobilize support, to adjust social interactions, and to control and employ resources.⁷⁹ The paradox rests within the reasons why this impedance occurs in weak states of the Middle East.

Migdal also points out that to overcome these shortfalls in governance, weak state must “become the constant and formidable presence even in the most remote villages.”⁸⁰ This is problematic, because it is at this point weak states in the Middle East tend to become entangled in a paradox which precludes them from become strong states. To have a formidable presence within these societies, states must create strong and capable agencies and local bureaucracies with resources capable of enabling them to carry out the state leadership’s decrees, laws, etc.⁸¹ The threat to senior leadership within weak regimes is that if these types of state established agencies and or local bureaucrats have too much of a power base or too much influence to mobilize enough resources and people on their own, they could eventually become a threat to the senior leaders of the state. The fear of these senior leaders is that those power bases could enact a coup d’état or start a revolution and overthrow their government.⁸² Therefore, weak state regime leadership within Middle Eastern states tend to use coercive mechanism (e.g., shuffling of leadership position, loyalty appointments versus merit appointments, overlapping bureaucratic functions) to prevent this type of power gain from happening, thereby weakening their own representatives, and in effect weakening their own ability to govern their societies at the same time.

Whether a state is strong or weak can be summed up by defining the relationship between the state agencies (the state) and its relationship with the society (the populous) it has authority over. Although military might and power are measured aspects of strong or weak states, from an international perspective, it is clearly not the only defining factor taken into consideration when determining that state’s internal governance status. To

⁷⁹ Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 5–6.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 6.

⁸¹ Joel Migdal, *State in Society*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 68.

⁸² Ibid.

explain this paradox, there must first be an understanding of what exactly it means to be a strong state and what it means to be a weak state. A strong state, as defined by Joel Migdal, is one which is “at center stage, kneading society into new forms and shapes, adapting it to the exigencies created by industrialization or other stimuli.”⁸³ In other words, the societies in which the state has authority over are governed by a single set of “rules” and regulations set forth by the state, enforced by state representatives, and implemented by local level bureaucrats, who tend to be co-located within those societies, see Figure 4.⁸⁴




Figure 4. The Strong State

The measurement of success then presented is whether or not those societies, within the state’s sphere of influence, tend to follow the set of rules set forth by the state or whether they chose or are coerced into following a different set of rules determined and enforced by a different non-state agency (i.e., tribe, family, or other organization).

This brings us to the definition of a weak state. The structure of the society in a weak state differs mainly at the local level, although not always the case. What generally ends up happening in a weak state is that lower level bureaucrats, or the state rule implementers, tend to compete with non-state affiliated formal or informal organizations,

⁸³ Joel Migdal, *State in Society*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 58.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 63.

agencies, tribes, and families, otherwise known as “strongmen,” for authority over societies at the local level.⁸⁵ These strongmen tend to be seen as the dominant force within the area, and usually offer protection, control resources, and enforce their set of rules and laws. The society itself is basically caught between choosing between obeying the state authority and its set of rules or the rules set by the local strongmen, see Figure 5.




Figure 5. The Weak State

The delineation between the weak state and the strong state can partially be determined by the amount of resources put forth by the state towards its enforcement capabilities and agencies. A strong state will provide the local level implementers with the appropriate resources and authority necessary for that state agency to execute the state rules and regulations (i.e., laws), using coercive means when and if necessary.⁸⁶ Furthermore and most importantly, in a strong state, the state and its representative agency are seen as the single source for the rule of law and are dominant over and trump all other organizations, clans, families, and tribes within the state.

Why the paradox then? As stated above, in order to be a strong state, local leadership must have the tools and have effective state representative agencies at the local societal level, in effect, allowing the state apparatus to penetrate and influence its citizen

⁸⁵ Joel Migdal, *State in Society*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 63.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

at the lowest levels of society (i.e., the individual). What has happened in the Middle East is that many states, like Iraq (pre-U.S. war), Libya, and Yemen for example, which are considered to be “weak” states tend to rule from “bunkers,” as Clement Henry and Robert Springborg state in their book *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East*.⁸⁷ The leaders in these types of countries are not necessarily fearful of other states, but tend to be more fearful of their own populations. These leaders are afraid that any agency which is given too much power is bound to mobilize and rise up against them. What has happened in these states is that leadership has created agencies to carry out its will and enforce laws and regulations, but there are several problems. First, the agencies that are meant to carry out and enforce the laws of the state are purposely hamstrung by their limited resources and authority. These agencies have been made virtually powerless through “overlapping functions” so that no one agency is given total power. Second, those same agencies are pitted against each other to either fight for resources or what little power they are actually given. This creates distrust and disloyalty among agencies and can create alliances against those agencies which may be seen as gaining too much power (a balance of power). Third, leadership in these state tend to use non-merit appointments to place or assign personnel, who have demonstrated regime loyalty, in places of management in order to prevent counter loyalties from forming. Eventually, usually when they feel threatened, the state then shifts those same selected leaders from position to position, sometime regardless of experience or skill, in order to prevent them from establishing power bases in those areas and position. Finally, if worst comes to worst, state leadership can simply resort to plainly removing (eliminating) any agency leadership it perceives as a threat, normally without cause.

Because of this type of state leadership paranoia, governance at the local level is weak at best. The populous in these types of communities look to the dominant leadership agency whether it is state run or non-state affiliated (i.e., tribe, family, clan, gang) to provide them with their basic needs of security and stability. Therefore, at the local societal level, the populous must choose who to follow. Although they can and

⁸⁷ Henry M. Clement and Robert Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 99–133.

many times are forced to follow the “biggest dog on the block,” they must follow that agency’s or organization’s set of rules, and many times those rules or laws conflict, e.g., the difference between tribal law and state law. This is where the strongmen, or local non-state organizations or agencies (the tribe, family, and industrial enterprise) come into play. Because of the weakness of local bureaucracy (limited power and/or resources), these strongmen agencies tend to fill the created leadership void left by local bureaucrats. These strongmen are usually local, well-established in the community, and well-known by the people, unlike that of the state appointed local bureaucrats.⁸⁸ The strongmen tend to be in control of many, if not, most of the valuable and profitable resources within their communities.⁸⁹

The answer, as some weak states have resorted to, would be for leaders to use the state’s military prowess to crack down on these types of strongmen at the local level. The problem lies in the fact that the type of military presence and the amounts of resources needed to suppress this type of local level strongman activity would be overwhelming, costly, and virtually impossible to implement everywhere, at the same time. The limited power given to the local bureaucrats and enforcers is not enough, in many cases, to thwart the strongmen, especially in rural areas. It is obvious from an outside perspective, that if more power and resources were given to local state representatives, if less shifting of state agency leadership and expertise took place, and if there was a abolishment of overlapping bureaucratic functions that states, which employed these power shifting tactics, would intuitively become more stable and more secure. Is it possible that the perceived risk (coup d’état, death, etc) is truly too high for leaders in the Middle East to ever change their tactics?

The bottom line is that due to many Middle Eastern regime fears of being overthrown or dismissed by the very agencies they have appointed within their own state, they have constrained those same agencies and therefore created weak bureaucratic leadership at the local levels of their societies. The weakness has led to the fragmentation of the social structures within the state, and consequently limited their ability to rule over

⁸⁸ Joel Migdal, *State in Society*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 63.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

and enforce their own rules of law, “penetrate their society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways.”⁹⁰ Although, the validity of being overthrowing is an obvious reality for Middle Eastern state leaders, those same leaders will continue to be encased within this paradox until they can break through that same fear. Consequently, if this breakthrough does not occur, these weak states will continue to be fearful of their own societies and will most likely continue to hamstring local state agencies thereby bestowing local power to strongmen, fragmenting their societies, and remaining weak states.

⁹⁰ Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 4.

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IV. EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON MIDDLE EAST ECONOMICS

A. ECONOMICS AND GLOBALIZATION

Today, Islam is the second largest religion in the world with a total of about 1.3 billion people, thus constituting approximately 21.1 percent of the world's religious followers, see Figure 6.⁹¹ With this information in hand, questions begin to formulate about where Islam and the Muslim people stand in the world market hierarchy, and where they might be in the future? Below are some of the postulations that have surfaced throughout the scholarly world.

Does religion by itself affect economic growth or status? Specifically, does the Islamic faith affect the economic growth process of a country? Does Islam as a religion bleed over into the nation-state affairs of a country, i.e., an "Islamic" state? How do predominantly Muslim countries fare economically? Does the percentage of Muslim followers in a country affect that country's economic status and/or growth? Do Islamic beliefs hold back economic progress? Does Islam get along with Capitalism? Can Islam be adapted to the modern world, and if so, how fast? Is Islam holding its people back from getting on the globalization train? Will the Islamic faith and its followers continue to grow or begin to fade in the near or distant future? As my research will show, these questions are not new or unique, but are examples of the many questions being asked and studied by scholars today.

⁹¹ CIA World Factbook 2008, s.v. "Religion," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html> (Accessed March 4, 2008). Infoplease.com, s.v. "Top Ten Organized Religions of the World," <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0904108.html> (Accessed March 4, 2008).




Figure 6. Top Ten World Religions

Note: Mid 2004 data was used due to its consistency among multiple sources. Figures of 2007 and earlier show similar values and percentages. Figure 1 is a representation of the relative population of the Islamic religion throughout the world. This Chart includes only organized religions and excludes more loosely defined groups such as Chinese or African traditional religions.

Source: Infoplease.com, s.v. "Top Ten Organized Religions of the World," <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0904108.html> (Accessed March 4, 2008).

B. MIDDLE EASTERN ECONOMICS

This chapter approaches the study of Middle Eastern economics from several different perspectives by looking at the Middle East economy as a whole, by using case analysis, and comparative data analysis of a country's historical GDP and Globalization Index relative to a country's Muslim population percentage. The idea for this analysis came from Frederic Prior's 2006 essay on "The Economic Impact of Islam on Developing Countries." Prior's study focused on developing countries only and he used data from 2000 to perform his analysis. He stated "*that the presence of Islam has*

relatively little influence on most economic or social performance indicators” and that in “*Muslim economies, religion does not appear to be a useful explanatory variable.*”⁹² Again, he only focused on developing countries with majority Muslim populations, but the following analysis section broadens that examination. It was important to compare all countries in order to get a holistic or global view of this “Muslim Variable” or as I would like to coin it, “The Muslim Effect.” The goal here was to see what kind of results or answers could be concluded by conducting simple comparisons of Muslim populations throughout the world and measurable world productivity data (GDP, Globalization Index).

C. MUSLIMS ECONOMICS

As stated in the previous sections and chapters, the Islamic faith plays a significant role in the lives of the Muslim people. The *Qur’ān*, *Hadith*, *Qiyas*, *Ijmā*, and *Ijtihad* all affect the daily lives of billions of Muslims every day, just visit any of the major Ayatollah’s Question & Answer website section. The practices, teachings and laws (*Shari’a* law and *jurisprudence*) that are provided by these life directing sources can and do have limitations on many different levels, and many eventually have an effect (either direct or indirect) on the economic realm. Pryor mentions these limitations in his essay, and Hourani and Esposito define them in their books.⁹³ For example, there are direct economic limitations that prohibit the paying or accepting interest (*ribā*), prohibition of investing in chancy industry business enterprises, and the a “redistribution” of earnings through the well known *zakat* and *khum*, which is short for distributions of charitable donations. These limitations are not absolute, but obviously affect countries with large populations of Muslims (mainly with Muslim majority (>50%) populations). Countries with larger Muslim populations tend to be more effected by the binding economical limitations and laws, *fatwas* or legal judgment of a senior or Islamic specialist, and the opinions of local fundamentalist. So, are Muslims finding ways

⁹² Frederic L Pryor, "The Economic Impact of Islam on Developing Nations," *World Development* (November 2007): Vol. 35, Issue 11, 1815.

⁹³ Frederic L Pryor, "The Economic Impact of Islam on Developing Nations," *World Development* (November 2007): Vol. 35, Issue 11, 1816–1819. John L. Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 30, 90. Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 148.

around the Islamic Law (*Shari'a*) because they want to be successful and be afforded the ability to compete in the global market? The assumption is yes.

D. DEMOCRACY TO CAPITALISM

Robert Dahl observes that political democracy and market-capitalism have a curious relationship. On the one hand, they support each other, whereas on the other hand, they modify and limit each other. This section critiques this interdependence between political democracy and market capitalism, and looks at why Muslims need to embrace Democracy and Capitalism together, and attempts to highlight why they can't have one without the other, because of the true interdependence.

Democracy itself is dependent on the successful practice of market capitalism within its resident society, and at the same time market capitalism, itself, is dependent on the successful practice of democracy. Dahl points out that although this connection is an "I need you and you need me" type relationship, it is also a relationship that involves volatile balancing act of opposing forces, in a fight for a "balance of influence." Market capitalism is supported by Democracy through its government regulation. The same government regulation (the government's power to regulate), and balance thereof, continuously threatens the markets existence. Democracy needs market capitalism to survive, because of the positive influence and impact it has on the polis. So if Democracy over-influences the free market, hence destroying its true nature, it will inevitably destroy the life blood of democracy itself. Dahl's paradox that, "*a market-capitalist economy inevitably generates inequalities in the political resources to which different citizens have access*"⁹⁴, is true. Without market capitalism democracy itself would be at risk and without democracy capitalism would be at risk. Certainly both want and need each other, but they are locked in a permanent and sensitive balancing act attempting not to tip the scale too much one way or the other. There seems to be no relief in the future to the pressure between these two forces, so we should have a basic understanding of what exactly keeps them fighting and at the same time what exactly keeps them together.

⁹⁴ Dahl, *On Democracy*, Yale University Press, 1998, 158

1. I Need You, You Need Me

Why do they need each other? Why does democracy need market capitalism, and why does market capitalism need democracy? As Dahl states, “*market capitalism favors democracy because of its social and political consequences.*”⁹⁵ Basically, market capitalism promotes the economical growth of a population which in turn is a promotion and a foundation for democracy. Economical growth leads to increased wealth, education, and people with jobs at all levels, in effect, a creation of middle class society. It is that same society that promotes democracy and provides the air for its existence. An economy which is not centralized provides opportunities for its citizens to become independent, which is constructive for democracy. Democracy provides, ideally in a non centralized way, the laws and regulations by which the market itself runs. This is done by creating policies and laws to discouraging monopolies and to protect and enforce people’s rights.⁹⁶ In other words, the democratic government must at times step-in in order to protect the citizens from themselves or harmful market practices. This is tricky, because in a sense this “step-in” is contrary to the free market concept, and can lead to both the demise of the market and that of itself, if the government “steps-in” too far. This leads us to why market capitalism and Democracy oppose each other.

2. Balancing the Power of Influence

Why do they fight each other? Why does market capitalism threaten democracy, and why does democracy threaten market capitalism? Basically, for the same reasons market capitalism and democracy need each other, described above. The case still stands that a market economy can never truly be self regulating, and there has never been a democracy that did not extensively regulate a free market.⁹⁷ The power, through democratic means, to effect these regulations of the market can and eventually does lead to corruption in the democratic process, political inequality, hence thwarting democracy. Special interest groups and large corporations (mainly of the free market) fund this type

⁹⁵ Dahl, *On Democracy*, Yale University Press, 1998, 168.

⁹⁶ Dahl, *On Democracy*, Yale University Press, 1998, 174.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 174, 176.

of coercion, corruption, directed political agendas, false advertisements, and misguided information. Some politicians have been guilty of taking bribes (political resources) for their votes and supported regulations and laws which led to gains (profits) for the self interest of the companies, but at the same time were harmful to people those politicians should have been protecting. This has been proven true in the U.S. and among other countries, on many occasions. Dahl states that “*unequal ownership and control of major economic enterprises in turn contribute massively to the inequality in political resources . . . and thus to extensive violations of political equality among democratic citizens.*”⁹⁸ In a sense, the elites of society threaten the point of disguising an Oligarchy as a Democracy. The free market will not last under a false Democracy, and hence is doomed to fail.

So, the paradox stands. Democracy has an affect on market capitalism and market capitalism has an affect on democracy and there is truly no end. The fate of one entity depends solely on the success or failure of the other.

E. WHY HAVE MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIES NOT DIVERSIFIED?

There are several reasons why Middle East economies have not diversified, because this paper is limited in size, its scope will be limited to several generalizations about the Middle East, which do not always necessarily speak to all of the individual states, but rather to a majority of them.

At first glance, one could assume the reason why the Middle East has not diversified is due to the fact that countries in the Middle East inhabit some of the hottest, driest, and limited arable land in the world and secondly that they sit on the some of the largest known oil reserves in the world. It could be a plausible case that, even with the limited of quantity of so many other resources, the abundance of hydrocarbons, and the enormous rents and revenues they have generated for the region, have given the Middle East insufficient, if any, motivation to make investments in any other industry.⁹⁹ This assessment has some truth to it, but only part of the answer.

⁹⁸ Dahl, *On Democracy*, Yale University Press, 1998, 182

⁹⁹ Eckart Woetz, *Gulf Geo-Economics*, (Dubai: Gulf Research Center, 2007), 14.

To begin, much of the Middle East has been defensive towards economic diversification as subset of globalization, mainly due to the actions and effects of the political elites within the region, who are bent on retaining their ruling power.¹⁰⁰ The net effect is that authoritarians, praetorian regimes, and select elites have exploited and controlled just about every facet of the countries in which they govern or have influence on, focusing unquantifiable national assets on personal gain, security system, and militant devices to aid in their governance.¹⁰¹ Consequently, their economies have paid a considerable price and lost out on numerous years of foreign investment, human capital development, and infrastructure development, all of which would have assisted in the diversification process.¹⁰² These consequences are the underlying reasons why the Middle East in general has not particularly diversified and led to the main causes of diversification resistance.

First, one of the major diversifying weaknesses of the Middle East is its development of the private sector. As most economic scholars would suggest, successful integration of a country's private sector into the national economy is essential to economic reform and success.¹⁰³ This is not to say that all counties in the Middle East region have necessarily discouraged their private sectors from flourishing, rich oil producers like Saudi Arabia, which makes up about half of the entire private sector in the GCC, have in fact encouraged it.¹⁰⁴ Overall, smaller oil producer and non-oil producer regimes in the Middle East lack in this area. This deficiency in privatization is mainly due to costly start up fees, lengthy and complex start up processes, corruption, and accounts of cronyism.

¹⁰⁰ Clement H. Henry, and Robert Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 228.

¹⁰¹ Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008), 349.

¹⁰² Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008), 349.

¹⁰³ Louise Luciani, "Oil and Political Economy in the International Relations of the Middle East," *International Relations of the Middle East*, ed. by Louise Fawcett, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 95.

¹⁰⁴ Eckart Woetz, *Gulf Geo-Economics*, (Dubai: Gulf Research Center, 2007), 15.

Second, those countries, such as Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, which have attempted to diversify or reform their economic developmental policies, and mirror plans like the Washington Consensus no less, have inevitably failed to reach any significant benefits to prove its success.¹⁰⁵ Hence little incentive has been provided by a Middle East “success story” to inspire other Middle East countries to follow in their footsteps.¹⁰⁶ With that being said, the oil producers continue to rely heavily on the oil rents to supplement their economies and like wise the non-oil producers continue to rely of the remittances received from those same oil producers.

Overall, the failure to diversify has been failure of the Middle East regime leaders to place the state over personal gains and agendas, invest in and truly foster private sectors, and look beyond the “oil” status quo. In effect, they have been nurtured by their contentment of oil and gas rents, revenues, and remittances from the abundance and success of the global hydrocarbon market.

In what ways has hydrocarbon dependence structured economic and political relationships between the countries of the region? The hydrocarbon dependence has strengthened and weakened economic and political relationships between the countries of the Middle East region. There are two main distinctive relationships which can be seen in the Middle East. The first is the relationship among the major petroleum producers in the region. The second and more involved relationship is the one between the regional petroleum producers/labor importers (oil-rich) and non-petroleum/labor exporters (oil-poor). Because of its complexity, the latter relationship will be the main focus of this portion of the essay.¹⁰⁷

These relationships can also be viewed from two different perspectives. One perspective is that hydrocarbon dependence is bringing Middle East countries together,

¹⁰⁵ Louise Luciani, “Oil and Political Economy in the International Relations of the Middle East,” *International Relations of the Middle East*, ed. by Louise Fawcett, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 94.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Eckart Woetz, *Gulf Geo-Economics*, (Dubai: Gulf Research Center, 2007), 15.

and the other perspective is just the opposite, that hydrocarbon dependence in the region is driving them apart. There is evidence of both.

Although the relationship between the oil-rich and oil poor countries is a complex one, and one in which the region's dependence on oil has made the relationship even more complicated, evidence to support the argument that the hydrocarbon dependence is binding these countries together is fairly transparent.¹⁰⁸ First, there is the simple economic relationship between these states which involves oil-rich countries providing direct and indirect budget subsidies to neighboring oil-poor countries.¹⁰⁹ In return, the oil-rich have expected but not necessarily received some form of political return.¹¹⁰ Second, oil-poor countries receive remittance revenue by providing human labor to the oil-rich countries.¹¹¹ Labor migration in itself has altered the political economy in the Middle East.¹¹² The result is cheap labor for the oil rich countries and remittances for the oil poor countries.¹¹³ In both of these relationships, oil-poor countries see themselves politically fused to oil-rich countries, and although the economic and political commitment may at times seem two-way, there tends to be less commitment from the oil-rich countries, which see more benefit in associating themselves to more significant hydrocarbon-utilizing states (U.S., China, etc), than to oil-poor countries.¹¹⁴

In a similar fashion, evidence to support the argument that the hydrocarbon dependence is dividing these countries is of a comparable transparent nature, and equally important because of its effect on underlying regional relations. Two examples of this

¹⁰⁸ Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008), 385–405.

¹⁰⁹ Louise Luciani, "Oil and Political Economy in the International Relations of the Middle East," *International Relations of the Middle East*, ed. by Louise Fawcett, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 98.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 97.

¹¹¹ Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008), 402.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 405.

¹¹³ Louise Luciani, "Oil and Political Economy in the International Relations of the Middle East," *International Relations of the Middle East*, ed. by Louise Fawcett, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 97.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, and Marcus Noland and Howard Pack, *The Arab Economies in a Changing World*, (Washington D.C.: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007), 217.

divide are the widening wealth divide between the oil-rich and oil-poor countries of the Middle East and a condition known as “Arabization.”¹¹⁵

First, the slow and threaten shift in the region’s balance of power, which began after the discovery oil, led older oil-poor to quickly fall behind the new found oil-rich.¹¹⁶ In effect, while the older oil-poor and ridged countries either wasted economic opportunities or invested in bad ones, the oil-rich made extensive and successful economic gains through steps and eventually leaps towards globalization. The outcome was that wealth in the oil-rich countries continuously bread wealth, which in turn increased the chances for even more wealth.¹¹⁷ With that being said, oil-rich countries have attempted to promote more regional cooperation, which in effect would increase regional interdependence, yet oil-poor countries have declined cooperative efforts for fear that the increased interdependence would diminish their power and influence within the region, which has paradoxically declined because of that unwillingness.¹¹⁸

The second example of regional division may be less obvious than the first, but no less a product of regional hydrocarbon dependence. For a regional which is rich in history and tradition, culture has always played a significant role in the lives of just about every Middle East citizen. “Arabization,” or nationalization of Arab workforces, and “De-Arabization,” or the loss of Arab national identity, have become unspoken points of contention with both political and economic ramifications for both Middle East oil-rich and oil poor countries.¹¹⁹ As labor migration has benefited both oil-rich and oil-poor countries and increased cohesiveness, it has also paradoxically driven them apart. Fear of De-Arabization, which has actually been felt by and caused controversy on both sides,

¹¹⁵ Louise Luciani, “Oil and Political Economy in the International Relations of the Middle East,” *International Relations of the Middle East*, ed. by Louise Fawcett, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 101, and Andrzej Kapiszewski, “De-Arabization in the Gulf: Foreign Labor and the Struggle for Local Culture,” *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*; Summer 2007; 8, 2; Research Library, 86, and Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008), 126.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., Luciani, 98.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Andrzej Kapiszewski, “De-Arabization in the Gulf: Foreign Labor and the Struggle for Local Culture,” *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*; Summer 2007; 8, 2; Research Library, 86.

has provoked oil rich counties to promote ideas like “Saudization,” “Omanization,” and “Emiratization,” as sub-form examples of Arabization, in order to protect oil-rich Arab cultures from external influences, but also to protect Arab oil-rich labor and jobs.¹²⁰ Policies such as reserving professions “for citizen only”, enforcement of employment quotas for local Arabs, and a host of other initiatives (allowing women to drive themselves, private schooling for indigenous Arabs, wage subsidies for blue-collar and white collar jobs) have been advertised in order to decrease the need for foreign workers.¹²¹ This has obviously been seen as a threat to oil-poor country’s labor migration and in effect vital remittances, which inevitably cause political and economic difficulty throughout the region.

F. IS THE MIDDLE EAST AT A TIPPING POINT?

The central economic challenge confronting the Arab world today is how to provide employment for the large numbers of young people entering the labor force.

Noland and Pack Arab Economies at a Tipping Point

The “tipping point” which Noland and Pack describe, is essentially the critical point at which the Arab economy, as a whole, finds itself today. There is no doubt the Arab region is currently, at least on the surface, in a period of accelerated economic gain, but what is the outlook of its future? As Noland and Pack explain, the region has some serious thinking to do and decisions to make. High energy prices have given the Arab region increased wealth, more jobs have been created, and employment is better, but the region as a whole still has one of the world’s highest unemployment rates overall. The Arab region is presently sitting on a powder keg of educated yet unemployed generation of young Arabs, who are quickly approaching their prime productive working years. Current high energy prices have provided adequate rents and profits which have aided in keeping the lid on this powder keg and fostering the Arab economy at the same time. At

¹²⁰ Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008), 126, and See article by Andrzej Kapiszewski, “De-Arabization in the Gulf: Foreign Labor and the Struggle for Local Culture,” *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*; Summer 2007; 8, 2; Research Library, 81–88.

¹²¹ Ibid., Kapiszewski, 86–87.

first glance, the Arab economy looks as if it may continue on a path of apparent prosperity, but for how long? What happens if and when the price and demand for oil unexpectedly go into a continuous downward spiral?

The argument by scholars like Noland and Pack is that leaders of Arab Economies have not been as forward thinking as they should be. There is no doubt they have been investing in their region's future, but most investments have been linked back to the oil sector (oil refining). In addition, the industries they have invested in are many automated industries (fertilizer and aluminum smelting) and unfortunately not in the future job creating sectors such as global technologies and globally manufactured exports. Furthermore, petrodollar recycling has taken place within the region in other areas such as interregional real estate and tourism investments, which again are not tradable sectors. Either way, investments in these areas will do little to help derive global market sectors and produce the much needed job market and industrial environment needed if such a downturn takes place in the future

1. Are Arab Economies at a Tipping Point?

Unequivocally, the answer is yes. The question which leaders in Arab Economies need to answer is what happens from here? The situation which Noland and Pack, the World Bank, and others have described is that essentially the future prices of hydrocarbons and other nonrenewable energy sources is unknown, and arguably it is an extremely volatile market. Current Arab prosperity caused by the "economic energy boom" has given Arab Economies the chance to anticipate and create financial opportunities which would help them to continue on a prosperous track. The decision the Arab region needs to make is whether or not it will take full advantage of this windfall and prepare its population for the competitive global economic environment they will face after the boom has ended. The Arab economy as a whole is facing two distinctly different paths, and the region must make a decision on which way it will go.

A turn in a direction leading toward increased poverty, discontent, militancy, and repression will be the dreadful path taken if economic gaps between the Arab world and the industrial world are not closed, if global manufacturing of exports and technological

innovations are not fostered, and if the most important issue of creating a quality global job market is not solved. To avoid this horrific path, successfully addressing these issues through a range of economic and government reforms and political policy changes is a must.

2. Can We Speak of Arab Economies as a Whole?

Yes, we can speak of Arab Economies as a whole, if we acknowledge the fact that the Arab Economies, as a whole, have revolve around oil and energy production. Also, that the increase in energy prices has had both positive and negative implications for both the oil and non-oil producing countries in the region, especially with respect to the downbeat repercussions on the regional job market, employment, and unemployment. As Noland and Pack stated the “Dutch disease” has affected both the oil and non-oil producers in the Arab region. The young educated people within the oil producing countries have grown up in a system which offers a limited job market, allows them to maintain an unemployed status with little or no negative implications, or forces them to seek higher level employment outside the region where their knowledge can be appreciated and utilized more productively. Non-oil producers, by the same token, have incurred a strain on their labor markets because the wages earned by laborers outside their resident countries and within the oil producing ones far exceed anything offered at home. Local employers and industries within the non producing countries consequently are not able to hire labor with what would normally be considered a standard rate wages due to the competitively higher rates offered abroad. Furthermore, development in global markets has lagged in these countries as well, due to direct or indirect “spillover effects” from oil producing countries’ shaky political policies, authoritarian regime motivations, and regional instability. In turn, this has affected their migration flow or indigenous labor force, and foreign and local investments in the advancement of global market exports.

If we look at the Arab economy as a whole in its current state, with energy prices on the rise, prospects are good for the region. If and when those same energy prices fall, or new energy technologies arise outside the region, it could mean doom for the Arab Economy. With the core income of their economy gone what would they fall back on?

As discussed earlier, the region is weak in global technology and globally manufactured exports. If the volatile floor of the energy market were to collapse from underneath them, the “Arab economy” as we know it would cease to exist. Individual countries and governments would find themselves stressing to find new sectors in which they could be competitive in and would eventually have to face the microeconomic issues (lack of globalization, technological innovation, and the “brain drain”) they have neglected. These economies would find it difficult and hard to adjust to such an economic change given their inadequate preparation of such an event.

There is no doubt that the economies of the Arab region are interconnected between the “resource-rich, labor-importing” and the “resource-poor, labor abundant countries.” If we look at the Arab Economies as a whole, the solution to avoiding the above crisis is to thoughtfully allocate the oil fund windfall into global market sectors that will benefit not only the oil producers, but the non oil producers as well. Additionally, government and political reforms must take place in the powerful and resource rich Arab countries so that the “spillover effect” of economic policies can work across the borders and have a positive affect across the region, and hopefully as regional stability increases, economic growth and development would increase as well.

G. CASE STUDY: COMPARING AND CONTRASTING HOW SAUDI ARABIA AND QATAR HAVE DEALT WITH THE THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION.

As with several of the countries within the MENA region and specifically among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have adopted a combination of elements from different development models. For the most part, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have both sought to implement the oil-export-led growth model, because oil is an important natural resource which both of these countries have an abundance of. Although Saudi Arabia with its plausible ownership of approximately one-fifth of the petroleum on the globe is an exception compared to the rest of the GCC, both countries have adopted and implement this developmental policy.¹²² According to

¹²² Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008), 23.

this model, the original goal of these two countries should be to attain enough revenue from oil exports to eventually build an industrial base that, in the event that their natural resources run dry, would be able to support and sustain their countries in the future.

The goal of export-led growth dovetails into the second developmental policy which Saudi Arabia and Qatar have attempted to implement, that of import-substituting industrialization (ISI). Although the oil-export-led growth model has been the foundational model for many years following the discovery and exploitation of Middle Eastern oil, Saudi Arabia and Qatar painfully learned, or so it seemed, the lesson of depending on a single export when they realized the 1970's oil boom was just that, only a boom. They eventually realized their export revenues were very volatile and "highly dependent on oil price developments."¹²³ In effect, Saudi Arabia and eventually Qatar saw the need to diversify and branch out into other economically viable sectors, and hence they began to adopt elements of the ISI model. The difference here is that Saudi Arabia with many superior advantages (land, labor, and capital) compared to Qatar has been able to implement the ISI model more successfully, and mainly in the areas of fertilizers and petroleum. So, it is with the elements of ISI model that we begin to see a significant difference between the economies of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and realize the size does matter.

Additionally, although not as explicit, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have, over the past few years and especially after the 1970's oil boom, made social-economic changes and adopted some of the elements of the Washington Consensus mainly in the areas of foreign investment and budgeted "priority to primary health, education, and infrastructure investments."¹²⁴ Again, we can see differences in each country's ability to adopt and implement changes within the government and economy. If we look to the relative size of the country, Qatar has the advantage in this respect, because as a relatively smaller

¹²³ Steffen Hertog, "Segmented Clientelism: The Political Economy of Saudi Economic Reform Efforts," *Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs*, ed. Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonnemen (London: Hurst & Company, 2006), 111. and Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008), 23.

¹²⁴ Clement H. Henry and Robert Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 168 and 13.

country it tends to run and operate more like a large business, and therefore compared to Saudi Arabia is able to make and implement decisions faster and react to changes in the economy quicker. In a similar fashion, Qatar although arguably more liberal than Saudi Arabia, witness the Al-Jazeera network, tends to be more flexible in its policies and therefore able to flex to more international ideas like the Washington Consensus.

1. Domestic, Regional and International Factors which Induced the Selection of this Combination of Models

As describe in the earlier question, the obvious answer lies within the discovery, want, and need for oil globally, the abundance of that oil, and the limited non-petroleum resources available in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and not to be forgotten the nature of these regimes which survived imperialism in the wake of the post colonial era. Still, there is no doubt that the discovery of abundant oil reserves allowed these two countries to easily slip into the export-led growth model managed by a monarchy and authoritarian government. Over time and as events like the 1970's Oil boom and the following oil decline, as well as an actual and perceived instability in the MENA region caused these countries to begin the process of adopting elements of the ISI model in addition to the export model. Furthermore, pressures from western petroleum consumers eventually encourage and persuaded Saudi Arabia and Qatar both with "concentrated finical systems" to further diversify their developmental models to include the adoption of some elements of the Washington Consensus.¹²⁵

2. Opposition to Models within Saudi Arabia and Qatar

Saudi Arabia and Qatar have not necessarily had to contend with an immense amount of opposition to their combined or mixed developmental models per se. Opposition if any has mainly come from extern pressure to either further adapt to the ISI or Washington Consensus models in preparation of perceived eventual downturn in the global market for oil or the physical evaporation of their oil reserves.

¹²⁵ Clement H. Henry and Robert Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 168.

Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar's internal opposition can be viewed from two points of view. From one point, we can look at the social welfare system in either nation, and see that its robustness has and will continue to persuade the indigenous populous to maintain the status quo. As long as adequate welfare checks continue to support their lifestyle, they will continue to be happy. The perceived problem with this scenario is obvious, if the checks stop coming as the government eventually goes into debt due to a downturn in the oil market, there will more than likely be civil unrest and the populous will have little experience to get it going again. But until this happens, presumably there will be little opposition to either the development models or to the political structure of either country. Furthermore, the current GDP per capita (Saudi Arabia's GDP per capita ~\$23,000 and Qatar's GDP per capita is ~\$87,000 and one of the highest in the world) of either country is nothing to scoff at and this represents the capital influence of the oil export model on the populous pocketbooks.¹²⁶

From another view, opposition to the combined models, but maybe more so toward the type of governance, which could eventually gain some ground, is in the limiting of privatizing numerous sectors in the many financial and industrial sectors of the economy. Furthermore, reform requests in several other areas include the problems with privatization of certain public sectors of the economy and a move away from indigenous labor forces clogging up the public and governmental job sector.¹²⁷ As it stands today, there is a blurry line between what is private and what is public in these two countries.¹²⁸ Although many of Saudi Arabia and Qatar's principle businesses do well within the realm of a globalized world, an additional private sector could possibly increase and eventually supplement their already booming export-based economy in the long run.¹²⁹ If

¹²⁶ CIA World Fact Book 2008, s.v. "*Qatar*," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/qa.html> (Accessed December 10, 2008), and CIA World Fact Book 2008, s.v. "*Saudi Arabia*," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html> (Accessed December 10, 2008).

¹²⁷ Clement H. Henry and Robert Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 169.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

and when the oil export model begins to turn sour for these two countries due to a downturn on the oil market, and presumably Qatar will be affected first, it is more likely that opposition forces to the oil export model will rise.

3. Weaknesses of Models

The problem with the selection of the export-led growth model is that both Saudi Arabia and Qatar are limited in their non-petroleum resources and therefore limited in creating secondary sustainable industrial based economy. Comparatively and due to its inadequate land mass, Qatar with 4,416 square miles is much more limited in this perspective than that of Saudi Arabia with 830,000 square miles.¹³⁰ Similar, Qatar is limited in arable land, water, and population compared to Saudi Arabia. So, in a sense and in this specific case, size does matter. All other things being equal Qatar is more likely to be susceptible to export resource depletion than Saudi Arabia.

Second, overtime and as history has shown us, countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar whose export revenues and therefore economies are primarily based on a single export are very dependant on the market price fluctuations for that single export. As witnessed in the 80's through to 2000, a simple and drastic change in the price of oil can disrupt their economies for an unknown period of time.

The third weakness of the export-led growth model for Saudi Arabia and Qatar is found in the lack of incentive to develop their human capital. This lack of incentive is due in part to the combination of each government's political structure and large incomes generated from their oil export revenues. There is no doubt that the poor native labor market development in Saudi Arabia and Qatar's indigenous human capital is due mainly to these two factors. This combination has led to the creation of a "cradle-to-the grave welfare system" which much of the population relies on and has no incentive to remove itself from.¹³¹ This is not to say that either country does not believe in or foster

¹³⁰ CIA World Fact Book 2008, s.v. "*Qatar*," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/qa.html> (Accessed December 10, 2008), and CIA World Fact Book 2008, s.v. "*Saudi Arabia*," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html> (Accessed December 10, 2008).

¹³¹ Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008), 24.

education. This is simply not the case for either Saudi Arabia or Qatar. Both countries have diverted funds from oil rent incomes and placed them towards education programs for their people. Qatar has built an Education City and created a Supreme Education Council.¹³² Saudi Arabia has invested in numerous schools, colleges, and training institutions as well as provided scholarships to even send students to western institutions of higher-education. The problem which these two countries face is not the education of the populous, but the motivation for them to actually work and be productive citizens.¹³³ With a limited job market and a limit to attractive job opportunities for educated personnel, a robust welfare system, and the possibility to fill a respectable Saudi or Qatari position in the future, most citizen will easily opt to remain in a welfare status until an opportunity which is in a position of authority, has status, and is respected makes itself available. In other words, the citizens have what is known as the “mudir syndrome.”¹³⁴

4. How Have Saudi Arabia and Qatar Dealt with Key Developmental Challenges?

Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar have presumably seen the writing on the wall, especially after the 70’s oil boom and 80’s and 90’s oil crash. As explained earlier, size does matter. Because of this unfortunate but real economic conundrum, these two countries have dealt with the developmental challenges similarly but, because of the physical difference, on a slightly differently scale.

Saudi Arabia has attempted to expand and invest in several different ventures in order to deal with an uncertain oil export future, and based on the consumption and production rates of the future it is perceived that they sit on oil reserves which are predicted “to last 50 to 250 years,” but nobody knows for sure, maybe not even the

¹³² Aylin Erman, “MIDDLE EAST: Think Independent,” *Harvard International Review*; Winter 2007; 28, 4; 12.

¹³³ Clement H. Henry and Robert Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 179.

¹³⁴ Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008), 23, and Clement H. Henry and Robert Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 181.

Saudis.¹³⁵ This prediction has led them to develop and invest in several strategies. The first of which is based around a petroleum-based industry, which focuses on “petrochemical complexes, fertilizer plants, aluminum smelting, and steel production.”¹³⁶ These industries are energy and capital intensive and will exploit the huge oil capacity of the country as well as the plethora of capital Saudi Arabia has acquired during the recent oil boom of the early 2000’s. Saudi Arabia’s second strategy is to expand the country’s infrastructure with construction projects launched throughout the country, for example King Abdullah Economic City and several others planned economic cities. Focus on this strategy has been placed in road, shopping mall, and officer building construction, but because of the current limited infrastructure and the numerous requests for projects of incredible magnitude, these endeavors have been slow to take off, but are increasing exponentially.¹³⁷ Saudi Arabia’s third and most common of the GCC state’s strategies is the investment of their oil revenue funds into financial institutions in the West. This seems to have been a “no brainer” for Saudi Arabia, because they benefited from tapping into the knowledge and expertise of the western financial industry and made enormous gains. Lastly, Saudi Arabia has begun the process of sanctioning greater position for foreign institutions by increasing its regulatory quality in order to perk up the attractiveness and outlook of its financial markets in order to boost foreign investment within the country.¹³⁸

Qatar, although still relatively abundant in its oil supplies, is really limited to just that, oil and natural gas. Qatar is limited in its expansion of infrastructure due to the amount of developable land and the established infrastructure is weak to say the least. On the other hand, Qatar has attempted to transform and become an example for Middle Eastern economic and social change by investing in and establishing institutions like the

¹³⁵ Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008), 24.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 23.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Marcus Noland and Howard Pack, *The Arab Economies in a Changing World*, (Washington D.C.: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007), 119.

Education City, Sports City, and the Qatar Financial Centre (QFC).¹³⁹ On the same note, Qatar's industrial economy already rests on the shoulders of an immigrant population which makes up somewhere between sixty and seventy percent of a total population of approximately one million people within the country.¹⁴⁰ Even with these surprising statistics, Qatar is attempting to build a future like a country which realizes it will eventually run out of its single largest export. Qatar, like Saudi Arabia, has successfully invested overseas and in Western institutions, and will likely rely on the money earned there in the foreseeable future. Along those same lines Qatar has followed suit with the smaller GCC states and invested in off shore banking, free trade zone, and reshipment center infrastructures in hopes of creating and sustaining a market share in the Middle East financial industry.¹⁴¹

An example of Saudi Arabia and Qatar's attempts to adopt a more western model of doing business and in an attempt to attract foreign investments, they have both carefully stepped into the controversial sharia realm of financial investments and interests. Since 2001, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar, along with several other Islamic states, have become issuers of "sukuks, or sharia-compliant Islamic bonds" in order to become competitive with the likes of western and global conventional financial institutions.¹⁴² Instead of paying or accepting interest, which is against the sharia law, the sukuks derive payments from cash flows from material assets and paid out in dividends.¹⁴³ In other words, they have found a work around or loop hole to the sharia in order to become competitive within global finance.

¹³⁹ Marcus Noland and Howard Pack, *The Arab Economies in a Changing World*, (Washington D.C.: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007), 111.

¹⁴⁰ CIA World Fact Book 2008, s.v. "Qatar," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/qa.html> (Accessed December 10, 2008), and CIA World Fact Book 2008, s.v. "Saudi Arabia," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html> (Accessed December 10, 2008).

¹⁴¹ Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008), 67, and Marcus Noland and Howard Pack, *The Arab Economies in a Changing World*, (Washington D.C.: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007), 119.

¹⁴² Marcus Noland and Howard Pack, *The Arab Economies in a Changing World*, (Washington D.C.: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007), 115.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

5. Comparing the Suitability and Sustainability of Saudi Arabia's and Qatar's Strategies by in Grappling with Globalization

In Saudi Arabia and Qatar's defense they have begun the morphing process towards economic efficacy, but in grappling with globalization, regional instability, and with national, regional, and international external pressures, their combined developmental policies may sustain in them in the short run. For the most part, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar's economies are still primarily petroleum based and follow the oil-export-led growth model. From their perspectives this may be the most suitable strategy for both of these countries, but in the assessment of most MENA economic scholars this is not necessarily the case.¹⁴⁴ These countries still face issues of fiscal transparency and accountability which they are comfortable with, and because of this opaqueness these two countries have to miss out on foreign private investment.¹⁴⁵ Until their models morph into a more Anglo-American like model or something similar will practices transparency accountability Saudi Arabia and Qatar will both continue to loose out on foreign private investment for the foreseeable future.¹⁴⁶

On the other hand, even though Saudi Arabia and Qatar financial institutions have been traditionally centered on Islamic economics and transparent business practices, these states have been so heavy involved in the world hydrocarbon sector that the globalized nature of the oil business and their more modern and mostly western consumers have inadvertently forced them to become accountable and somewhat transparent.¹⁴⁷ As stated earlier, this hesitance to open up is an artifact left over from a period of war and colonization. Granted, Saudi Arabia and Qatar were less tainted than the most countries of the GCC, and therefore actually preserved their societies in a way which has allowed them to retain the skills of there native capitalists and their pluralistic

¹⁴⁴ See Tim Niblock and Monica Malik, *The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia*, (New York: Routledge, 2007).

¹⁴⁵ Clement H. Henry and Robert Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 225.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Clement H. Henry and Robert Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 225.

societies. But the fact remains, when compared to western society, those societies which apply or practice a “more flexible political system” tend to react and better handle the principle effects of globalization.¹⁴⁸

In general, especially in Saudi Arabia’s case, there is no real shortage of capital and the future prospective of oil seems to be positive, even given the recent events of 2008. Armed with this information, and it can only be perceived that there will be no true reason for absolute economic reform or political change. As I once heard on a BBC radio program, “pain is the ultimate motivator for change,” and this seems to be a statement fit and applicable to Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Short of the oil markets dropping out from underneath them like the years from the mid 1980’s through the year 2000, or the oil wells drying up, there will be little to persuade Saudi Arabia or Qatar from exploiting their gift of a precious nature resource and grasping onto the power it has provided.¹⁴⁹ Yet, the problems which Saudi Arabia and Qatar will face in the future may be more than they can handle if there is a collapse in the oil market or when oil reserves evaporate.¹⁵⁰ Furthermore their problem will be worsened by the fact that their work force has no real experience and their populations have continued to rapidly expand, therefore civil unrest is more likely become rampant as the welfare system dries up, and Islamist which has been hiding in the shadows will eventual immerge from the shadows and quickly gain followers, inevitably turning hostile against a weak and poor government.¹⁵¹ This is a sad but foreseeable scenario for these countries if they do not develop a suitable and sustainable plan for the future.

H. GLOBAL DATA ANALYSIS

Fredrick Pryor’s universal thoughts on religious member measurement seem to be true, where accuracy of any religion can be questioned due to three factors, formal versus

¹⁴⁸ Clement H. Henry and Robert Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 228–229.

¹⁴⁹ Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008), 407.

¹⁵⁰ Tim Niblock and Monica Malik, *The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 1.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

informal membership, the advantage of misrepresenting size of religious population, and the defined boundaries crossing of similar religions.¹⁵² Although Pryor used data from a study done by Barrett, Kuran, and Johnson (2001), the data used in this essay was collected by the Central Intelligence Agency, from a source known as the CIA Factbook, which is easily accessible and reliable (See Tables 1 and 2).¹⁵³ The globalization index data was collected from the KOF Index of Globalization website (see Table 3),¹⁵⁴ which contained a well defined explanation of their variables and calculations.

This section took an uncomplicated approach and looked at the variables of GDP, Globalization Index performance, and Muslim population percentages, to see what type of information could be derived from performing a simple linear regression on these variables using current (2007) statistical data. The goal was to see if any prediction or correlation in economic performance could be determined. Furthermore, GDP and Muslim Population data from 2000 was also collected to see what type of conclusions could be drawn from comparing this pre-9/11 period with the current post-9/11 period.

All other things being equal, a simple comparison, of the GDP and Muslim population of all the U.S. recognized countries of the world percentages from 2000, resulted in a non-conclusive negative correlation ($r^2 = -.076$) between the two variables, as seen in Figure 7.

The weak correlation concluded that as Muslim population percentages increased, state GDP decreased. The same yet somewhat higher correlation was seen when the analysis was run with the 2007 data ($r^2 = -.092$), see Figure 8.

Although these regression lines were inconclusive, if compared, show that countries with small Muslim population percentages at one end of the spectrum increased an overall average GDP value by as much as 75 billion dollars, while countries with relatively higher Muslim populations at the other end of the spectrum, actually decreased

¹⁵² Tim Niblock and Monica Malik, *The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), Pryor, 1816.

¹⁵³ Frederic L Pryor, "The Economic Impact of Islam on Developing Nations," *World Development* (November 2007): Vol. 35, Issue 11, 1816.

¹⁵⁴ KOF Index of Globalization, s.v. "Detailed Rankings," http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/rankings_2008.pdf (Accessed April 15, 2008).

their average GDP by as much as 25 billion dollars. With that understanding, in 2000 for every 1 percent increase in a countries Muslim population there was an average 1.75 billion dollar loss in GDP. In 2007 the figure was even higher, for every 1 percent increase in Muslim population there was a 2.75 billion dollar loss in GDP. Over the seven-year period, that was an approximate loss in GDP of about 6 percent per year.





Figure 7. GDP vs. Country Muslim Percentage (2000)

Note: Figure 2 is scaled down to emphasize the significance of the trend line, outliers with GDP greater than \$300 billion are not displayed, but were used to calculate the regression.

Sources: CIA World Factbook 2001, s.v. "Religion," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html> (Accessed March 4, 2008) and CIA World Fact Book 2001, s.v. "GDP," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html> (Accessed March 4, 2008).



GDP vs MUSLIM PERCENTAGE (2007)

Figure 8. GDP vs. State Muslim Percentage (2007)

Note: Figure 3 is scaled down to emphasize the significance of the trend line, outliers with GDP greater than \$300 billion are not displayed, but were used to calculate the regression.

Sources: CIA World Factbook 2008, s.v. "Religion," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html> (Accessed March 4, 2008) and CIA World Fact Book 2008, s.v. "GDP," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html> (Accessed March 4, 2008).

A higher correlation was achieved when the 2007 Globalization index (GI) and Muslim Populations were compared. The resultant r^2 was equal to -.22, but again not extremely conclusive that higher Muslim populations negatively affect their countries Globalization index rating. Of note, after analyzing the GI data more carefully, it was discovered that approximately 20 significant and predominately Muslim countries (greater than 50%) were left out of the GI. The assumption is that there was not enough data for those countries to give them an accurate GI value. For arguments sake, when these countries were added to the data, and given the arbitrary GI value of 25 (the lowest GI value given for 2007), the r^2 significantly increased to -.45 (see Figure 9).

As the results of this analysis were not overly conclusive as to the effect of a Muslim population on a country's economics, it was clear that this study was oversimplified and too basic to conclude that a comparison of Muslim population percentages to GDP or GI alone could predict the economic performance of a country. But it does question the possibility that Islam as a religion, along with its followers, can have a direct effect or indirect affect on a country's economy. Further study and a more detailed analysis, with respect to the economic effects of Islamic religiosity (similar to the McCleary and Barro Study) and countries with majority Muslim populations, will be conducted via separate a follow-on paper. Another follow-on study would be to compare Christian communities in this same respect to see how the progress of these communities compared to Islamic communities. Nations with a majority of Christian followers are doing much better in the global market than many of the other religions. Yet another interesting study on how countries with Muslim majorities fair in the market (as of 2007 approximately 50 out of 230 countries have a religious Islamic majority), as well as those countries with Muslim population greater than 50 percent, would be tantalizing. Even better may be to compare countries with similar populations and percentages and see how they fair against each other with respect to their economic development.




Figure 9. Globalization Index vs. State Muslim Percentages (2007)

Sources: CIA World Factbook 2008, s.v. "Religion," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html> (Accessed March 4, 2008) and CIA World Fact Book 2008, (Accessed March 4, 2008), s.v. "Detailed Rankings," http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/rankings_2008.pdf (Accessed April 15, 2008)

It is obvious that this section is only a scratch on the surface of understanding the connection between Islam and economics. As with the scholars in the Middle Eastern field have come to understand, those who continue to research this topic and drive deeper into the other comparable factors, which undermine the Islamic countries from entering the flattening Global Market playing field, have a difficult road ahead.¹⁵⁵

Although, future research will be enlightening, heartbreaking, and exciting, given the right amount of time, continued cultural understanding, and armed with the proper knowledge Muslims will band together and rise up against the fundamentalist who are resisting adaptation to modern society and social openness. Muslims will eventually

¹⁵⁵ See for example, Thomas L Friedman, *The World is Flat*, (New York: Picador 2005).

fight for change and fight for the right to take advantage of the positive gains and fruits of globalization. They will get on the globalization train, even if they have to run after it and grab onto the caboose with one arm. Muslims must get on the train for their very survival.

Table 1. (2000 Data)

Country	% Muslim	GDP (Billions)	Country	% Muslim	GDP (Billions)	Country	% Muslim	GDP (Billions)
<i>Afghanistan</i>	99	\$21.0	<i>Congo, Rep. of the</i>	2	\$3.1	<i>India</i>	12	\$2,200.0
<i>Albania</i>	70	\$10.5	<i>Cook Islands</i>	0	\$0.1	<i>Indonesia</i>	88	\$654.0
<i>Algeria</i>	99	\$171.0	<i>Costa Rica</i>	0	\$25.0	<i>Iran</i>	99	\$413.0
<i>American Samoa</i>	0	\$0.5	<i>Cote d'Ivoire</i>	27	\$26.2	<i>Iraq</i>	97	\$57.0
<i>Andorra</i>	0	\$1.2	<i>Croatia</i>	1.2	\$24.9	<i>Ireland</i>	0	\$81.9
<i>Angola</i>	0	\$10.1	<i>Cuba</i>	0	\$19.2	<i>Israel</i>	14.6	\$110.2
<i>Anguilla</i>	0	\$0.1	<i>Cyprus</i>	18	\$0.8	<i>Italy*</i>	10	\$1,273.0
<i>Antigua & Barbuda</i>	0	\$0.5	<i>Czech Republic</i>	0	\$132.4	<i>Jamaica</i>	0	\$9.7
<i>Argentina</i>	0	\$476.0	<i>Denmark</i>	2	\$136.2	<i>Japan</i>	0	\$3,150.0
<i>Armenia</i>	0	\$10.0	<i>Djibouti</i>	94	\$0.6	<i>Jersey</i>	0	\$2.2
<i>Aruba</i>	0	\$2.0	<i>Dominica</i>	0	\$0.3	<i>Jordan</i>	92	\$17.3
<i>Australia</i>	0	\$445.8	<i>Dominican Republic</i>	0	\$48.3	<i>Kazakhstan</i>	47	\$85.6
<i>Austria</i>	0	\$208.0	<i>Ecuador</i>	0	\$37.2	<i>Kenya</i>	7	\$45.6
<i>Azerbaijan</i>	93.4	\$23.5	<i>Egypt</i>	94	\$247.0	<i>Kiribati</i>	0	\$0.1
<i>Bahamas, The</i>	0	\$4.5	<i>El Salvador</i>	0	\$24.0	<i>Korea, North</i>	0	\$22.0
<i>Bahrain</i>	100	\$10.1	<i>Equatorial Guinea</i>	0	\$1.0	<i>Korea, South</i>	0	\$764.6
<i>Bangladesh</i>	83	\$203.0	<i>Eritrea*</i>	25	\$2.9	<i>Kuwait</i>	85	\$29.3
<i>Barbados</i>	0	\$4.0	<i>Estonia</i>	0	\$14.7	<i>Kyrgyzstan</i>	75	\$12.6
<i>Belarus</i>	0	\$78.8	<i>Ethiopia</i>	47.5	\$39.2	<i>Laos</i>	0	\$9.0
<i>Belgium</i>	0	\$259.2	<i>Falkland Isle</i>	0	\$0.1	<i>Latvia</i>	0	\$17.3
<i>Belize</i>	0	\$0.8	<i>Faroe Islands</i>	0	\$0.9	<i>Lebanon</i>	70	\$18.2
<i>Benin</i>	20	\$6.6	<i>Fiji</i>	8	\$5.9	<i>Lesotho</i>	0	\$5.1
<i>Bermuda</i>	0	\$2.1	<i>Finland</i>	0	\$118.3	<i>Liberia</i>	20	\$3.4
<i>Bhutan</i>	0	\$2.3	<i>France</i>	3	\$1,448.0	<i>Libya</i>	97	\$45.4
<i>Bolivia</i>	0	\$20.9	<i>French Guiana</i>	0	\$1.0	<i>Liechtenstein</i>	0	\$0.7
<i>Bosnia & Herzegovina</i>	0	\$6.5	<i>French Polynesia</i>	0	\$2.6	<i>Lithuania</i>	0	\$26.4
<i>Botswana</i>	0	\$10.4	<i>Gabon</i>	0	\$7.7	<i>Luxembourg</i>	0	\$15.9
<i>Brazil</i>	0	\$1,130.0	<i>Gambia, The</i>	90	\$1.5	<i>Macao</i>	0	\$7.8
<i>British Virgin Islands</i>	0	\$0.3	<i>Gaza Strip</i>	98.7	\$1.1	<i>Macedonia</i>	30	\$9.0
<i>Brunei</i>	67	\$5.9	<i>Georgia</i>	11	\$22.8	<i>Madagascar</i>	7	\$12.3
<i>Bulgaria</i>	13	\$48.0	<i>Germany</i>	1.7	\$1,936.0	<i>Malawi</i>	20	\$9.4
<i>Burkina Faso</i>	50	\$12.0	<i>Ghana</i>	30	\$37.4	<i>Malaysia</i>	0	\$223.7
<i>Burma</i>	4	\$63.7	<i>Gibraltar</i>	69	\$0.5	<i>Maldives</i>	100	\$0.6
<i>Burundi</i>	10	\$4.4	<i>Greece</i>	1.3	\$181.9	<i>Mali</i>	90	\$9.1
<i>Cambodia</i>	0	\$16.1	<i>Greenland</i>	0	\$1.1	<i>Malta</i>	0	\$5.6
<i>Cameroon</i>	20	\$26.0	<i>Grenada</i>	0	\$0.4	<i>Man, Isle of</i>	0	\$1.4
<i>Canada</i>	0	\$774.7	<i>Guadeloupe</i>	0	\$3.7	<i>Marshall Islands</i>	0	\$0.1
<i>Cape Verde</i>	0	\$0.7	<i>Guam</i>	0	\$3.2	<i>Martinique</i>	0	\$4.4
<i>Cayman Islands</i>	0	\$0.9	<i>Guatemala</i>	0	\$46.2	<i>Mauritania</i>	100	\$5.4
<i>Central African Rep.</i>	15	\$6.1	<i>Guernsey</i>	0	\$1.3	<i>Mauritius</i>	166	\$12.3
<i>Chad</i>	50	\$8.1	<i>Guinea</i>	85	\$10.0	<i>Mayotte</i>	97	\$0.1
<i>Chile</i>	0	\$153.1	<i>Guinea-Bissau</i>	45	\$1.1	<i>Mexico</i>	0	\$915.0
<i>China</i>	25	\$4,500.0	<i>Guyana</i>	9	\$3.4	<i>Micronesia</i>	0	\$0.3
<i>Christmas Island</i>	10	\$NA	<i>Haiti</i>	0	\$12.7	<i>Moldova</i>	0	\$11.3
<i>Cocos Islands</i>	57	\$NA	<i>Honduras</i>	0	\$17.0	<i>Monaco</i>	0	\$0.9
<i>Colombia</i>	0	\$250.0	<i>Hong Kong</i>	0	\$181.0	<i>Mongolia</i>	0	\$4.7
<i>Comoros</i>	98	\$0.4	<i>Hungary</i>	0	\$113.9	<i>Montserrat</i>	0	\$0.0
<i>Congo, Dem. Rep.</i>	10	\$31.0	<i>Iceland</i>	0	\$6.9	<i>Morocco</i>	98.7	\$105.0

Table 1. 2000 GDP Data

Table 1. (2000 Data) Continued

Country	% Muslim	GDP (Billions)	Country	% Muslim	GDP (Billions)
Mozambique	20	\$19.1	Singapore*	14.9	\$109.8
Namibia	0	\$7.6	Slovakia	0	\$55.3
Nauru	0	\$0.1	Slovenia	1	\$22.9
Nepal	3.8	\$33.7	Solomon Islands	0	\$0.9
Netherlands	4.4	\$388.4	Somalia	100	\$4.3
Netherlands Antilles	0	\$2.4	South Africa	0	\$369.0
New Caledonia	0	\$3.0	Spain	0	\$720.8
New Zealand	0	\$67.6	Sri Lanka	7	\$62.7
Nicaragua	0	\$13.1	Sudan	70	\$35.7
Niger	80	\$10.0	Suriname	19.6	\$1.5
Nigeria	50	\$117.0	Swaziland	10	\$4.4
Niue	0	\$0.0	Sweden	0	\$197.0
Norfolk Island	0	\$NA	Switzerland	0	\$207.0
N. Mariana Islands	0	\$0.9	Syria	90	\$50.9
Norway	0	\$124.1	Tajikistan	85	\$7.3
Oman*	75	\$19.6	Tanzania	35	\$25.1
Pakistan	97	\$282.0	Thailand	3.8	\$413.0
Palau	0	\$0.1	Togo	12	\$7.3
Panama	0	\$16.6	Tokelau	0	\$0.0
Papua New Guinea	0	\$12.2	Tonga	0	\$0.2
Paraguay	0	\$26.2	Trinidad & Tobago	5.8	\$11.2
Peru	0	\$123.0	Tunisia	98	\$62.8
Philippines	5	\$310.0	Turkey	99	\$444.0
Pitcairn Islands	0	\$NA	Turkmenistan	89	\$19.6
Poland	0	\$327.5	Turks & Caicos Isles	0	\$0.1
Portugal	0	\$159.0	Tuvalu	0	\$0.0
Puerto Rico	0	\$39.0	Uganda	16	\$26.2
Qatar	95	\$15.1	Ukraine	0	\$189.4
Reunion	0	\$3.4	United Arab Emirates	96	\$54.0
Romania	0	\$132.5	United Kingdom	2.5	\$1,360.0
Russia*	12	\$1,120.0	United States	0	\$9,963.0
Rwanda	1.9	\$6.4	Uruguay	0	\$31.0
Saint Helena	0	\$0.0	Uzbekistan	88	\$60.0
St. Kitts & Nevis	0	\$0.3	Vanuatu	0	\$0.2
Saint Lucia	0	\$0.7	Venezuela	0	\$146.2
St. Pierre & Miquelon	0	\$0.1	Vietnam	0	\$154.4
St. Vincent & Grenadines	0	\$0.3	Virgin Islands	0	\$1.8
Samoa	0	\$0.6	Wallis and Futuna	0	\$0.0
San Marino	0	\$0.9	West Bank	75	\$3.1
Sao Tome & Principe	0	\$0.2	Yemen	99	\$14.4
Saudi Arabia	100	\$232.0	Yugoslavia	19	\$24.2
Senegal	92	\$16.0	Zambia	24	\$8.5
Seychelles	0	\$0.6	Zimbabwe	0	\$28.2
Sierra Leone	60	\$2.7	Taiwan	0	\$386.0

Table 2. 2000 GDP and Muslim Percentage Data (Continued from Table 1)

*Note: Some Muslim percentages were not specifically defined in the CIA World Factbook 2001; countries such as Russia Singapore had no percentage value so 2007 percentages were used. Some countries reported their Muslim population as "other," to be consistent; those countries were given a zero percentage. Somalia which reported no percentage but reported Islam as their only religion were given a value of 100 percent. Countries (Italy and Eritrea) which gave a mix of religions including Islam but no percentage value, were given a proportion value of based on the number of religions listed. Where 2000 data was not available, the CIA World Factbook supplied the most recent and current data available. Sources: CIA World Factbook 2001, s.v. "Religion," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html> (Accessed March 4, 2008) and CIA World Fact Book 2001, s.v. "GDP," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html> (Accessed March 4, 2008).

Table 2. (2007 Data)

Country	% Muslim	GDP (Billions)	Country	% Muslim	GDP (Billions)	Country	% Muslim	GDP (Billions)
<i>Afghanistan</i>	99	\$9.9	<i>Costa Rica</i>	0	\$22.8	<i>Ireland</i>	0	\$253.3
<i>Albania</i>	70	\$11.2	<i>Côte d'Ivoire</i>	37.5	\$19.5	<i>Isle of Man</i>	0	\$2.7
<i>Algeria</i>	99	\$125.9	<i>Croatia</i>	13	\$51.0	<i>Israel</i>	16	\$132.5
<i>American Samoa</i>	0	\$333.8	<i>Cuba</i>	0	\$45.1	<i>Italy</i>	0	\$2,068.0
<i>Andorra</i>	0	\$0.0	<i>Cyprus</i>	18	\$17.4	<i>Jamaica</i>	0	\$8.9
<i>Angola</i>	0	\$61.0	<i>Czech Republic</i>	0	\$168.1	<i>Japan</i>	0	\$4,346.0
<i>Anguilla</i>	0	\$0.1	<i>Denmark</i>	2	\$310.7	<i>Jersey</i>	0	\$5.1
<i>Antigua and Barbuda</i>	0	\$1.1	<i>Djibouti</i>	94	\$0.8	<i>Jordan</i>	92	\$15.7
<i>Argentina</i>	0	\$245.6	<i>Dominica</i>	0	\$0.3	<i>Kazakhstan</i>	47	\$95.5
<i>Armenia</i>	0	\$9.3	<i>Dominican Republic</i>	0	\$35.5	<i>Kenya</i>	10	\$29.5
<i>Aruba</i>	0	\$2.3	<i>Ecuador</i>	0	\$44.5	<i>Kiribati</i>	0	\$0.1
<i>Australia</i>	0	\$889.7	<i>Egypt</i>	90	\$127.9	<i>North Korea</i>	0	\$2.2
<i>Austria</i>	42	\$366.7	<i>El Salvador</i>	0	\$20.2	<i>South Korea</i>	0	\$991.0
<i>Azerbaijan</i>	93.4	\$31.1	<i>Equatorial Guinea</i>	0	\$9.5	<i>Kosovo*</i>	25	\$3.2
<i>Bahamas</i>	0	\$6.6	<i>Eritrea</i>	0	\$1.4	<i>Kuwait</i>	85	\$103.4
<i>Bahrain</i>	81.2	\$16.9	<i>Estonia</i>	0	\$21.2	<i>Kyrgyzstan</i>	75	\$3.5
<i>Bangladesh</i>	83	\$70.6	<i>Ethiopia</i>	32.8	\$16.9	<i>Laos</i>	0	\$4.0
<i>Barbados</i>	0	\$3.7	<i>Falkland Islands</i>	0	\$0.0	<i>Latvia</i>	0	\$27.0
<i>Belarus</i>	0	\$38.7	<i>Faroe Islands</i>	0	\$1.7	<i>Lebanon</i>	59.7	\$24.0
<i>Belgium</i>	0	\$442.8	<i>Fiji</i>	7	\$3.3	<i>Lesotho</i>	0	\$1.6
<i>Belize</i>	0	\$1.3	<i>Finland</i>	0	\$236.1	<i>Liberia</i>	20	\$0.7
<i>Benin</i>	0	\$5.4	<i>France</i>	7.5	\$2,515.0	<i>Libya</i>	97	\$66.0
<i>Bermuda</i>	0	\$0.0	<i>French Polynesia</i>	0	\$3.8	<i>Liechtenstein</i>	0	\$36.3
<i>Bhutan</i>	0	\$1.2	<i>Gabon</i>	0	\$10.3	<i>Lithuania</i>	0	\$28.6
<i>Bolivia</i>	0	\$12.8	<i>The Gambia</i>	90	\$0.4	<i>Luxembourg</i>	0	\$47.7
<i>Bosnia-Herzegovina</i>	40	\$14.2	<i>Gaza Strip</i>	99.3	\$5.3	<i>Macao</i>	0	\$14.3
<i>Botswana</i>	0	\$11.4	<i>Georgia</i>	9.9	\$9.6	<i>Rep. of Macedonia</i>	33.3	\$6.9
<i>Brazil</i>	0	\$1,269.0	<i>Germany</i>	3.7	\$3,259.0	<i>Madagascar</i>	7	\$7.3
<i>British Virgin Islands</i>	0	\$0.8	<i>Ghana</i>	15.9	\$14.9	<i>Malawi</i>	12.8	\$3.4
<i>Brunei</i>	67	\$12.5	<i>Gibraltar</i>	4	\$1.1	<i>Malaysia</i>	60.4	\$165.0
<i>Bulgaria</i>	12.2	\$39.1	<i>Greece</i>	1.3	\$356.3	<i>Maldives*</i>	100	\$1.0
<i>Burkina Faso</i>	50	\$6.9	<i>Greenland</i>	0	\$1.7	<i>Mali</i>	90	\$6.9
<i>Burma</i>	4	\$13.7	<i>Grenada</i>	0	\$0.6	<i>Malta</i>	0	\$6.5
<i>Burundi</i>	10	\$1.0	<i>Guam</i>	0	\$2.8	<i>Marshall Islands</i>	0	\$0.1
<i>Cambodia</i>	0	\$8.3	<i>Guatemala</i>	0	\$31.4	<i>Mauritania</i>	100	\$2.7
<i>Cameroon</i>	20	\$20.9	<i>Guernsey</i>	0	\$2.7	<i>Mauritius</i>	16.6	\$7.0
<i>Canada</i>	1.9	\$1,406.0	<i>Guinea-Bissau</i>	85	\$4.6	<i>Mayotte</i>	97	\$0.0
<i>Cape Verde</i>	0	\$1.4	<i>Guinea</i>	45	\$0.3	<i>Mexico</i>	0	\$886.4
<i>Cayman Islands</i>	0	\$0.0	<i>Guyana</i>	10	\$1.0	<i>Micronesia</i>	0	\$0.2
<i>Central African Rep.</i>	15	\$1.6	<i>Haiti</i>	0	\$5.3	<i>Moldova</i>	0	\$4.0
<i>Chad</i>	53.1	\$7.4	<i>Honduras</i>	0	\$10.1	<i>Monaco</i>	0	\$0.0
<i>Chile</i>	0	\$160.8	<i>Hong Kong</i>	0	\$203.0	<i>Mongolia</i>	4	\$3.9
<i>P.R. of China</i>	1.5	\$3,249.0	<i>Hungary</i>	0	\$136.4	<i>Montenegro*</i>	33	\$2.3
<i>Colombia</i>	0	\$171.7	<i>Iceland</i>	0	\$19.5	<i>Montserrat</i>	0	\$0.0
<i>Comoros</i>	98	\$0.4	<i>India</i>	13.4	\$1,090.0	<i>Morocco</i>	98.7	\$72.8
<i>D.R. of the Congo</i>	10	\$9.9	<i>Indonesia</i>	86.1	\$410.3	<i>Mozambique</i>	17.8	\$8.1
<i>Republic of the Congo</i>	2	\$6.8	<i>Iran</i>	98	\$278.1	<i>Namibia</i>	0	\$6.7
<i>Cook Islands</i>	0	\$0.2	<i>Iraq</i>	97	\$55.4	<i>Nauru</i>	0	\$0.0

Table 3. 2007 GDP and Muslim Percentage Data

Table 2. (2007 Data) Continued

Country	% Muslim	GDP (Billions)	Country	% Muslim	GDP (Billions)
<i>Nepal</i>	4.2	\$9.6	<i>Solomon Islands</i>	0	\$0.4
<i>Netherlands Antilles</i>	5.5	\$754.9	<i>Somalia*</i>	100	\$2.5
<i>Netherlands</i>	0	\$0.0	<i>South Africa</i>	1.5	\$274.5
<i>New Caledonia</i>	0	\$3.3	<i>Spain</i>	0	\$1,415.0
<i>New Zealand</i>	0	\$124.4	<i>Sri Lanka</i>	7.6	\$25.8
<i>Nicaragua</i>	0	\$5.7	<i>Sudan</i>	70	\$49.7
<i>Niger</i>	80	\$4.2	<i>Suriname</i>	19.6	\$2.2
<i>Nigeria</i>	50	\$126.7	<i>Taiwan</i>	10	\$2.7
<i>Niue</i>	0	\$0.0	<i>Swaziland</i>	0	\$431.6
<i>N. Mariana Islands</i>	0	\$0.6	<i>Sweden</i>	4.3	\$413.9
<i>Norway</i>	1.8	\$369.3	<i>Switzerland</i>	90	\$29.3
<i>Oman</i>	75	\$40.5	<i>Syria</i>	0	\$375.6
<i>Pakistan</i>	97	\$106.3	<i>Tajikistan</i>	90	\$3.4
<i>Palau</i>	0	\$0.1	<i>Tanzania</i>	35	\$14.1
<i>Panama</i>	0	\$19.3	<i>Thailand</i>	4.6	\$225.8
<i>Papua New Guinea</i>	0	\$5.9	<i>Timor-Leste</i>	1	\$0.5
<i>Paraguay</i>	0	\$9.3	<i>Togo</i>	20	\$2.4
<i>Peru</i>	0	\$101.5	<i>Tokelau</i>	0	\$0.0
<i>Philippines</i>	5	\$144.1	<i>Tonga</i>	0	\$0.2
<i>Poland</i>	0	\$413.3	<i>Trinidad and Tobago</i>	5.8	\$14.2
<i>Portugal</i>	0	\$219.5	<i>Tunisia</i>	98	\$34.5
<i>Puerto Rico</i>	0	\$0.0	<i>Turkey</i>	99.8	\$482.0
<i>Qatar</i>	77.5	\$65.8	<i>Turkmenistan</i>	89	\$26.2
<i>Romania</i>	0	\$158.5	<i>Turks & Caicos Islands</i>	0	\$0.0
<i>Russia*</i>	12.5	\$1,286.0	<i>Tuvalu</i>	0	\$0.0
<i>Rwanda</i>	4.6	\$2.8	<i>Uganda</i>	12.1	\$11.1
<i>Saint Helena</i>	0	\$0.0	<i>Ukraine</i>	0	\$131.2
<i>Saint Kitts and Nevis</i>	0	\$0.5	<i>United Arab Emirates</i>	96	\$189.6
<i>Saint Lucia</i>	0	\$1.0	<i>United Kingdom</i>	2.7	\$2,756.0
<i>St. Pierre & Miquelon</i>	0	\$0.0	<i>United States</i>	0.6	\$13,790
<i>St. Vincent & Grenadines</i>	0	\$0.5	<i>Uruguay</i>	0	\$21.2
<i>Samoa</i>	0	\$0.4	<i>Uzbekistan</i>	88	\$20.2
<i>San Marino</i>	0	\$1.0	<i>Vanuatu</i>	0	\$0.4
<i>São Tomé & Príncipe</i>	0	\$0.1	<i>Venezuela</i>	0	\$226.9
<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	100	\$374.5	<i>Vietnam</i>	0.1	\$66.4
<i>Senegal</i>	94	\$13.0	<i>U.S. Virgin Islands</i>	0	\$0.0
<i>Serbia</i>	3.2	\$41.0	<i>Wallis and Futuna</i>	0	\$0.0
<i>Seychelles</i>	1.1	\$0.7	<i>West Bank</i>	75	\$5.3
<i>Sierra Leone</i>	60	\$1.5	<i>Yemen</i>	75	\$22.7
<i>Singapore</i>	14.9	\$153.5	<i>Zambia*</i>	25	\$10.9
<i>Slovakia</i>	0	\$71.6	<i>Zimbabwe*</i>	1	\$16.2
<i>Slovenia</i>	2.4	\$44.6	<i>World</i>	21.01	\$53,640

Table 4. 2007 GDP and Muslim Percentage Data (Continued from Table 3)

**Note: Some Muslim percentages were not specifically defined in the CIA World Factbook 2008; countries such as Russia (Côte d'Ivoire and Zambia) contained a range of values, of which the average was taken. Some countries reported their Muslim population as "other," to be consistent; those countries were given a zero percentage value. Countries (Maldives and Somalia) which reported no percentage but reported Islam as their only religion were given a value of 100 percent. Countries (Kosovo, Montenegro, Yemen) which gave a mix of religions including Islam but no percentage value, were given a proportion value of based on the number of religions listed. Where 2007 data was not available, the CIA World Factbook supplied the most recent and current data available.*

Sources: CIA World Factbook 2008, s.v. "Religion," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html> (Accessed March 4, 2008) and CIA World Fact Book 2008, s.v. "GDP," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html> (Accessed March 4, 2008).

Table 3. (Globalization Index 2007 Data)

Country	GI Rating	% Muslim	Country	GI Rating	% Muslim	Country	GI Rating	% Muslim
Albania	42.0	70.0	Germany	82.5	3.7	Norway	77.8	1.8
Algeria	45.5	99.0	Ghana	56.0	15.9	Oman	51.7	75.0
Argentina	64.1	0.0	Greece	74.9	1.3	Pakistan	52.4	97.0
Australia	80.9	0.0	Guatemala	50.0	0.0	Paraguay	57.6	0.0
Austria	91.6	4.2	Guinea-Bissau	40.7	85.0	Peru	57.1	0.0
Bahamas	47.9	0.0	Guyana	47.4	10.0	Philippines	59.0	5.0
Bahrain	60.9	81.2	Haiti	28.6	0.0	Poland	78.2	0.0
Bangladesh	36.0	83.0	Honduras	54.0	0.0	Portugal	83.1	0.0
Barbados	43.5	0.0	Hungary	81.2	0.0	Puerto Rico	63.3	0.0
Belgium	92.0	0.0	Iceland	67.8	0.0	Russia*	69.9	12.5
Belize	47.3	0.0	India	49.7	13.4	Rwanda	29.3	4.6
Benin	41.7	0.0	Indonesia	51.3	86.1	Saudi Arabia	53.7	100.0
Bolivia	49.1	0.0	Iran	35.2	98.0	Senegal	48.6	94.0
Botswana	46.8	0.0	Ireland	83.1	0.0	Sierra Leone	33.3	60.0
Brazil	59.6	0.0	Israel	70.8	16.0	Singapore	82.1	14.9
Bulgaria	65.5	12.2	Italy	80.6	0.0	Slovakia	72.6	0.0
Burundi	25.8	10.0	Jamaica	62.9	0.0	Slovenia	68.8	2.4
Cameroon	41.3	20.0	Japan	64.2	0.0	South Africa	62.5	1.5
Canada	87.5	1.9	Jordan	64.7	92.0	Spain	82.5	0.0
Central African Rep	26.8	15.0	Kenya	49.1	10.0	Sri Lanka	49.7	7.6
Chad	39.6	53.1	South Korea	64.8	0.0	Sweden	89.9	4.3
Chile	69.9	0.0	Kosovo	63.5	85.0	Switzerland	85.5	90.0
People's Rep of China	65.3	1.5	Latvia	61.6	0.0	Syria	39.1	0.0
Colombia	52.3	0.0	Lithuania	63.3	0.0	Tanzania	43.2	35.0
Demo Rep of the Congo	35.5	10.0	Luxembourg	74.2	0.0	Thailand	56.9	4.6
Republic of the Congo	38.8	2.0	Madagascar	37.5	7.0	Togo	42.2	20.0
Costa Rica	55.0	0.0	Malawi	43.7	12.8	Trinidad and Tobago	50.8	5.8
Côte d'Ivoire*	45.4	37.5	Malaysia	75.8	60.4	Tunisia	51.8	98.0
Croatia	69.3	1.3	Maldives	42.4	90.0	Turkey	63.5	99.8
Cyprus	62.5	18.0	Malta	63.8	0.0	Uganda	44.5	12.1
Czech Republic	84.5	0.0	Mauritius	48.8	16.6	Ukraine	61.8	0.0
Denmark	84.3	2.0	Mexico	55.5	0.0	United Arab Emirates	70.4	96.0
Dominican Republic	51.7	0.0	Morocco	52.9	98.7	United Kingdom	89.3	2.7
Ecuador	54.5	0.0	Myanmar (Burma)	27.3	4.0	United States	80.8	0.6
Egypt	54.2	90.0	Namibia	53.8	0.0	Uruguay	61.8	0.0
El Salvador	58.0	0.0	Nepal	35.3	4.2	Venezuela	53.8	0.0
Estonia	72.1	0.0	Netherlands	89.2	0.0	Zambia*	51.8	25.0
Fiji	48.5	7.0	New Zealand	73.5	0.0	Zimbabwe	40.1	1.0
Finland	84.8	0.0	Nicaragua	51.6	0.0			
France	87.7	7.5	Niger	34.3	80.0			
Gabon	49.2	0.0	Nigeria	53.0	50.0			

Table 5. Globalization Index and Muslim Percentage 2007 Data

Sources: CIA World Factbook 2008, s.v. "Religion," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html> (Accessed March 4, 2008) and CIA World Fact Book 2008, (Accessed March 4, 2008), s.v. "Detailed Rankings," http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/rankings_2008.pdf (Accessed April 15, 2008)

V. EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON MIDDLE EAST CULTURE

A. GETTING ON THE GLOBALIZATION TRAIN

The intent of this thesis is by no means to foster any idea of doing away with the traditional Islamic faith or Arab culture. The fact is that the Islamic faith and its respective traditions have given many of its Muslim followers complete and utter satisfaction, and it has also been a positive influence on multiple cultures around the world. But, it is imperative to bring to light the necessity for Islamic Arabs in the Middle East, like other cultures and regions, to discover a common ground between their faith and culture and the inevitability of the rapidly approaching globalization train. Granted there is another responsible party on this globalization train, that of its “western conductor,” or promoter. It is the responsibility of the conductor to slow the train down in order to allow passengers to get on rather than passing them by, forcing them to jump on, or just plain running them over.

What if Arab Islamic Middle Easterners do not want to get on is particular type of train? The question which needs to be asked is whether or not there is another train? Is there a train that is better suited to their wants, needs, and style? Maybe there is another train in which they can be more than just a passenger. A train which allows them to give their input on the type of seats and color of the fabric, and other options which would make the train more comfortable for them, in other words, a train which they will want to ride because they have a vested interest in it.

Summed up, this is a cultural and global learning process in which promoters of globalization must entertain and participate in, to facilitate or potentially accommodate those populations which may end up being passengers on the globalization train. Although a debatable presumption, it can be assumed that the majority of Islamic Arabs, in general, want to get on a globalization train, that is, they want to have the “best and most enjoyable” life possible and take advantage of the benefits of globalization. Yet, there is also a belief that a minority of Islamic followers, the fundamentalist and militant radicals (violent or extreme Islamists), are holding back, through various acts and are

preventing the Islamic Arab majority from getting on the globalization train. The Islamists believe, in the most basic sense, that they are literally defending the fundamentals of their religion and their Islamic community against the influences of globalization and their definition of the “Westernization” world. Their defense, in effect, has caused those countries, in which they reside, to fall economically farther and farther behind. If the majority of the Islamic Arab community could be made aware of this problem, where they stand economically in the world market, and that they are being held back by unwavering fundamentalist minority ideologies, maybe then they would rise up against their own resident Islamists. In effect, radical Islamic fundamentalism could fall not to the sword of western powers, but rather, from within its own community and by the soft voice of its own constituents.

B. MEDIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

One of the wonders of current globalization is that of cultural knowledge and information exchange, which has been basically brought about by the advances made in technology and communication mediums. Particularly, in the Middle East, computers, cellular phones, and satellite televisions have all been important contributors to this information exchange.

There are several examples of Middle Eastern authoritarian regime control over information, extending from the outlawing of public forums and protests to suppression of the internet, but none of which are more salient than the censorship of the Arab media and news networks. The purpose of this section is to bring to light the Middle Eastern and Western love and hate relationship with the rising Arab Islamic media, and for specific illustrations of these perspectives the international and well known Al-Jazeera network will be the prime media model. This section, will examine the rapport between Al-Jazeera and the proponents and opponents both in the Middle East and the West in order to illustrate that the technological element of globalization, represented by satellite media communication, over the past decade and a half can be viewed as influential and positive to some and controversial and threatening to others.

Regimes of the Middle East which utilize authoritarian rule as a means of governance use several methods of control to repress their populations in order to maintain the existing ruling power. The problem facing Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes is that globalization of the Arab Islamic Middle East, which consists of political, economic, social, and technological elements, has provided the opportunity for the oppressed and information famished populations of the region to be nurtured with information from uncontrolled and uncensored sources.

Throughout the twentieth century the Arab Islamic Middle Eastern population was starved of important and relevant knowledge concerning the local, regional, and international world events around them. Advances in satellite technology towards the end of the 20th century, specifically in the realm of information media broadcasting, enabled the Middle Eastern Arab Islamic population to view the world around them, and simultaneously allowed the world to gain a detailed and in depth view of the Arab world. Middle East scholars such as Gentzkow and Shapiro, Nobel Peace Prize winner Elie Wiesel, and western policy makers such as World Bank President James Wolfensohn, believe that “increasing access to information in a broad sense will improve relations between the Muslim world and the West.”¹⁵⁶ Although proponents of this statement believe this to be true, there are opponents, both in the Middle East and in the West, who believe that the freedom with which these rising Arab satellite media outlets are broadcasting the story of the Middle East region is instead a credible threat to their authority.

1. Middle Eastern Love and Hate

To understand the Middle East’s infatuation with Al-Jazeera’s programming is to know and understand the history of a Middle Eastern Arab people who have never truly had access to legitimate and uncensored Arab mass media. Unlike the past, advances in satellite technology have allowed media broadcasters to cross national borders and

¹⁵⁶ Matthew A. Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro, “Media, Education and Anti-Americanism in the Muslim World,” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Summer 2004), 118.

circumvent Authoritarian regime control.¹⁵⁷ In addition and after the first Gulf War (1990–1991), satellite television and its access expanded rapidly in many parts of the Middle East.¹⁵⁸ Over the last decade and a half, satellite television has become a mainstay in Middle Eastern life, and can be placed in the same category of importance as electricity, food, and water.¹⁵⁹ With that being said, perceptions and views of current events happening locally, regionally, and internationally are formed around the broadcasts and news coverage produced by these satellite news stations, and because of this enormous influence, both leaders in the West and in the Middle East are concerned.

There are numerous Arab media broadcasting stations throughout the world which air in the Arabic language and can be received via satellite in the Middle East region. From the Arab perspective, most of the satellite stations, which feed into the Middle East and are meant for Arab viewers, face a bias in one of two ways, either through viewer interest or media legitimacy. On one hand, there are stations like Rusiya Al-Yaum (Russian) and BBC Arabic Television (U.K.), which are transmitted in Arabic from outside the region into television inside the Middle East. Although these stations are allowed more free speech and not handicapped by local Authoritarian authorities, much of the broadcasting has a Western spin, external area bias, or has non-compelling programming. In other words, because they are not physically located within the region itself, Middle Eastern viewers see these stations as out of touch with real and actual regional concerns.¹⁶⁰ On the other hand, stations like Al Arabiya (Saudi Arabia), Al-Alam (Iran), and Egyptian Space Channel (Egypt), although based in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, are state run enterprises with Authoritarian government or government proxy ownership, and are severely censored and coerced.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁷ Naomi Sakr, "Satellite Television and Development in the Middle East," *Middle East Report*, No. 210, (Spring 1999), 6.

¹⁵⁸ Mary Ann Tétreault, "Advice and Dissent in Kuwait," *Middle East Report*, No. 226 (Spring, 2003), 37.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Naomi Sakr, "Satellite Television and Development in the Middle East," *Middle East Report*, No. 210, (Spring 1999), 6.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

Overall, the Middle East populous believes that Al-Jazeera is a media network of a different sort. Al-Jazeera is based in Qatar and the only assumed connection to the government is through a one time grant given at the stations inception by the Qatar's Emir Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani.¹⁶² Yet further research confirms Al-Jazeera, which has not achieved total independence, still receives yearly subsidies from the Emir.¹⁶³ Given this connection, Al-Jazeera's wide scope and highly controversial output are evidence to the fact that the regionally based station is closer legitimacy, and closer to independence from both government censorship and intervention than most regional media outlets. At this time, Al-Jazeera is the only Arab international network which truly compares to the likes of CNN and BBC, and is quickly becoming one of the first internationally trusted Arab media networks.

In some older and more anti-western circles of the Middle East, even Al-Jazeera like the rest of Arab media still retains the stigma of being a tool of coercion and control by Authoritarian rulers. Although some perceive Al-Jazeera to be a pro-Arab Islamic Middle Eastern satellite channel,¹⁶⁴ used to rally Arabs inside and outside the region, others proclaim this to be false perception. Some common everyday Arabs perceive Al-Jazeera to be a modern tool of authoritarian security and information collection. In fact, statements made in threatening tones like, "Do you want your name to be on Al-Jazeera," can be heard in some pessimistic and fearful circles today.¹⁶⁵ Furthermore, given Al-Jazeera's western reporting techniques and appearance, other Arab circles believe the network is really just an extension of western coercion delivered by turncoat Arab personnel.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶² Joel Campagna, "Arab TV's Mixed Signals," *Foreign Policy*, No. 127 (Nov-Dec 2001), 88.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Fouad Ajami, "The Falseness of Anti-Americanism," *Foreign Policy*, No. 138 (Sep-Oct 2003), 53.

¹⁶⁵ Gideon Levy, "Empty Gestures," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Summer 2003), 107.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

As influential reporter and writer Thomas Friedman put it, Al-Jazeera has become “the biggest media phenomenon to hit the Arab world since the television.”¹⁶⁷ Yet, its uncensored programming and news broadcasts have infuriated many of the Arab Authoritarian regimes throughout the Middle East. Authoritarian regimes have even allegedly threatened their local businesses in order to dissuade them from purchasing advertising airtime on Al-Jazeera.¹⁶⁸ In addition, Arab rulers in the region have publicly and privately criticized Qatar and its ruling family, the home and sponsor to Al Jazeera, for the critical reporting done on the rest of the ruling regimes in the Middle East while only “soft” coverage of Qatar has been reported.¹⁶⁹ Others criticize the network’s actual impact on politics in the region, claiming that the debates which appear on the network are entertaining, but not likely to affect any decision making by Middle East authorities.

Even with this sort of criticism, Al-Jazeera has become a sort of Arab “human nervous system” which has come to connect Arabs around the globe with one another and evolved to become a source of perceived legitimate information in which Arabs inside and outside the region of the Middle East can trust and respect, and yet at the same time Arab and some western authorities have come to despise and fear.¹⁷⁰

2. Western Love and Hate

For expatriate Arabs around the world, primarily in western countries located in North America and Europe, Al-Jazeera is a trusted link back to their country of origin, spoken in a common and familiar language, and attune to their concerns and interests.¹⁷¹ Similarly, Al-Jazeera has also afforded western non Arabs with the opportunity to peer into the world of the Middle East. Arab and Middle Eastern images and reports that were once pushed into the margins of network news coverage or tagged as not news worthy

¹⁶⁷ Joel Campagna, “Arab TV’s Mixed Signals.” *Foreign Policy*, No. 127 (Nov.–Dec 2001), 88.

¹⁶⁸ Al-Jazeera total commercial airtime averages about 45 minutes in a 24 hour period, Hugh Miles, *Al-Jazeera: The Inside Story of the Arab News Channel that is Challenging the West*, (New York: Grove/Atlantic, Inc., 2005), 2.

¹⁶⁹ Joel Campagna, “Arab TV’s Mixed Signals.” *Foreign Policy*, No. 127 (Nov–Dec 2001), 89.

¹⁷⁰ Adel Iskandar and Mohammed el-Nawawy, *Al-Jazeera: The Story of the Network that is Rattling Governments and Redefining Modern Journalism*, (Cambridge: Westview Press 2003), 20.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 8.

now have an outlet and a target audience. Al-Jazeera has provided such an opportunity for the West to learn about the Middle East and at the same time provided the opportunity for the Middle East to understand the West. As Hugh Miles stated in his book on Al-Jazeera, “the information age is upon us and in the decades ahead we can expect only more Al-Jazeeras,” and with more media station like Al-Jazeera information will continue to spread and be transferred between once isolated and inaccessible cultures.¹⁷²

Given the tragic events which expired on September 11, 2001, the West quickly came to grips with the notion that it must gain knowledge about, study, and understand a new Middle Eastern threat. Prior to Al-Jazeera, much of the “legitimate” news coverage on the Middle East came from Western sources like the BBC and CNN. The problem, which would soon come to light, was that the coverage and distributed product, although from a prominent and legitimate source, contained a western bias or slant and was not always accurate. Like CNN and the BBC, Al-Jazeera has its proponents and opponents within the Middle East and around the world, but unlike CNN and the BBC, Al-Jazeera has earned a special connection, trust, and access which the others do not possess within the Middle East. Because of this special relationship and access to locations within the Middle East, Al-Jazeera’s network has become a knowledge base not only for the Middle Eastern populous, but for western intelligence collection agencies gathering open source intelligence material.

From the standpoint of many senior U.S. government officials, Al-Jazeera represents and promotes an anti-American bias in the Arab media.¹⁷³ Although the word “hate” maybe strong a word to use to describe western views of the Arab media, the

The West, and more specifically the U.S., has taken action to counter and offer alternatives to Arab media networks like Al-Jazeera. First, senior officials like Secretary Donald Rumsfeld have publicly condemned Al-Jazeera and others have appealed to the Emir of Qatar to tone down the coverage of American military action in the Middle East,

¹⁷² Hugh Miles, *Al-Jazeera: The Inside Story of the Arab News Channel that is Challenging the West*, (New York: Grove/Atlantic, Inc., 2005), 426.

¹⁷³ Matthew A. Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro, “Media Bias and Reputation,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 2006, vol. 114, no. 2, 310.

and U.S. officials eventually shut down the Baghdad Al-Jazeera office.¹⁷⁴ Secondly, in 2004, the U.S. Congress authorized \$62 million to launch an Arabic television channel called Al-Hurra or "The Free One" to counter Arab media like Al-Jazeera, to win the hearts and minds of the Arab people, and to promote democracy in the Arab world.¹⁷⁵ A station manager of Al-Hurra, Mouafac Harb who is a Beirut born Muslim, stated in an interview that Al-Jazeera does fuel anti-Americanism, but that it is not clear whether the network is doing it intentionally or unintentionally.¹⁷⁶

Setting aside the proposed anti-American bias, another way to view the effect that Al-Jazeera and the increasing number of Arab media outlets have on the West is a so called a "disciplining effect." In other words, legitimate international Arab media, in local languages, has increased the global competition for Middle East regional viewers. In 2006, Gentzkow and Shapiro conducted a study using empirical evidence which proved that international media monopolies (like CNN and BBC) allowed Western media bias and erroneous reporting to exist in the Middle East region. The study went on to show that the introduction of Arab news outlets, like Al-Jazeera, have in fact lowered the total amount of Western partiality and flawed reporting in the region.¹⁷⁷ The point being, that the introduction of equivalent legitimate international Arab media outlets increased the likelihood that Western media as well as U.S. government reports would be less bias and more accurate in accounting for actions in the Middle East, for fear that erroneous reporting would be exposed ex post by Al-Jazeera media broadcasts, and western media stations could ultimately lose viewer confidence.¹⁷⁸

Along these same lines the debate about freedom of speech becomes a highly sensitive topic. For many years the West dominated the airwaves and television stations

¹⁷⁴ Matthew A. Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro, "Media Bias and Reputation," *Journal of Political Economy*, 2006, vol. 114, no. 2, 310.

¹⁷⁵ Foreign Policy. "Operation Broadcast Freedom: FP Interview with Mouafac Harb." *Foreign Policy*, No. 142 (May–Jun 2004), 16.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Matthew A. Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro, "Media Bias and Reputation." *Journal of Political Economy*, 2006, vol. 114, no. 2, 282 and 310.

¹⁷⁸ Matthew A. Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro, "Media Bias and Reputation." *Journal of Political Economy*, 2006, vol. 114, no. 2, 307.

throughout the world. If competition for viewers and content of programming was not enough to worry about, countries like the U.S. have paradoxically had an issue with Al-Jazeera's free style and free media behavior.¹⁷⁹ One of the biggest confrontations that Al-Jazeera has had with the West at large and the U.S. specifically, as stated by officials like Secretary of State Colin Powell, is that Al-Jazeera has on many occasions given undue attention to terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden interviews, and other terrorist video tapings.¹⁸⁰ Furthermore, the U.S. Government claims that Al-Jazeera has over reported and formally criticized the mistakes of U.S. military's actions in the Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the world.

In some cases western powers feel like they are caught in a "Catch .22," because freedom of speech has been promoted by the West as a basic human right. Through example, the West taught media outlets like Al-Jazeera how to report both sides of a controversy, fairly and without bias. In a sense, through the promotion of democracy and the freedom of speech, the West may have indirectly fostered and educated, in their minds, a media "monster" that has now turned against them. So, as the attention in crisis' like the GWOT, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to stagnate, Al-Jazeera has vowed to report what it deems appropriate whether or not the U.S. or the West feels the same way. Al-Jazeera representatives feel that they have the right to report on something they disagree with and it is their right to express their opinion even if it possibly comes at the expense of Middle East and Western relations.¹⁸¹

3. Summary

This section set out to examine how the technological element of globalization, as represented by satellite media communication, over the past decade and a half could be viewed as influential and positive to some and controversial and threatening to others. The positives of uncensored Arab satellite media, promotion of democracy, freedom of

¹⁷⁹ Adel Iskandar and Mohammed el-Nawawy, *Al-Jazeera: The Story of the Network that is Rattling Governments and Redefining Modern Journalism*, (Cambridge: Westview Press 2003), 175.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 176.

¹⁸¹ Adel Iskandar and Mohammed el-Nawawy, *Al-Jazeera: The Story of the Network that is Rattling Governments and Redefining Modern Journalism*, (Cambridge: Westview Press 2003), 177.

speech, and cultural awareness and education, will most likely outweigh and overcome the realization that authoritarian regimes face losing their information control and western government's controversial actions will continue to be criticized. Given the fact that there is a Middle Eastern and Western love and hate relationship between the Arab media, the statement presented earlier which states that "information access will improve the relationship between the Middle East and the West,"¹⁸² may in fact hold water, but only the future will tell.

This section also demonstrated how uncensored satellite media technology has the ability to reach out to Arabs and western audiences around the world and possibly affect policy and decision-making globally. Although major international media networks, like CNN and the BBC news still dominate space and airtime, Al-Jazeera is quickly following suit and becoming the CNN/BBC of the Middle East and one of the most trusted sources of Arab news and information. Although, it can be debated between proponents and opponents whether or not Al-Jazeera recognizes and reports impartiality on contending subjects and issues important to the Arab people with vigor and legitimacy, there is no doubt the information age has forever changed the way Arabs view media.

Authoritarian regimes, under threat of losing control over the information flow within their respective counties, will attempt to adapt to this unstoppable regional informational phenomenon, but may discover that influence over a control mechanism may now be beyond their grasp. Similarly, the West which has promoted this spread of technology and free speech must also stand fast and be prepared for competition and criticism. For the world and especially the Middle East, globalization has spread the gift of technology, Pandora's Box has been opened, and a flood of information in an increasingly abundant amount will blanket the earth over the next decade and a half.

Lastly, there is no doubt that information collection and dissemination has become part of world's daily life. How easy or how difficult the task of collecting and disseminating that information is generally based on where you are in the world. On the other hand, it is certain that today's technological advances in cellular, internet, and

¹⁸² Matthew A. Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro, "Media, Education and Anti-Americanism in the Muslim World," *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Summer 2004), 118.

satellite communication have increased mans ability to mass communicate just about anywhere in the world at any given time. In a sense, technology has opened the world for all to see and given man the ability to reach out and touch a society that years ago he would have known nothing about.

C. ADDRESSING THE CAUSES AND CONDITIONS OF TERRORISM

Globalization has allowed terrorist groups increase transnational access to people and places around the world, and provided numerous technologies and communication tools which years ago they would never dreamed of attaining. Is it possible that globalization is an enabler of terrorism? This section will address the conditions and causes of terrorism, as seen through the eyes of several experts in the field of terrorism.

In several article and books, Martha Crenshaw explains cogently what the causes of terrorism are. If society were able to address those causes, could we defeat terrorism? There is no doubt that Crenshaw's scholarly works logically explain the causes and conditions of terrorism.¹⁸³ There is no doubt if society could address all the various causes and conditions of terrorism; in a perfect world it could, in fact, eradicate terrorism. But this is by no means a perfect world and definitely not a utopia so the question is not whether society can defeat terrorism, but whether or not it can address the causes and conditions that make terrorism the option of action. The question of whether terrorism will ever truly be defeated is a quite relevant one, but not realistic. The answer to this question is more complicated than a simple "yes" or "no."

It is an obvious fact that the use of terrorism as a tactic has been around for centuries. Although it is generally a tactic of the weak, it has been used by the strong and the weak alike. It has been seen as an effective tactic by those who have chosen to use it to achieve their goal or goals, and by those factions it has been used against. Even though there are many forms and groups of terrorist sects, for the purpose of this paper I will briefly utilize the Islamist as my test case example. The Islamist easily displays both a religious and political aspect within the cause(s) for which the group is fight for or

¹⁸³ Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," in Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed), *The New Global Terrorism*, 92-105.

defending. It is for these dual motivations (political and religious) that make answering the title question even more difficult, more complicated, and an almost impossible to postulate a formidable response.

This section is by no means an end all be all answer to defeating the causes and conditions of terrorism altogether. On the contrary, it is more or less a light surface scan of the theoretical building blocks of terrorism, i.e., Crenshaw's causal conditions where terrorism eventually becomes an option.

Let's observe Crenshaw's "*conditions*" of terrorism. In the book *The New Global Terrorism* by Charles W. Kegley Jr., Part Two, Chapter Eight "*The Causes of Terrorisms*," Crenshaw describes what she believes to be the causes of terrorism.¹⁸⁴ Crenshaw briefly attests to the notion that "*modernization*" and "*urbanization*" are the factors that aid in creating the framework from which brew the basic foundations of terrorism ideologies.¹⁸⁵ Furthermore, for this essay it will be assumed that urbanization is a byproduct of modernization, and that modernization is the original foundation of terrorism. Again, this paper is not meant to prove or disprove the causes of terrorism, but to rather understand why terrorism can neither be truly avoided nor destroyed altogether.

The obvious point which can be inferred is that, if modernization itself is the basic building block for the causes of terrorism, we can never truly defeat terrorism. Modernization by itself is an unstoppable force which is needed in order to continue and sustain life on earth as we know it. If this is true, we must then look at the causal conditions of terrorism that spawn from modernization. Crenshaw states that modernization over the years has generated so many religious, "*social*" and "*economical complexities*," and it is from the complexities, that "*grievances*" are created and formed in certain minority groups.¹⁸⁶ Moreover, it is this formed grievance that, if powerful enough, will eventually create an overwhelming amount of dissatisfaction and

¹⁸⁴ Martha Crenshaw, "*The Causes of Terrorism*," in Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed), *The New Global Terrorism*, 92–105.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 93–94.

¹⁸⁶ Martha Crenshaw, "*The Causes of Terrorism*," in Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed), *The New Global Terrorism*, 94.

resentment. If we could somehow stop this condition of terrorism here (i.e., allow the grieyed party to express themselves) there would most likely be less of a reason for the grieyed party to possibly feel the need to adopt the tactic of terrorism.

In order for the grieyed party to be heard, they would need some kind of outlet from which to be heard. This then leads us to the second condition of terrorism, which is described by Crenshaw as the lack of opportunity for “*political participation*.”¹⁸⁷ Undoubtedly, if we allowed the grieyed party to express themselves in a formal and political way, we would surely then be able to stop the build up of dissatisfaction and resentment, right? On the contrary, political participation alone would be the easy solution, but it is more detailed and complicated than that. When needs and grievances are not met by through political participation, to the satisfaction of the grieyed party, the grieyed party again begins to build dissatisfaction and resentment. Thus leading the same grieyed parties to possibly ascertain terrorism as a means through which to be heard and have its requests met.

Now that we have addressed the possible causes and conditions for terrorism, let’s consider one of the many theories for eradicating terrorism. In his book, *Terror in the Mind of God*, Mark Juergensmeyer sums it up quite nicely by describing five potential “*cures*” for terrorism.¹⁸⁸ The first “cure” is described as basic brute force, in a sense just destroying the terrorist with an overwhelming destructive and annihilating power.¹⁸⁹ The second is as basic reversal of terror, in that, the mere threat of violence or retaliation by a government organization, or the like, may create doubt or vacillation in the minds of a terrorist organization, thereby halting their future actions.¹⁹⁰ Third, the terrorist organization itself, through the use of violence, attains its goal, and hence ceases to use further aggressive attacks.¹⁹¹ A fourth ending would be to separate the religious aspects

¹⁸⁷ Martha Crenshaw, “*The Causes of Terrorism*,” in Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed), *The New Global Terrorism*, 95.

¹⁸⁸ Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror In The Mind Of God* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003)

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 233–234.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 236–237.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 238–239.

of the cause from the political aspect of the cause.¹⁹² As Juergensmeyer points out, and many other scholars concur, negotiation with or bullying a religious fundamentalist group would most likely be in vain. Hence, dealing with a political element alone, has a higher probability of success and compromise. Lastly, and almost a reverse to the fourth ending, adding a “*moral integrity*” aspect to politics on the part of the government authorities, by basically gaining, at a minimum, a pseudo trust of a terrorist sect by adopting and demonstrating a sense of devout morality within the accused governmental organization.¹⁹³ At the same time we must address the assumption that there are several variations of outcomes (actions and reactions), but these five represent a good summation and generalization of various historical endings.

At this point we can stop at general conditions of terrorism, because it is from this point we can only diverge into the individual causations of the many different dissatisfied organizations. It is at this point that exist the many reasons why some groups chose terrorism as their method while others do not, and it is here that it becomes an overwhelming debate which is beyond the scope of this paper. With that said, let us briefly turn to Islamism as an example of why these conditions will never truly be eradicated, why terrorism as a means will never truly be defeated, and why the “cures” stated earlier are only effective to a point and don’t address the initial building blocks of terrorism.

The answer and example presented may be over-simplistic in nature, and can lead to a lengthily discussion, but this cannot be entirely accomplished within the scope of this essay. Simply put, one reason why these causes and conditions (modernization, settling of grievances, and political participation) can never truly be addressed when dealing with Islamists, and hence why Islamist sects who exercise terrorism will truly never be defeated or go away, rests merely in the complex nature of Islam. The simple answer is

¹⁹² Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror In The Mind Of God* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 240–241.

¹⁹³ Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror In The Mind Of God*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 243–245.

that Islam is a “*religion and a state*.”¹⁹⁴ Many scholars will agree with the statement that terrorism by definition is *political in nature*, and that Islamist themselves are in the “*fight*,” with political agenda in their back pocket.¹⁹⁵ In the Islamic faith, there is also no objection, by those same scholars, to the fact that in Islam, the religious aspect and political aspect are connected by unbreakable bond, for as described by Johannes J.G. Jansen’s book, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism*. The problem is two fold. First, modernization by nature creates fundamentalists, i.e., those minority groups mainly on the fringes of a society who want to return to the days of old, i.e., pre-enlightenment. By modernization alone you create a minority group with a grievance. In a sense, if we believe that modernization is necessary for the earth to sustain life, Crenshaw’s first condition of terrorism, minority groups with grievances, is inevitable for the foreseeable future. We can not simply turn back the hands of time. Secondly, when dealing with a religious or divine aspect, in most cases there is no compromise. As Juergensmeyer describes, *compromise* with the religious aspect of a fundamentalist group is near impossible.¹⁹⁶ Due to the fact that the Islamist religious aspect is permanently bonded to the political aspect, the two shall never be separated. The second condition of terrorism cannot be successfully addressed either, due to this unwavering and uncompromising nature, especially in the religious aspect, of Islamism. In a sense, attempting to deal politically, and hence create a compromise, with the religious aspects of the Islamic would be fruitless. For this reason, “*this prevents the fundamentalist leaders from participating in government*.”¹⁹⁷ It can be said that any of Juergensmeyer’s five “cures” could be effective against the Islamist, some better than others, but only up until the point where grievances are formed and modernization takes place.

¹⁹⁴ Carl L. Brown, *Religion and State: the Muslim Approach to Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 31.

¹⁹⁵ Abdel S. Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, *Islamic Fundamentalism* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 3.

¹⁹⁶ Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror In The Mind Of God*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 241.

¹⁹⁷ Johannes J.G. Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1997), 24.

Again this scan of terrorism is overly simplistic, but terrorism, especially under the Islamic Fundamentalist terrorist wing, will never truly be eradicated. The fact is, there will always be a time and a place, in the constantly modernizing world, where and when a weak minority group will feel they must resort to terrorism or a terrorist act in order to be heard and create change. For Islamic fundamentalism, the answer may not lie within the boundaries of the causes and conditions of terrorism, or even within the elements of globalization, but may lie within the boundaries of the Islamic faith itself. As Marari pointed, out most terrorist groups tend to act within the boundaries of their constituency's approval.¹⁹⁸ So, if the terrorism is contained within constituency, it is the constituency that must be manipulated to not approve the use of terrorism. This is a great topic of discussion which is currently being research by scholars today.

D. UNDERSTANDING THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

The farther backward you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.

Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill

Is it possible that by holding onto history, sometimes centuries old, and using that history to make decision on future endeavors could prevent Arab Middle Easterners from making forward progress and truly embracing the globalized world? Many scholars believe that one of the keys to unlocking peace and fostering prosperity in the Middle East is through settling the Arab and Israeli conflict. In general and in a globalized and more modern world there seems to be less and less room and less and less tolerance for ethno-discrimination. Therefore settlement of this issue is inevitable and unavoidable. For many Middle Easterners, understanding and holding onto the history of their people and land is part of their cultural upbringing and key to their lives and future. Although the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is just one of the many Arab issues, it is still ongoing and it tends to resonate with Arabs around the world. This section will attempt to disseminate the basis, or history, of this conflict in order to understand its current characteristics in

¹⁹⁸ Ariel Merari, "Psychological Aspects of Suicide Terrorism," in Bruce Bongar, Lisa M. Brown, Larry E. Beutler, James N. Breckenridge, and Phillip G. Zimbardo (eds.), *Psychology of Terrorism*, 110.

hopes of understanding how globalization can be used to address and possibly settle historical issues between cultures, thus promoting prosperity.

The Israeli and Palestinian conflict has been raging for almost a century, and although there have been periods of “peace” the conflict between these two factions continues to take lives on both sides, and is a global issue. This section will attempt to discern some of the historical grounds and sources of the Palestinian and Israeli conflict, specifically with respect to determining whether or not primordial characteristics were at hand during this conflict’s inception or whether primordialism came along at some other time. Furthermore, this paper will examine the Palestinian and Israeli conflict and search for examples of other types of cultural conflict theories, i.e., constructivism and instrumentalism, to see if they had a presence and affect at any time in the conflict.

The primary question this section will attempt to answer is whether or not cultural identity based on primordial elements, in this specific conflict, “ancient hatreds,” were the original triggers or catalyst which led to the Palestinian and Israeli conflict?¹⁹⁹ Furthermore, if primordialism was not the cause of the conflict, this section will attempt to bring to light tangible evidence of alternative triggers. Additionally, if primordialism was not the cause of the Palestinian and Israeli conflict, has it ever appeared or been associated with the conflict, and if so when did it first appear?

The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians has been raging since the early 1900’s, but to analyze this conflict effectively and determine whether or not primordialism actually caused this conflict, this paper will first step back and identify the origins of the main groups (Arabs and Jews) in the conflict, and determine whether or not there are subdivisions within those groups and if so, identify the dynamics. Moreover, this paper will attempt to determine whether or not there are any other influential societal groups that exist and determine whether or not they had any effect on the relations between Arabs and Jews.

¹⁹⁹ James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity.” *International Organization*, 54 (4) (Autumn 2000), 849.

Secondly, this section will also attempt to examine the historical outline of the conflict and identify the compelling periods of dispute. Once these periods are identified, this paper will observe the evidence and examples of cultural interaction and violence within each period in order to determine what conflict elements were present during that time. To do this I will search for the contours of the conflict, mainly underlying factors which have instigated the conflict, triggers for episodes of conflict, and the sites of contestation. Diagnosing this evidence should help to assess whether or not primordialism was or is present in the Palestinian and Israeli conflict and when it originated.

Of note, although this area is still being disputed, for the purpose of this section “Palestine” will be used to describe to disputed area up until the British mandate period of 1920, and the “State of Israel” after the British Mandate. For specific illustration and when needed, “Israel” will be used to delineate the Israeli occupied area, and Gaza Strip and/or West Bank to describe the Palestinian occupied territory.

1. Main Groups

Although there are several subdivisions within either side of the conflict, which I will briefly touch upon in the section below, due to the limited scope of this paper, I will keep the focus on the foremost division and controversy between the Jewish Israelis and the Arab Palestinians. With this caveat in mind, there may be times throughout the paper when a brief subdivision dialogue will be presented, such as discussing Hamas and Fatah opposition.

Currently within the State of Israel and Palestinian occupied territories there are several ethnic and religious divides. The two main groups in the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict are obviously the Israelis and the Palestinians, but within these two main groups and within the state itself there are subdivisions as well as Christians, Druze, Samaritans, and several other smaller groups. Problematic internal divides within the population such as Arab Israelis or Arab citizens of Israel and Jewish settlers who occupy Palestinian land, complicate this conflict even further. The current demographics of this area are depicted below:

Israel: Population–7,112,359 (*note:* includes about 187,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank, about 20,000 in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, and fewer than 177,000 in East Jerusalem (July 2008 est.)). Religion–Jewish 76.4%, Muslim 16%, Arab Christians 1.7%, other Christian 0.4%, Druze 1.6%, unspecified 3.9% (2004).²⁰⁰

West Bank: Population–2,407,681 (*note:* in addition, there are about 187,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank and fewer than 177,000 in East Jerusalem (July 2008 est.)). Religion–Muslim 75% (predominantly Sunni), Jewish 17%, Christian and other 8%).²⁰¹

Gaza Strip: Population–1,500,202 (July 2008 est.). Religion–Muslim (predominantly Sunni) 99.3%, Christian 0.7%).²⁰²

Given the length of time this conflict has been going on, there are Jews who are indigenous to the area (mainly Ashkenazi), and there are Jews who have migrated to the area (mostly Sephardim and Mizrahim). On the other hand, there are Arabs who are also indigenous and who have migrated to the area too. Furthermore, Hebrew and Arabic are the two official languages of the area. Moreover, Hebrew being the primary language is spoken by most Israelis, yet there is still a minority of Jewish population who immigrated from Arab countries and use Arabic as their primary language. Over the recent years and due mainly to the violent conflict and attempted negotiations, this area has been divided into fairly homogeneous zones, where Palestinians mainly occupy the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the Israelis occupy all other areas (to include some parts of the West Bank), there are pockets of heterogeneous living arrangements which stem from historical boundaries and claims.

²⁰⁰ CIA World Fact Book, “Israel,” <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/is.html>. (Accessed February 28, 2009).

²⁰¹ CIA World Fact Book, “West Bank,” <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html>. (Accessed February 28, 2009).

²⁰² CIA World Fact Book, “Gaza Strip,” <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gz.html>. (Accessed February 28, 2009).

For the Israelis and according to Zionist and Jewish historical beliefs, the now contested area, somewhere before ~1500 BCE, was known as Eretz Isreal, and was home to an ancient Jewish community.²⁰³ At that time native ethnic Jews, otherwise known as the Hebrews, had settled the land. Fast forward through several hundred years, several violent territorial conflicts, and the rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire, and Arabs populated the land, made up a majority of the population, and claimed the State of Palestine as their homeland. Jewish groups, although a minority, still populated portions of the land, and around the turn of the 19th century, Jewish Nationalism spawned a movement which encouraged and influenced an influx of Jews to return back to their historical homeland.

Currently, there is a subdivision within the Palestinian National Authority, which has been fractured by the elected organization Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Baring the split within Palestinian authority and some factions within the Israel population, the Palestinians and the Israelis are oppositional groups within the State of Israel. Numerous external groups and nations are engaged in and influence the relations between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

With this information in mind, we can start to build an argument for and against the primordial nature of this conflict. The two major groups in and of themselves are distinctly different in culture, tradition, and language, but what they share is common territory. The primordial nature of both these groups individually revolves around “shared blood,” ancestral relations, and kinships ties.²⁰⁴ But if we look back in history to some of the initial interaction within this area, there was little conflict, between the Israelis and the Palestinians, caused by the contrasting traditions. In fact, conflict between these two groups did not really erupt until transformations outside of their control began to change the landscape and demographics of the area.²⁰⁵

²⁰³ Margalit Shilo, “The Immigration Policy of the Zionist Institutions 1882–1914,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Jul., 1994), 597–617.

²⁰⁴ Walker Connor, “Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond,” Excerpt from *Ethno-Nationalism: The Quest for Understanding*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 71.

²⁰⁵ Clifford Geertz, *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*, (New York: The Free Press, 1963), 155.

2. Periods of Conflict

The period of conflict that this paper with cover spans from 1917 to the present day. But as Mr. Churchill stated, “the farther backward you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see,” and I believe this statement is very applicable in this case. This paper will be divided into four distinct periods, pre-twentieth century (pre-1900s), British Mandate (1920–1948), United Nations partition (1948–1999), and the present twenty-first century (2000–present). During this historical examination, we can begin to see how manipulation of the landscape, war, conquest, colonization, and immigration changed the demographics of the area. As major events shifted control of this area, each new governing force enacted its own changes; in this situation the territory changed hands several times. The indigenous Jewish population was expelled from the land of which it had significant historical and religious ties to, and as Monica Toft explains there is an importance to how groups are tied to certain pieces of territory.²⁰⁶

a. *Pre-20th Century*

The build up to the current problems in the Levant stem from a history of conflict and change which actually dates back several thousands of years. Much of the historical works which describe this area revolve around religious and territorial aspects. In a sense, what was created in many societies during this time, as Benedict Anderson explained, were “cultural artifacts” around which groups formed particular ideologies and cultural systems.²⁰⁷ Ancient indigenous Jews, formed religious communities, spoke a sacred language, and eventually became guardians of their “holy land.”²⁰⁸ The current State of Israel has linkages back to the ancient Kingdom of Judah, other wise known as the Land of Israel or *Eretz Yisrael*, the Holy Land, Land of Canaan, Palestine, and many others.²⁰⁹ Additionally, the State of Israel has Jewish historical discourse and tradition

²⁰⁶ Monica D. Toft, “Indivisible Territory and Ethnic War,” chapter two in *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests and the Indivisibility of Territory*, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003), 43.

²⁰⁷ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (New York: Verso, 1983), 12.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 13.

²⁰⁹ *Bible*, Number 34, Versus 1–12.

which reference the area and its relevance to the birth place of Abraham's Father.²¹⁰ With this evidence we begin to see less primordial attributes and more of a constructed identity based around symbolism and history.

Palestine and the surrounding land had gone through numerous changes and conflicts stemming from Egyptian rule (~1500 BCE), Persian (~500 BCE), Greek (~300 BCE), to Roman rule (~63 BCE–630 CE), each leaving its mark on the society at hand. Of note, the period of Roman rule was particularly important, because of the brutality which took place within the Jewish communities in the area. Jews that stayed became part of and assimilated to the Roman civilization, while others were exiled or scattered and absorbed by the surrounding and more accepting societies. There is no doubt that the Roman conquest of this area and the resultant ethnic conflict between the Romans and Jews had primordial aspects mainly due to the extreme and immutable differences in religion. As a result the Jewish community was disfigured by force and violence.

Finally, the Arab Muslims came to rule the area of the Palestine, which fell under the Caliphate, in 634 CE. Initially, the Qur'an references the "Holy Land" as the land which is to be inhabited by Moses' people, better known as the Jews.²¹¹ Later on, the Qur'an makes references to the Holy Land and in short proclaims that God or Allah banded Moses' people from the Holy Land and that Muslims would "inherit the land."²¹² We can begin to see the establishment of conflict arise as early as 632 CE when the Qur'an was fully revealed to the divine Prophet Mohammed, and this became even more problematic once the Qur'an, Torah, and Bible went into printed form. This is extremely significant with regards to the longevity and passion of Palestinian and Israeli conflict, because at this point historical religious references in both groups now lay claim to the same land, which was fostered by the word of a divine power, and the same divine power to be exact.

²¹⁰ *Bible*, Genesis, 15, Versus 18.

²¹¹ *Qur'an*, Chapter 5, Section 4, Verses 20–21.

²¹² *Qur'an*, Chapter 5, Section 4, verses 26 and Chapter 20, Section 7, verse 105.

Jews and Christians were allowed to live, do business, and practice their religions under the Arab Caliphate. Jews who had been previously banished from the lands of the Israeli state were allowed to return. During this time, cities like Jerusalem experienced extensive immigration and an influx of mainly Arab and Jewish people from all across the region. Much of this peaceful interaction between these two groups during the Arab rule was due to the familiarity which was felt between the Muslims, who had similar religious monotheistic roots, and the Jews or “People of the Book” as they were come to be known. There is little evidence to prove why the Arabs and Jews were able to live peacefully during this time period, other than their shared monotheistic roots, which is evidence to the fact that primordial conflict was not a factor early on in their interaction. The strict numeric dominance of the Arab population did not seem to prove to be a significant case of conflict at that time. As Paul Collier pointed out, conflict in situations like these is usually limited because groups like the Jews, during that time, had no real motivation or grievances with the more dominant Arab society at this point.²¹³ Collier goes on further to explain that with ethnic dominance as a factor, societies which are ethnic and religiously diverse tend to be less confrontational.²¹⁴ Again in this case, if we look to the religious practices of either group, Arabs tolerated Jewish religious practices as was dictated in the Qur’an, and the Jewish population therefore had little if any organized grievances especially as compared to the likes of their previous Roman occupiers.

Following mainly Arab occupation, along with sparse Jewish settlements, Palestine saw more foreign conflict and war over the next century and a half. The ownership and occupation of the area was in constant fluctuation until finally ending up in the hand of the Ottomans from 1516 until 1917, although there were brief periods of French (1799) and Egyptian (1831–1841) occupation during that time.²¹⁵ The Ottomans

²¹³ Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy,” in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, (Washington, DC, USIP Press, 2001), 145.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 149.

²¹⁵ Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 265.

began to organize their territory and define borders, although Palestine, as it was called back then, still did not have clearly defined borders and no real defined area.

This period of Ottoman Rule is significant, because it continued to set the stage for the eventual conflict between the Arab Palestinians and the Jewish population. What we have seen over the past thousand years or so, is the way Palestine's society was constructed and changed over time to reflect a new balance of ethnically diverse groups. Under the Ottoman Empire, both Arab and Jewish populations were now dominated by an external force, greater than either individual group. Over the years of domination by the Ottomans, neither group was expelled which resulted in both groups becoming more entrenched and settled. Again, little if any conflict between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine was present during this time. Ottoman control over the new rising political institutions and instruments of the 18th and early 19th century limited the struggles for economic and political power by both groups.²¹⁶ What would happen after Ottoman occupation disappeared? How would the Arab Palestinians and Jewish populations view the land? How would new imperialistic forces be viewed, and how would they treat the indigenous Arabs and Jews? Both groups now had historical roots (Jews more than the Arabs), and established communities (Arabs more than the Jews) co-located in the same areas. What would be the dominating factor(s) which would drive these two groups to conflict?

b. British Directive Period (1920–1948)

Until the 20th century relations between the Jewish people and the Arabs had been rather peaceful and passive, but as we will see in this period, manipulation and external institutions play a major role in changing the dynamics of societies within the Levant area. As Jillian Schwedler stated, relationships between groups are really just the “product of historical processes and experiences through which individuals and groups come to see themselves, their place in the world, and their relationship with those around

²¹⁶ Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 249–256.

them.”²¹⁷ Although a constructed foundation was built from continuous external warring and area dominance, Jewish emigration, and Arab immigration, the basis for the Palestinian and Israeli conflict formed several thousand years ago, and the catalyst which sparked the ethnic conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians was only introduced around the end of World War I.

The Skyes-Picot Agreement of 1916, which stated that much of the Levant area would become a neutral international zone after the war, was one of the initiating catalytic processes.²¹⁸ The Skyes-Picot Agreement in itself did not initially change the outlook of the groups in the Levant, but promoted the idea that the territory, after the war, could potentially be influenced and manipulated by the Allied “winners” of WWI.²¹⁹ This was one of the first attempts at social manipulation in this area, based on international policies and enforced by external social forces. This type of social manipulation was not necessarily the same level of elite social construction, in Fearon and Laitin’s view, where the point is to manipulate or create sides in order to produce opposing factions.²²⁰ In this case, the consequences of unintended British social manipulation, although arguable, still promoted their own gains and helped them to reach their own ends, and the resulting division it caused, was just as intrusive and precarious as intended social manipulation.

Following the Skyes-Picot Agreement were secret talks and bargaining between the British and Jewish nationalist organizers. The classified Balfour Declaration of 1917 basically stated that in exchange for Jewish support (mainly financial) and upon the surrender of the Ottoman Empire, the British government would assist in establishing a Jewish state in the region known as Palestine.²²¹ Although the goal of the Balfour Declaration was to eventually establish a Jewish national home, it was not meant to

²¹⁷ Jillian Schwedler, “Islamic Identity: Myth, Menace, or Mobilizer?” *SAIS Review* vol. XXI, no. 2 (Summer—Fall 2001), 5.

²¹⁸ Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 318.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²²⁰ See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity.” *International Organization*, 54 (4) (Autumn 2000), 845–877.

²²¹ Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 318.

disrupt the indigenous Arab inhabitants of the area. Although this is not in itself evidence of social manipulation per se, it adds further fuel to the eventual and long range conflict between the Jewish and Palestinian population. Capital and support was received by the British from interested Jewish institutions during the war, further establishing a moral obligation by the British to eventually make good on their promise.²²² Again, this is evidence that negligible maliciousness on either the British or the Jewish side was present during this time, but pressure to follow through on deals made would result in unintentional negligence, which would eventually help to spark conflict.

The Ottomans did eventually surrender in 1918, yet the Skyes-Picot Agreement was disregarded, and the territory of the Levant was divided up primarily between the French and British, and placed under their direct European control. Britain ended up controlling the area of Palestine and declared the official languages of the area to be English, Arabic, and Hebrew. Although exact boundaries for Palestine had not been settled among the victors of the war, pressure began to arise among the areas small indigenous Jewish population and numerous international Jewish supporters, who had been promise a piece of the post war Levant pie. Settlement of the borders came about five years later, in 1923.

Over the years leading up to the World War II, the disputed British mandate over Palestine and the now open British promise to subdivide Palestine into an Arab and Jewish state became a hot topic among the members of the League of Nations and many Arabs Leaders as well, and with no true resolution. During this time the British not only allowed Jewish immigration into Palestine, but encouraged it as well.²²³ Furthermore, the British fostered land ownership within Palestine. Britain's policy of large-scale Jewish immigration and land purchase sparked discontent, civil disorder, and finally revolt by indigenous and discontent Arab majority population. Similarly, surrounding Arabs nations began to support the distressed Palestinians.

²²² Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 321.

²²³ Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 323.

Over the next 20 years, despite Arab resentment, the Jewish population continued to grow within Palestine under British authorization, political tensions among the Jews and Arabs began to build, and ideas of a Jewish statehood began to actually take hold. Ethnic divisions between the Jews and Arabs became apparent in the several areas, such as education, business, and public roles within the society. With support from the governing British and external Jewish organizations, it was clear these two societies were beginning to diverge in very different directions. Because of the diverging paths, Arab and Jewish nationalism became salient. As with any change in social structure of a society fear of one party can be sparked by the collapse or perception of collapse of one's own society.²²⁴ Arabs within Palestine began to see the Jews as a threat to their society and Jews could see a glimpse of a possible opportunity for self rule.²²⁵ Is it possible that resentment and eventually hatred of the Jewish population, as Roger Petersen predicts happens once an ethnic threat has been identified, would soon follow and become the basis for conflict?²²⁶ Furthermore, if hatred did result from this conflict was it of the primordial or "Ancient Hatred" kind, or more of a created (constructed) and divisive (instrumental) sort, manipulated to generate nationalism and eventually make violent attacks permissive?

After the Second World War finished, bilateral discussions between the Arab and Jewish populations came to no consensus and no policy suggestions were approved by either the Jew or the Arab parties. A war weakened Britain, who planned to withdraw from Palestine and saw the need for reconciliation between the Israelis and the Palestinians prior to their departure, led the fruitless discussions. It is at this point in the conflict that we begin to see the early stages of attempted conflict intervention and negotiations, but problems arise during this period because the external mediator (Britain) seemed unable to address the area problems or offer agreeable solution. As Timothy Sisk argued, managing complex negotiation involves "trained mediators" who can provide

²²⁴ Roger Peterson, *Understanding Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Hatred and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe*, (New York: Cambridge, University Press, 2002), 25.

²²⁵ Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 331.

²²⁶ Roger Peterson, *Understanding Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Hatred and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe*, (New York: Cambridge, University Press, 2002), 25.

timely solutions and “credible commitments,” neither of which Britain could offer at that time, because a majority of its attention was spent on recovering from the war.²²⁷

In 1947, Britain, obviously inadequate and ill-equipped, turned the Jewish and Arab issue over to a United Nations (UN) special committee which studied the problem and created a plan of partition, which arguable favored the Jews over the Arabs.²²⁸ Although the General Assembly voted to accept the committee’s proposal, Arab UN members as well as Palestinian Arabs opposed it, and the Arab world as a whole was enraged.

c. United Nations partition (1948–2000)

The Palestinian and Israeli conflict really begins to spillover during this time. The third period, from 1948 to 2000, marks a period of colonial transition, war, and a major shift in power and control of Palestine state to a newly formed State of Israel. On 14 May 1948, the British finally withdrew from Palestine believing that their withdrawal would initiate peace between the two factions. Instead, the withdrawal created a large power vacuum leftover from years of colonial oversight and security. In effect, the British withdrawal led to increased violence between the Arabs and the Jews, and finally led to civil unrest in the same year. Again there is little proof of primordialism during this time, and the fact is that the disgruntlement was due to the constructed nature of the partition, which in the Arab minds was unfair, and hence created an obvious territorial grievance. Toft’s point of the importance and view of territory to opposing factions is one of the most important insight to a conflict, but maybe even more so in this specific case.²²⁹ To the Arabs this land was theirs, and they now had significant historical and religious ties, which only added to more fuel to the fire. For the Jews, they too had

²²⁷ Timothy D. Sisk, “Peacemaking in Civil Wars: Obstacles, Options and Opportunities,” in *Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts: Perspectives on Successes and Failures in Europe, Africa and Asia*, ed. Ulrich Schneckener and Stefan Wolff. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 267.

²²⁸ Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 359.

²²⁹ Monica D. Toft, “Indivisible Territory and Ethnic War,” chapter two in *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests and the Indivisibility of Territory*, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003), 3.

historical ties and now international approval (non-Arab states). Here we begin to see the influence of external spoilers such as the United States for Israel and Jordan, Iran, Egypt, and Lebanon for the Palestinians.

After the initial Palestinian revolt, the more organized, better trained, and newly formed Israeli army quickly defeated the less organized Palestinians, and following their victory the Jewish community declared Israel an independent state. Nations such as the United States, Britain, and Russia quickly recognized this declaration, but Arab countries such as Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan were again outraged and moved armed forces into Arab areas of the contested territory. The Arab-Israeli War ensued until a 1949 armistice, supervised by the UN, was created between the surrounding Arab states and the Israeli Army. During the war, a majority Arabs had left their homes and fled to Arab control areas of the country, and following the defeat were now consisted refugees. New stable frontiers and boundaries were formed, officiated under the UN, but to add insult to injury, the Arab defeat, also caused the Israelis to increase and occupied an even greater amount of land. Momentum to continue fighting was lost, especially by the Palestinians and Arab allies.

In the years following the Arab defeat (1950s and 1960s), a rise in Arab Nationalism began to mount in the Middle East, led by Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser, who was also very popular among Palestinians. Pan-Arab nationalism peaked 1967 when Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and other Arab nations again engaged the Israeli Army in a war over the Israeli/Palestinian lands.

The third period of the Palestinian and Israeli conflict (1967 to 1993) began with the defeat of the Arab forces by the Israelis in the Six Day War. This defeat not only led to Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Gaza Strip and West Bank territory, it also led to Israeli control of additional Arab territory identified as the Sinai Peninsula, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.

Although Arab Nationalism as a whole faded into history, remnants of the movement still remained within Palestine and began to form and rally around Palestinian nationalism. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) officially gained the right to

represent the Arabs of Palestine in 1974. The years that followed the formation of the PLO were plagued with continuous violence within Palestinian and Israeli territory. The First Intifada (1987–1993) was initiated by the Palestinian in an effort to rise against the 1967 Israeli occupation. During the First Intifada the PLO claimed a State of Palestine status, although no state was official recognized by the UN. Regardless, the claim aided in rallying Arabs and once again created a national Palestinian identity.

In 1993, the signing of the Oslo Accords by the Arab Palestinians and the Israelis and led by the United States put and end to the First Intifada. The Oslo Accords set the framework from which the two factions would eventual agree upon an administration and territorial control turnover over of Palestine which would officially consist of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. As Timothy Sisk explains, one of the desirable peace making options is to conduct the peace process in secret in order to quickly negotiate peace, with little outside distraction.²³⁰ Although this option can be effective as Sisk writes, it is usually more desirable for more transparent talks in cases where long term and sustainable peace is desired.²³¹ Much of the Oslo Accords process took place in secret and behind closed doors, and which was deemed to be one of the reasons why it had initial success.²³² The process itself was set to take approximately three years with final settlement terms completed by the middle of 1996.²³³ Possibly, distrust and loss of credibility between the representatives and leadership (at the time, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasser Arafat) of both sides and their constituents led to constant break downs in the process and significantly delayed any further reconciliation. In 2000, the failure of the Oslo Accords and hence the failure to create a truly independent Palestinian State, led to a second, more violent, intifada.²³⁴

²³⁰ Timothy D. Sisk, "Peacemaking in Civil Wars: Obstacles, Options and Opportunities," in *Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts: Perspectives on Successes and Failures in Europe, Africa and Asia*, ed. Ulrich Schneckener and Stefan Wolff. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 261.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Middle East*, (New York: Routledge 2003), 90.

²³⁴ Ibid., 233.

Some critics of Yasser Arafat argue that he had more to gain (financially) from keeping the conflict going.²³⁵ If this is believed or proven to be true then it would point to definite elite manipulation and personal agendas. Again, the initial spark for the conflict was obviously not started by him, but it can be said that he help to continue it and almost promote it. What this illustrates is that although the conflict began under different circumstances, significant individuals, groups, and events, both internal and external to the conflict can has severe impacts to the initial cause of conflict as well as the fuel to keep it going.

d. The Twenty-First Century and the Second Intifada (2000–Present)

After all the attempted peace initiatives, the Cave of Patriarchs massacre, failed negotiations on both sides, the Israeli establishment of check-points, constant violence, Palestinian economic deterioration and suicide attacks, and finally failed intervention by external social forces, the Palestinian and Israel conflict has continued “bleed” over into the 21st century. There are two positions. From the Israeli side the reason for failure was due to the Palestinian’s impatience with the peaces process, and from the Palestinian point of view the process failed because the Israelis had dragged their feet and had no true intention handing over complete military and political control of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Although much of the background and fuel, which sparked the failure of the Oslo peace process, took place just over the past fifty years; the Palestinian Second Intifada has encompassed spoiler influences (mainly from Arab states like Iran, and Western states like the United States), ancestral issues and claims, religious and historical references, and dating back thousands of years. This is more evidence that this period of the conflict encompasses not only constructivism, but primordial elements as well.

More important than the historical references and spoilers was the Israeli decision to pull completely out of the Palestinian territories (Gaza Strip and the West Bank) in 2006. As Svante Cornell pointed out, this could have been a huge and

²³⁵ See *Arafat, From Defender to Dictator*, by Aburish Said K.

detrimental mistake, given the negative impacts of “ethicizing territory.”²³⁶ The result of Palestine’s autonomy is evidence to Cornell’s and Nancy Bermeo’s point, the homogeneity can be even more dangerous than heterogeneity, or in this case Israeli occupation.²³⁷ The point being that, although both sides supposedly wanted a peaceful resolution, the consequential outcome of Palestinian autonomy was exactly opposite of what either party wanted, and in fact it spurred more hate and discontent among the Palestinians toward the Israelis and initiated internal fighting among Palestinians (mainly between Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Fatah in the West Bank and which continues today). The question then remains, if a two state solution or federalism is not the answer than what is?

As it stands today, there are several outstanding central topics that have been created just over the past fifty years, which stem from boarder disputes, to the occupation and ownership of the city of Jerusalem, security within both territories, to issues of Palestinian refugees, and finally resource allocation (especially water). Some of the controversy still rallies around, religious and biblical references, but more so around the recently created mistrust and hatred cause by Palestinian terrorism and disproportionate Israeli military reactions.

3. Summary

This section attempted to bring to light some of the initial causes and enablers of the Palestinian and Israeli conflict, and discover whether or not primordial characteristics were present at the time of the conflict’s inception, whether primordialism came along at a later time, or whether primordialism has ever present during the conflict. This paper also examined the Palestinian and Israeli conflict to see if the other ethnic conflict theories, those of constructivism or instrumentalism, have been present at any time in the conflict.

²³⁶ Svante Cornell, “Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective,” *World Politics* 54 (January 2002), 276.

²³⁷ Nancy Bermeo, “The Import of Institutions,” *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2) (April 2002), 96, and Svante Cornell, “Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective,” *World Politics* 54 (January 2002), 276.

This section's findings seem to further support the case that primordialism had little to do with the initial conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, and points to constructivism as the original caused of conflict between the Arabs and Jews. This can be attributed mainly to the fact that prior to the post World War I British mandate in the early 1900s, little violence existed between the indigenous Arab and Jewish Palestinian inhabitants. In fact, prior to the 20th century and as historical evidence has revealed, after numerous foreign battles, wars, and domination exhibited by several external forces over the now disputed area, the relationship between the Arabs and Jews of Palestine was rather reasonable.

Paradoxically, two distinctly different cultures formed historical and religious ties to the land. Although the Jewish population claims to have inhabited the area of Israel first, which has been verified to be true by both cultures and within each group's ancient religious text (the Bible for the Jews and the Qur'an for the Arabs), Arab culture and text (Qur'an) claimed that Allah or God banished the Jews from the land, which happened during the Roman occupation, and that Arabs would inherit the land, which happened during the Arab Caliphate. If one believes that both of these documents (Bible and Qur'an) were conceived by man, which they were, and passed on through both story telling and oral history, then it can be argued that it was early constructivism which actually aided in manipulating those societies and creating the historical and divine bond of those people to this disputed land.

Given the failure of the British to settle the disputed between the Arabs and Jews and the religious and historical ties that both of these factions claimed, the eventual United Nations (UN) partition was the final straw which broke the Arab back and created enough pressure to initiate violent conflict. Here again we see the infusion of a social institution's (UN) interference and resultant outcome of intensified ethnic conflict and violence. Although the UN's intentions were to establish peace, the result was quite the opposite. Again, even the UN's arguably sincere but unsuccessful attempts at establishing peace, screamed of constructivism. It is also open to question, yet not easily proven, that external spoilers and nations, on either side of the conflict, had individual agendas which only added to the constructed nature of this conflict.

Although constructivism can be easily seen in the early stages leading up to as well as throughout the conflict, instrumentalism is less obvious and more difficult to prove given the secrecy of some events and undisclosed evidence to the fact. With that in mind it can be only argued that instrumentalism within Palestinian and Israeli conflict really only began once strong leaders and influential political parties formed around each faction. One of the specific claims of theories is that Yasser Arafat was receiving monetary funds, which he used for personal gain during the conflict, and that it was in his personal interest to keep the fractions in conflict and never come to a consensus. Whether he continuously sponsored terrorism in Israeli territory or purposely failed negotiations with Israelis is still debatable, much of the evidence (his enormous bank accounts and perceived terrorist ties) points to what could be called or seen as elite manipulation or instrumentalism, although this point is very weak.

What is strongly supported is the fact that primordialism does not truly rear its unruly head until after the failure of the Oslo accords in 2000 and even more so after the eventual autonomy given to the Palestinian with the implementation of the Israeli disengagement plan of 2005. This primordialism was evident throughout the First Intifada, but really took hold through the Second Intifada and mainly during the establishment of Islamist groups like Hamas, who began rallying around the guise of Islamic fundamentals and the extensive and overwhelming Arab Muslim ancestry. Groups like Hamas tend to use ethnic and ethnic identities as well as perceived ancient hatreds as rallying points to gather support for their cause. What is evident today is that the Palestinian and Israeli conflict tends to be a thorn in the side of many Middle Eastern Arab Muslims today, who without knowing all the facts and history about the conflict automatically and overwhelmingly side with their Arab Palestinian “brothers,” in a “natural” kinship manner.

What this section has illustrated is that the ongoing Palestinian and Israeli conflict cannot be assigned to one specific conflict theory alone. In fact, complex conflicts of this nature and like the one between Palestinians and Israelis can begin and display elements of one theory or another, and as time progresses, shift and show signs of a different theory altogether. What is important in dissecting the Palestinian and Israeli conflict is

looking back deep into the history of both ethnic groups, and examining the foundation from which the conflict was built. Furthermore it explains the significance of Sir Winston Churchill quote, "*The farther backward you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see,*" basically that if we are able to understand our history and learn from it, therefore not allowing it to hinder our forward progress, maybe the acceptance of a constantly changing world will aid in the grasping progressive opportunities of a new and globalized world.

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VI. CONCLUSION

This thesis has examined the shape of globalization in the Arab Islamic Middle East, specifically with respect to three major elements of globalization, those of politics, economics, and culture. This thesis attempted to shed light on the importance and difficulties of fostering positive conditions, which could facilitate favorable terms for Islamic Arabs in the Middle East to fully embrace current globalization, thus increasing the region's prosperity and stability, and eventual having positive implementations on the world as a whole. Moreover, this thesis challenged and analyzed the compatibility of Islamic Arabs in the Middle East with current globalization trends. Although the topic of globalization is a fairly large and a constantly evolving subject to cover, the scope of this research was narrowed down to address the issue of acceptance of the elements of democracy, capitalism and cultural shifts by the Arab Islamic Middle East, and specifically the secular authoritarian regimes and the opposing Islamists within those social structures. With this in mind, this thesis emphasized and brought to light several obstacles which stand in the way of such progress and decrease the prosperity and stability within the Middle East region.

The topic embracing globalization in the Middle East originated from the observed issues in which the world community, in general, has encountered due to the regional stagnation of the region, which has been attributed to the increased political, economic, and cultural turmoil created partly by the Middle Eastern authoritarian leaders, western powers, and fanatic Islamic religious organizations. The objective of this thesis was to highlight the affects of current globalization on the Arab Islamic Middle East and bring to light ideas and solutions which could potentially help to marginalize or moderate the turmoil within the region, leaving more time, energy, and resources for the enrichment of the region and population at large, and potentially the world as a whole.

This thesis has attempted to look at the Middle Eastern crisis through a political, economical, and cultural lens, and postulate how Islamic Arabs could eventual and fully accept the influence of current globalization into the societies and states in which they live. What this thesis concluded was that globalization can be obtained successfully in

the Middle East and that the affects of positive economic growth, political autonomy, and cultural modernity can light the way for a better quality of life for Islamic Arab populations. What was also concluded was that the reality and acceptance of globalizations is theoretically easier said than done, and that in order to pursue a path to a better life quality life, secular authoritarian regimes must adjust their political structures, Islamists must moderate their political agendas, and culture shifts within the populous must take place.

Undoubtedly, Middle Eastern globalization is not just about the Middle Eastern states and their leadership, and there is another variable in this equation. This thesis concluded that those states which encourage, foster, and promote current globalization trends and its elements around the world, have a responsibility too. The problem is that globalization will not be accepted at face value nor will it be accepted voluntarily, and by no means should it be forced upon the Middle East. Furthermore, forcing globalization onto societies that are neither prepared for nor educated on the political, economic, and cultural changes will not only be counter productive to the globalization process, but will make it difficult and perhaps impossible to build the necessary groundwork upon which Middle Eastern productivity and prosperity should be built upon. Therefore, it has been concluded that the responsibility of those states encouraging globalization, in this case mainly western powers, to learn about and truly study those Middle Eastern societies which have not embraced globalization. Those powers must accurately understand the history, personality, and culture of those societies, and create relationships which will aid in the coordination of tailored societal globalization learning. Additionally, and more importantly, Arab Islamic Middle Eastern societies must be made aware and see the benefits of fostering current globalization. Lastly, a society which is educated on, passionate about, and truly comprehends globalization can use the benefits of globalization to its advantage and can prosper.

This thesis was not an all inclusive study of every factor of Islamic politics, economics, culture, or religious factors which affect a specific country's economy. The objective of this thesis was to bring to light the effects Islamists, authoritarian regime leadership, and external powers and demonstrate those effects affect the prosperity and

lives of the Arab Islamic Middle Eastern people, by creating shifts in motivation, work behaviors, as well as many other facets of the population. Conversely, there are some Middle Eastern countries, or outliers, which have done well when compared to the world market, e.g., Saudi Arabia; even in light of their less than pretentious support of cultural or religious globalization. This thesis determined that these outliers can be explained through understanding the long and short term effects of historical shaping events such as colonization, and decolonization, wars, and most of all the resource of “oil.” Furthermore, we must recognize that these outliers also maintain a large gap between the “Have and Have Not,” and as Albert Hourani recognized, the gap between the rich and the poor in the Middle East has continued to grow in relation to the increasing profits from oil.²³⁸ Kahn and Weiner wrote that “*nearly half of the people in the world still live on less than \$2 a day and a fifth survive on \$1 or less... the Middle East and Central Asia are poorer than at the cold war's close, despite the fast economic integration of the 1990's.*”²³⁹ The fact is that current statistics are truly not that different in the Middle East of the 2000s.

Finally, in the last chapter, this thesis concluded that technology, cultural understanding, and historical perspective, are major factors in how globalization is received by the societies of the Arab Islamic Middle East. For the preponderance of the Arab countries with Muslim majorities, there seems to be a lag in their ability to break out from under a so called Arab or Islamic affect. The question here is not whether Arab culture or Islamic religion is good or bad for individuals directly, but for example whether or not some of the Islamic religious traditions, financial laws, practices, and media or information restraints, are good for a country’s development and promotion of the positive influences of globalization. This thesis is by no means stating that Arab Islamic countries should not practice Islamic or religious traditions or maintain Islamic economic systems or maintain authority over information trafficking, rather it is suggesting that it is possible for Islamic traditions to positively or negatively affect the

²³⁸ Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 436.

²³⁹ Joseph Kahn and Tim Weiner, “World Leaders Rethinking Strategy an Aid to Poor,” *The New York Times* (March, 18 2002): sec. A (1), 1.

overall economic wellbeing of countries which tend to be predominantly Muslim. Most would argue that the practice and enforcement of Islam and all of its traditions have positive attributes which can improve the wellbeing of the society in which it has been practiced. On the other hand, some studies have attempted to prove that countries with strong religious beliefs, although secular in nature, do very well in the international economic market (Japan, South Korea, and Singapore).²⁴⁰ Other studies have attempted to show that the religiosity of a country actually has a profoundly negative impact on overall economic development.²⁴¹

When we look at the Arab Islamic Middle East and break it down into political, economic, and cultural elements it can be demonstrated that globalization can end up having a significant effect on the prosperity of this region. Although, religion and specify Islam and authoritarian regimes are not individually the sole hinders of globalization in the Middle East, when combined they can and do tend to obstruct and form barriers to this potentially prosperous phenomenon. The answer then, is for those countries which foster globalization, to help educate and encourage this current round of globalization in those countries of the Arab Islamic Middle East.

²⁴⁰ Daniel Gross, s.v. “*Thou Shalt Not Increase G.D.P.*,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/03/business/yourmoney/03view.html> (Accessed March 4, 2008).

²⁴¹ Robert J Barro and Rachel M. McCleary, “Religion and Political Economy in an International Panel,” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, (2006): 45(2), 149–175.

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